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Preface

The topic of Catholic institutional identity in higher education is a fascinating
one, and can be approached from numerous angles, drawing insights from various
disciplines. This dissertation represents a contribution from theology, and will necessarily
cover a great deal of ground as it argues for an intentional retrieval of the virtue of
hospitality and application to the Catholic intellectual life broadly but also Catholic
higher education in particular.
Chapter One will set the stage for what follows by examining the challenge of
Catholic institutional identity in light of developments of the past half century within the
life of the Church, with particular attention given to the buildup to, content of, and impact
following the promulgation of Pope John Paul II’s Ex Corde Ecclesiae in 1990. The
chapter will also note instances when hospitality has been given as a justification for a
number of decisions, sometimes controversial, on Catholic campuses.
Chapter Two will follow with an investigation of hospitality as a virtue. The
Scriptural testimony and early Christian witness to the practice of hospitality will be
explored. Efforts in the past four decades to retrieve hospitality will also be surveyed
with the hope of constructing some notion of what Catholic hospitality might entail in the
intellectual life. Additionally, the relationship of hospitality and friendship will be
examined with the intention of further clarifying the nature of hospitality, but also in an
effort to prepare for at least one of the three practitioners of Catholic intellectual
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hospitality to be covered later in the dissertation, who uses friendship as a term for how
he understood his practice of hospitality.
That thinker, Thomas Merton, is the subject of Chapter Three, which studies the
apostolate of friendship which Merton pursued in the final decade of his life. The chapter
will seek to understand exactly how Merton’s commitment to Catholicism impacted that
apostolate.
Chapter Four suggests there is a kind of hospitality latent within the Catholic
tradition’s tendency to seek a synthesis of knowledge, even if that hospitality did not
always surface clearly in practice. The place of the neo-Scholastic synthesis in Catholic
higher education in the early to mid-20th century will be described before the chapter
moves toward its primary focus, the intellectual hospitality of Bernard Lonergan. In
particular, the chapter will look to Lonergan’s work on human cognition to find a basis
for a new path toward greater hospitality among the disciplines.
Chapter Five will explore the work of the third and final practitioner of Catholic
intellectual hospitality, John S. Dunne. Dunne’s unique method of theological reflection,
which he called passing over, will be shown to be a clear demonstration of precisely the
kind of hospitality that this dissertation contends can move the discussion on Catholic
identity forward.
Chapter Six concludes the dissertation with a series of recommendations,
predominantly modest in nature, for Catholic universities seeking to cultivate hospitality
on campus. The intention is not so much to advocate a brand new approach to Catholic
higher education so much as to invite institutions, and even the individuals who work
v

within them, to consider how the things they are already doing might be reflections of the
hospitality which is, rightly understood, a virtue.
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ABSTRACT
Catholic Intellectual Hospitality: An Application to Catholic Higher Education
by Paul Schweigl, directed by Br. Michael J. McGinniss, FSC

Catholic higher education has been the focus of discussion concerning
institutional identity in the face of contemporary challenges. This discussion has been
especially vibrant since the promulgation of Ex Corde Ecclesiae in 1990. Faculty hiring
and invitations to guest speakers have been perceived as challenges to identity, despite a
growing awareness that Catholic universities are called to practice a distinctive welcome
to people of various backgrounds and worldviews. This dissertation will contend that
hospitality is crucial to the successful orientation of a Catholic university, as well as to
the integrity of the Catholic intellectual life.
The nature of Catholic intellectual hospitality will be examined from biblical and
historical (Chapter 2) perspectives. To practice hospitality requires openness to the other,
but it also requires a home. The difficulties associated with practicing hospitality directly
parallel the ongoing debates regarding the legitimate role of Catholic higher education
and the Catholic intellectual life. Namely, Catholic individuals and communities seeking
to practice hospitality have always struggled to strike a balance between remaining rooted
in the Catholic tradition while being open to the needs of the other.
The modern perspectives on intellectual hospitality will primarily come from
three highly-regarded writers who exemplify that virtue, Thomas Merton, Bernard
Lonergan, and John S. Dunne. All three of these thinkers were able to remain faithful to
their Catholic grounding while engaging persons from outside Catholicism. Merton’s
vii

apostolate of friendship (Chapter 3), Lonergan’s theory of cognition (Chapter 4), and
Dunne’s method of passing over (Chapter 5) will each be examined and surveyed for
insights into the nature of intellectual hospitality that might be applicable to Catholic
higher education. The dissertation will conclude with recommendations for how
institutions might cultivate hospitality in the campus community. These
recommendations will be modest in that they will align closely with regular university
practices, but could prove effective strategies in helping a Catholic university remain
grounded in its Catholic identity while also pursuing the critical engagement with all
ideas that is proper to a university
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Chapter 1: Catholic Higher Education and a Place for Hospitality

Introduction
This chapter seeks to explore the reasons behind the current need for greater
understanding of, and emphasis on, hospitality in the Catholic intellectual life. While
such an endeavor could likely treat with the vocation of the Catholic intellectual in
general, the focus here will instead be on trajectories in Catholic higher education. While
there certainly are many Catholic scholars doing fine work in non-Catholic institutions
(or even outside an institution altogether), an assumption of this chapter will be that
Catholic universities are especially responsible for the stewardship of Catholic
intellectual life. As the role of the Catholic university vis-à-vis the Church has evolved or
the past half a century, what the Church requires of Catholic intellectuals has similarly
developed and perhaps even expanded. Though Catholic scholars today are, much like
their forebears, engaged in the work of teaching, researching, and writing, there is an
entirely distinct ecclesiological function of the Church’s intellectual life today.
Unquestionably, the Second Vatican Council did much to signal, encourage, and define
this ecclesiological shift, which will be described below. Even the past three decades,
though, have witnessed intensive discussion on the obligations of the Catholic
intellectual.
This is largely because the proper role of Catholic intellectual life is an integral
part of the debate over Catholic institutional identity in Catholic higher education. In
1990, Pope John Paul II promulgated the apostolic constitution Ex Corde Ecclesiae,
which intended to clearly define the nature and mission of Catholic higher education
1
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throughout the world. This document set off a flurry of discussion, particularly in the
United States, where the majority of the world’s Catholic institutions are located.
Initially, this centered on issues of particular concern to American academics; namely,
institutional autonomy and academic freedom. The middle of the 20th century was a
tumultuous time in American history generally, but particularly so in the history of
American Catholic higher education. Ex Corde Ecclesiae was the culmination of decades
of dialogue, and has done much to bring order to what could easily have become chaos.
The Catholic university represents the setting wherein the content of the Catholic
intellectual tradition is brought into conversation with the content of human culture more
comprehensively and critically than anywhere else.
Church and the Modern World
Wrestling with the nature of a contemplative vocation in the midst of a troubled
society, Thomas Merton warned that “It is all too easy to retire into an ivory tower of
private spirituality and let the world blow itself to pieces.”1 For Merton, the
contemplative perspective was necessary for making sense of the way human history had
progressed in God’s world, but the solitude necessary to acquire that perspective could be
dangerous. If isolation became an absolute, a goal in and of itself, it was little more than
an immoral abdication of responsibility. In Matthew’s Gospel, the final task Christ gives
his followers, the Great Commission, exhorts the church to “Go therefore and make
disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of

1. David J. O’Brien, From the Heart of the American Church: Catholic Higher Education and
American Culture (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1994), 32.
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the Holy Spirit…”2 Clearly, the church is intended to look beyond itself, always with an
eye toward sharing its wisdom and capacity for unity in Christ with the rest of the world.
The Roman Catholic Church into which Merton converted, however, had an approach to
this task predicated on the idea that it, as a perfect society, possessed the means to
facilitate salvation by encouraging in its members a proper response to God’s grace.
Dialogue, then, in the pre-Vatican II church, required non-Catholic participants to
approach a Catholicism that had, in many ways, become the very kind of ivory tower
against which Merton warned. Christianity, with its eschatological vision of the Kingdom
of God, has had to struggle against contempt of ‘the world’ in any context. The
Reformation of the 16th century had initiated a defensive posture in Roman Catholicism,
and that mentality was given fresh energy in the church’s conflict with modernism in the
19 and 20 centuries. Merton’s lifetime, however, would witness a drastic reorientation
th

th

of Catholic perspectives, embodied most substantially in the Second Vatican Council.
In an earlier era, the Catholic university was able to exist and operate as an
extension of the church as ‘perfect society.’ Operating under the assumptions that the
Roman Catholic church possessed all that it needed to complete its mission and that it
was, by and large, a visible institution, Catholic higher education was often held in low
regard by non-Catholic observers of academe (think of the quip, often attributed to
George Bernard Shaw, that the very notion of a Catholic university was an oxymoron).
Though intensive instruction in neo-Scholastic philosophy may well have provided
students an academically rigorous experience, there was rarely much call for active

2. Matthew 28:19 (New Revised Standard Version).

4

engagement with contemporary cultures of the world that were not distinctively Catholic.
With Tridentine ecclesiology still holding sway throughout the first half of the twentieth
century, Catholic university campuses were often places where the handing on of
tradition was the primary (and perhaps sometimes the only) concern.
The Second Vatican Council rendered such an orientation of Catholic higher
education not only unhelpful, but also untenable. Vatican II represents, amongst other
things, a clarion call for Catholic universities to redouble their efforts in helping the
church learn in addition to helping it teach. As Stephen Bevans has observed, Pope John
XXIII “called for aggiornamento in the church, but not for its own sake. Any renewal the
council would bring was for the sake of a more intelligible and effective preaching of the
Gospel.”3 Though the Roman Curia may well have sought initially to minimize the
potential for anything groundbreaking to occur at the Council, a clear indication of the
Council’s ecclesiological direction was to take place early on in the first session: Cardinal
Lienart’s famous call for additional time for the Council Fathers to reconsider a list of
names provided them by the Curia for voting on members of each of the council’s ten
commissions. Archbishop John Quinn has highlighted the importance of Lienart’s
intervention: “What might, otherwise, have seemed a secondary moment, was, in fact, a
moment of great significance. It was a turning point, marking the world episcopate as
conscious of its collegial role.”4

3. Stephen Bevans, SVD, “Beyond the New Evangelization: Toward a Missionary Ecclesiology
for the Twenty-First Century,” in A Church with Open Doors ed. Richard R. Gaillardetz and Edward P.
Hahnenberg (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2015), 5.
4. Archbishop John R. Quinn, Ever Ancient, Ever New (New York: Paulist Press, 2013), 41
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Thomas Rausch points to a suggestion made by Cardinal Suenens as having
possibly even a greater impact on the ecclesiology set forth by the Council. Rather than
following the somewhat frenetic proposal provided by the Council’s Theological
Commission for a document on the church, Suenens proposed a two-pronged approach
that would eventually yield two separate documents: “First, (the Council) should look at
the Church in its inner life. This would allow a treatment of the Church as the mystery of
Christ living in his mystical body, as well as of its missionary, sacramental, and worship
life. The second statement should address the Church in its relations with the outside
world.”5
The first part of Suenens’ proposal, dealing with the church’s inner life,
culminated in the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, Lumen Gentium. In this
document the Council Fathers “gave unprecedented attention to defining the role of the
laity, opening the door to previously unheard of levels of participation in the ministries of
the church by laypersons. Rather than defining the laity negatively (as people who are not
ordained), the Council gave a powerful affirmation of the lay claim to be “sharers in the
priestly, prophetic, and kingly functions of Christ.”6 Lumen Gentium made significant use
of the ‘people of God’ image of the church, while also emphasizing the sacramental
nature of the church. This marked a significant departure from the emphasis on the
external structures of the church favored in much of pre-Conciliar ecclesiology.

5. Thomas P. Rausch, Towards a Truly Catholic Church (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2005), 16.
6. The Second Vatican Council, “Dogmatic Constitution on the Church,” in The Documents of
Vatican II, ed. Walter M. Abbott, S.J. (New York: Guild Press, 1966), 57.
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The second part of the vision put forth by Cardinal Suenens, a consideration of
the church’s relationship to the rest of the world, would culminate in the Pastoral
Constitution on the Church and the Modern World, Gaudium et Spes. While he notes the
contribution of Suenens, Rausch gives “ultimate credit” to Pope John XXIII for the
development of the document.7 Regardless, it is safe to conclude that Gaudium et Spes
was a culmination of numerous forces at work within the church that were pressing for a
different kind of engagement with the world than that with which Catholicism had
recently been accustomed. Rausch also notes that part of the discussion of the document
by the Council Fathers occurred while Pope Paul VI addressed the General Assembly of
the United Nations in New York. Rausch contends that the Pope’s speech and appearance
were “widely understood as symbolic of a reforming Church’s desire to put itself at the
service of the world it had so long described only in negative tones.”8
This document continues to be a major force in Catholic thinking on the mission
of the church. In particular, Gaudium et Spes demonstrates a profound awareness on the
part of the Council of the importance of culture. Noting Christ’s linkage of love for God
and love for neighbor, the Council Fathers recognized the social nature of all people and
sought to devote more of the church’s attention to the common good. Instead of
attempting to co-opt culture through an imposition of Catholic thinking, Gaudium et Spes
admits instead that the church “‘does not always have a ready answer to every question,’
but ‘is eager to associate the light of revelation with the experience of humanity in trying

7. Rausch, 34.
8. Ibid, 35.
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to clarify the course upon which it has recently entered.’”9 The church was never robbed
of its supernatural functions by the Council, especially considering its continued
willingness to use language such as Mystical Body and sacrament in thinking of the
church. Nevertheless, Gaudium et Spes makes it clear that the church was no longer
content thinking of itself as separate from the world in the same way that it once had; the
world was capable of being redeemed by God and this demanded a different posture on
the part of God’s church. The inductive approach of the pastoral constitution, in
particular, serves as a reminder that the church was a pilgrim alongside the rest of
humanity. The church wrestled with many of the same issues that non-members did, and
asked many of the same questions. The church could never again be complacent with its
own isolation.
Gaudium et Spes defined culture as “all those things which go to the refining and
developing of humanity’s diverse mental and physical endowments.”10 This definition, in
Vincent Miller’s interpretation of the document, “unites the developmental understanding
of culture with Catholic theological notions of creation, nature, and grace. Humankind
‘can achieve true and full humanity only by means of culture, that is through the
cultivations of the goods and values of nature’ understood here both as human nature and
the broader natural world in which we live.”11 While the Council was cognizant that
culture could sometimes exist in tension with theology, there was in Gaudium et Spes a
call to strengthen and make more efficient both the study of theology and the
9. Ibid, 38.
10. Ibid, 40.
11. Vincent Miller, “Ecclesiology Cultural Change, and the Changing Nature of Culture,” in A
Church with Open Doors ed. Richard R. Gaillardetz and Edward P. Hahnenberg (Collegeville: Liturgical
Press, 2015), 67.
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communication of doctrine. With the church rather suddenly very eager to learn and a
world with which it was eager to engage, the need for Catholic universities of high
quality was perhaps never felt more acutely. As Miller summarizes, the Council’s “vision
of engagement with culture is grounded in the bedrock dogmatic principles of creation,
incarnation, and soteriology.” The confidence with which the Council believed the
church could work toward a new Catholic synthesis in the midst of “the modern
proliferation of knowledge” was “ultimately rooted in faith that God’s saving presence is
at work in human history in a way that makes the historical and ethnographic diversity of
culture both intelligible and redeemable.”12
Gaudium et Spes seemed almost an about-face from church policy of the preCouncil era. This document strongly identified the “joys and the hopes, the griefs and the
anxieties of the men of this age” with the “joys and hopes, the griefs and anxieties of the
followers of Christ.”13 Indeed, the previously taken for granted distinction between the
church and ‘the world’ seemed to be drastically diminished by the Council’s call to
transform the world. As Yves Congar notes in a commentary on Gaudium et Spes, “The
‘world’ is not simply the power of the State, it is mankind at work; it is capable of
becoming Church…”14 There have been widely-divergent schools of thought regarding
the interpretation and application of the Council, but there is no contesting that the church
could no longer downplay the Great Commission’s demand for dialogue and
evangelization befitting the 20th century. As Congar observes, the Council “several times
12. Ibid, 70, 71.
13. The Second Vatican Council, “Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World,” in
The Documents of Vatican II, ed. Walter M. Abbott, S.J. (New York: Guild Press, 1966), 199-200.
14. Yves Congar, “The Role of the Church in the Modern World,” in Commentary on the
Documents of Vatican II vol. 5, ed. Herbert Vorgrimmler (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969), 212.
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states that our eschatological vocation in no way diverts people from their earthly tasks
but rather imposes an obligation on them to perform them”15 Echoing the Council, Joseph
Komonchak has pointed out that the decision to follow Christ is “a distinctive way of
being in the world…But this distinctiveness should not be purchased at the price of a
withdrawal from the world, but should rather be a distinctive way of being in and for the
sake of the world.”16
Ecclesiological Justification for Catholic Higher Education
It is, perhaps, a bit ironic that the Second Vatican Council advocated a position
that made the Catholic university a vital setting for the Church’s dialogue with the world
just as those same institutions were experiencing something of an identity crisis. Even a
decade before the Council, it would have seemed exceedingly peculiar to ask questions
about the Catholic identity of a Catholic college or university in the first place. Indeed,
into the beginning of the second half of the twentieth century, Catholic identity was
something that was for all intents and purposes taken for granted. With plenty of vowed
religious filling faculties and administrations, well-defined juridical relationships
between schools and the hierarchy, and a robust (though not uniform) Catholic subculture throughout the country, there was ample reason not to question whether the
institutions of higher learning that claimed to be Catholic actually were. While much
could be said to describe how the situation changed throughout the middle of the century,
it is sufficient for the purposes of this chapter to note that the complacency regarding
15. Ibid, 206.
16. Joseph A. Komonchak, “Mission and Identity in Catholic Universities,” in Theological
Education in the Catholic Tradition, ed. Patrick W. Carey and Earl C. Muller (New York: Crossroad
Publishing Company, 1997), 40.
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Catholic identity was in no small part a function of complacency regarding ecclesiology.
Up until shortly before the Second Vatican Council, the Catholic Church’s understanding
of itself was still dominated by the ecclesiology of the Council of Trent (or the Catholic
Reformation as a whole), and Vatican I. Given that both of these councils took place in
times of unease and pessimism regarding the broader world, Catholic thinking on the
church tended to promote the notion of the church as a fortress providing shelter (and
eventually salvation) from the fallen aspects of human culture gone awry.
Avery Dulles suggests an ecclesiological definition from Robert Bellarmine as
indicative of this earlier Catholic mindset: “The one and true Church is the community of
men brought together by the profession of the same Christian faith conjoined in the
communion of the same sacraments, under the government of the legitimate pastors and
especially the one vicar of Christ on earth, the Roman pontiff.”17 Clearly, Bellarmine’s
preoccupation with opposing Protestantism led him to concentrate on visible delineations
for where the Church ended and the rest of the world began. Indeed, it is not difficult to
see how a Catholic university operating under such an ecclesiological perspective might
similarly rely on visible criteria for demonstrating its Catholic identity. While such an
ecclesiology might support at least the illusion of certainty, Dulles hastens to point out
that “This clarity…was bought at a price. It tended to lower the Church to the same plane
as other human communities and to neglect the most important thing about the Church:

17. Avery Dulles, Models of the Church (New York: Doubleday, 1987), 16.
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the presence in it of the God who calls the members to himself, sustains them by his
grace, and works through them as they carry out the mission of the Church.”18
For his part, Dulles relied heavily on the notion that “The Church never fully
achieves itself as Church, at least not in the conditions of this world. It is true Church to
the extent that it is tending to become more truly Church.”19 This striving on the part of
the church must be seen as reliant on God’s grace, but it can also be expressed only
within the concrete realm of history. To be set within history implies a need for the
church—and the intellectual tradition it safeguards and seeks constantly to develop—to
engage with culture in whatever forms and contexts it finds itself. Miller concurs when he
posits that “The relationship of religion and culture is unavoidable for Catholicism
because of its understanding of the communal, ecclesial nature of salvation.”20
Historical Background
Though the Council clearly affirmed Catholic higher education, it did not create
it. Within the United States alone, there were well over 200 Catholic institutions before
the Council, which were, in some ways, extremely diverse. Catholic institutions of higher
learning included universities, colleges, schools founded by religious orders, diocesan
schools, or even, in one case, a school founded by Pontifical charter. Despite this
diversity (which was certainly not superficial), Alice Gallin has asserted that they
nevertheless had a “common culture. Their mission statements were almost
interchangeable, and their commitment to liberal arts, character formation, and a sense of

18. Ibid 16-17.
19. Ibid, 71.
20. Miller, 64.
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campus community…was openly proclaimed as rooted in their Catholic faith.”21
Academic freedom, already a highly-cherished virtue for secular American academics,
meant something decidedly more restrictive in Catholic institutions before the Council;
namely, freedom to teach and learn the truth. Illustrative of this point of view is a faculty
handbook from Duquesne University, published in 1940, which claimed that “no man is
free to teach objective falsehood simply because subjectively he fancies it to be the truth.
In questions of fact there is no such thing as academic freedom.”22
The curriculum at many Catholic institutions, then, was confidently based on the
idea that the Catholic tradition had already thought things through, and students were to
be brought up to speed with what the church already knew. The bedrock of this
confidence was the neo-Scholastic revival which had been underway since the middle of
the 19 century. Drawing heavily from the thought of Aquinas (as well as, to varying
th

degrees, the other schoolmen), neo-Scholasticism offered a synthesis of faith and reason
that was part philosophical and part theological in its orientation. Asserting that God’s
existence was provable by reason and that the human mind was fully capable of
“(arriving) at objective truth through the direct intuitions of the intellect and the exercise
of discursive reason,” the quasi-official status of neo-Scholasticism ensured that Catholic
higher education would often seem (especially to outsiders) to be little more than
indoctrination.23 Rather than promoting innovation, the general approach to education by
Catholic scholars “in the first half of the twentieth century was one of apologetics; every
21. Alice Gallin, O.S.U., Negotiating Identity: Catholic Higher Education since 1960 (Notre
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2000), 1.
22. Ibid, 5.
23. Philip Gleason, Contending with Modernity: Catholic Higher Education in the Twentieth
Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 118.
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new scientific or literary discovery had to be reconciled with an already defined
‘truth.’”24
The 1960’s, however, saw both a new understanding of freedom as well as the
collapse of the neo-Scholastic synthesis on Catholic campuses. This collapse, described
by Walter Kasper as “the outstanding event in the Catholic theology of our century,” was,
in retrospect, inevitable.25 Though there had been, in various intervals, a good deal of
criticism leveled against Catholic institutions for the prevalence of neo-Scholasticism on
its campuses, Philip Gleason argues that “The changes that mattered most were internal
to the Catholic subculture…”26 Such changes were no doubt accelerated at least in part
due to the significant increase in the accessibility of a college education for Catholics
welcomed home from the Second World War by the G.I. Bill. Already in the 1950’s,
Catholic dissatisfaction with the synthesis steadily rose. Gleason lists “the way NeoScholasticism was taught; tensions arising from the diversity of Neo-Scholastic schools
of thought; and increasing discontent at ecclesiastical authoritarianism” as the factors that
led to the collapse.27
This last factor was not limited to dissatisfaction with neo-Scholasticism. Gleason
rightly posits that “freedom became the central theme in American Catholic higher
education in the early 1960s.”28 Catholic scholars in many disciplines brought their
understanding of academic freedom, gained at the (probably) secular institutions where
24. Gallin, 3.
25. Robert Imbelli, “Theologians and Bishops,” in Theological Education in the Catholic
Tradition, ed. Patrick W. Carey and Earl C. Muller (New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 1997),
223.
26. Gleason, 298.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid, 305.
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they earned their advanced degrees, to the Catholic campuses where they taught. Truly,
freedom was very much a theme of the 1960s in general, as demonstrated by the potency
of the Civil Rights Movement in that decade. Combine this emphasis with the antiauthoritarian sentiment that was helped along significantly by American involvement in
Vietnam, and it is easy to see looking back that many of the elements needed for a shift,
or even a showdown of sorts, were in place. The opening of windows initiated by Pope
John XXIII at Vatican II seemed to many to be an official sanctioning of a new
understanding of freedom by the very top echelons of the Church.
Though there was no single moment in the 1960s that represented the end or
beginning of a new era, it is nevertheless possible to trace a series of events that are
representative of the changing climate on Catholic campuses. One of the key turning
points was no doubt the decision made in 1963 by the rector of Catholic University of
America, Monsignor William J. McDonald, to restrict four liberal theologians from
speaking on campus. In a short period of time, McDonald received criticism from within
and without the Church. There was already in 1963, then, a growing expectation on
Catholic campuses that decisions affecting freedom on campus would not be made
behind closed doors, whether administrators were clergy or not.29
Faculty concerns regarding their perceived lack of influence over institutional
decision-making (which seemed contrary to the spirit and letter of Vatican II) came to a
head in several highly-publicized encounters, notably at St. John’s University in 1965 and
at Catholic University of America in 1967. The case at Catholic University revolved

29. Ibid, 306.
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around the moral theologian Charles Curran, whose contract would be allowed to lapse in
August of that year as a result of a vote by the board of trustees. In what has been
described as a coup, the various faculties of Catholic University (except the School of
Education) refused to teach until Curran’s contract was renewed. In a move
inconceivable even a decade earlier, the board of trustees, which consisted entirely of
bishops, relented, reinstated Curran, and even promoted him to the rank of associate
professor.30 Unquestionably, Catholic higher education had entered something of an
identity crisis. Booming enrollments, energy that was high as a result of the Second
Vatican Council, and subsequent efforts to increase lay participation in the governance of
Catholic universities all contributed to it.
Also in 1967 were the first steps taken to lessen the influence of the religious
orders that had founded many of the Catholic institutions in the United States. As
enrollments grew and administrative challenges increased, it became apparent that these
challenges often required talent and experience that many of the religious orders could
not provide. Only by increasing the number of laypersons on boards of trustees,
laypersons with significant track records in business, law, and other professional
disciplines, could these schools hope to secure a brighter future. Any canonical
complications with this process were bypassed (or ignored) due to the persuasiveness of
John McGrath, a canon lawyer at Catholic University, who asserted that religious
communities were not the legal owners of the properties and other assets of the colleges.
Since these things were held in trust by the boards of trustees, these institutions were
30. Peter M. Mitchell, The Coup at Catholic University: The 1968 Revolution in American
Catholic Education (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2015), 55.
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simply not ecclesiastical property.31 Armed with the so-called ‘McGrath Thesis,’ Notre
Dame and St. Louis each initiated the process of separate incorporation, thereby limiting
the influence of their founding congregations, in January 1967.32
Such innovations were undoubtedly demonstrations of a strong lay commitment
to Catholic higher education, and the decrease in clergy and religious on boards of
trustees made it easier for Catholic institutions to justify their reception of federal aid,
without which many Catholic schools may have disappeared in the leaner years of the
early 1970s. They were also, however, causes of consternation to those who questioned
an institution’s ability to maintain a vibrant Catholic identity with laypersons at the helm
(though many schools maintained roles, sometimes prominent ones, for their sponsoring
communities). Additionally, there were also more basic questions of whether the term
Catholic could be a meaningful descriptor for an institution of higher learning in the first
place. Such questions had been raised often enough by non-Catholics and could therefore
be shrugged off as the products of anti-Catholic prejudice, but it was much harder to
ignore these questions when the people asking them were Catholic themselves. In 1967,
John Cogley questioned the future, and perhaps even the legitimacy of a Catholic
university, claiming that a day would come when they would “seem as anachronistic as
the papal states.”33 Acting along similar assumptions but unwilling to passively let
Catholics secularize in due course, Sister Jacqueline Grennan, S.L., president of Webster
College, not only handed control of the college to a lay board of trustees, but left her
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religious order so as to focus on running the “secular or semi-secular institution.”34 With
such perspectives being circulated publicly, if not popularly, steps needed to be taken in
order to discover what a Catholic institution might be in a post-Council, post-separate
incorporation context.
Build-up to Ex Corde Ecclesiae
That a pope in the late 20th century should write an apostolic constitution on
Catholic Higher Education should hardly be surprising, given what has been described
above. Indeed, what would eventually be Pope John Paul II’s Ex Corde Ecclesiae (Ex
Corde) can be seen as the culmination of more than two decades of dialogue among those
interested in and responsible for the Catholic identity of Catholic higher learning, within
the American context but also everywhere else. The American contribution to the
discussion was never monolithic, but an excellent place to begin surveying the history is
the Land O’Lakes Statement of 1967. Meeting at a property owned by Notre Dame in
northern Wisconsin were “twenty-six persons representing nine major Catholic
universities, members of the episcopacy, and well-known scholars and leaders of
religious communities.”35 The statement released by those present is famous for its claim
that “institutional autonomy and academic freedom are essential conditions of life and
growth and indeed of survival for Catholic universities as for all universities.”36 Just as
Vatican II blurred the boundary between the church and ‘the world,’ Land O’Lakes did
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something to lessen the distinctions between Catholic and secular higher learning.
Gleason has described it as “a declaration of independence from the hierarchy…”37 The
Land O’Lakes Statement gave assurances that the Catholic university would remain
“specifically Catholic in profound and creative ways for the service of society and the
people of God,” but this brief document certainly raised as many questions as it
answered.38
The 1968 meeting of the International Federation of Catholic Universities in
Kinshasa can be seen as a foreshadowing of the tensions to come between the American
experience and the desire of Catholics elsewhere (including but not limited to Rome) for
a clearly-defined, juridical relationship between Catholic institutions and the church
hierarchy. Whereas Kinshasa echoed Land O’Lakes in its emphasis on the importance of
theology, noticeably absent were any mention of autonomy or academic freedom.39 A
subsequent meeting in Rome the following year, hosted by the Congregation for Catholic
Education, explored the very issues of freedom and autonomy left open by Land O’Lakes
and ignored by Kinshasa. This meeting had a significant impact on the dialogue up to and
including Ex Corde, and in the discussions “we can almost hear the American delegates
trying to explain the independence of their institutions, newly reflected in the transfer of
governance to boards of trustees no longer directly linked to the authority of the religious
community.”40 Though the American insistence on autonomy and freedom no doubt
sounded dangerous to Rome, and the Roman insistence on straightforward definitions of
37. Gleason, 317.
38. “Land O’Lakes,” 11.
39. Gallin, Negotiating Identity, 129.
40. Ibid, 132.
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juridical clarity may have sounded like little more than a power grab to Americans, the
vigorous dialogue taking place certainly indicates some willingness to learn on both
sides.
Making it difficult to speak of a clear division between the American and Roman
‘sides’ of the conversation, however, was the lack of uniformity behind what is meant by
both ‘American’ and ‘Roman.’ Though an organization like the National Catholic
Education Association might legitimately represent the mainstream of American Catholic
thinking, equally articulate voices took a very different perspective, which ensured that,
oftentimes, “Rome received contradictory messages from these two groups.”41 Similarly,
‘Rome’ cannot be reduced to any single office or Congregation, either. The face-to-face
conversations between church delegates and American educators were often warm and
productive, but these delegates may not have had any more influence over official church
positions than canon lawyers, who might fairly be expected to insist on stricter definitions
of the relationship between religious orders and institutional governance, bishops and
theologians, etc.
Another meeting held in Rome, this time in 1972, under both the Congregation
for Catholic Education as well as the International Federation of Catholic Universities,
did much to relieve American concerns, acknowledging the great diversity amongst
institutions of Catholic higher learning throughout the world, as well as the importance of
both autonomy and academic freedom. Realizing a particular sticking point was
theologians’ academic freedom, this meeting’s final document, “The Catholic University
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in the Modern World,” quoted Paul VI: “The Magisterium knows that without the help of
theology it could no doubt preserve and teach the faith, but it would hardly attain to that
degree of richness and depth which it needs in order to accomplish its task fully.”42
Perhaps even more importantly, this document also gave a powerful affirmation of the
freedom of theologians, saying that they “must be free to question, to develop their
hypotheses, to search for more adequate interpretations and formulations, to publish and
defend their views on a scholarly level, and to study theological sources, including
pronouncements of the teaching Church, with the full freedom of scholarly research.”43
As Monika Hellwig has observed, “no subsequent official document has explicitly
acknowledged such a clear statement of the academic freedom of the theologian.”44 Also
examined at this meeting were when and how a local bishop might challenge the work of
an individual theologian. Any intervention on the part of “ecclesiastical authority should
respect the statutes and regulations of the institution as well as accepted academic
procedures.”45 It seems occasionally, at least, America and Rome could reach an
understanding.
Such moments of mutual respect and understanding, however, seemed destined to
be temporary. In 1974 Cardinal Garrone of the Congregation for Catholic Education
wrote a letter to the American bishops, expressing concern over the trend toward separate
incorporation amongst American Catholic institutions, asking why these schools were
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being ‘given away,’ and whether their lay boards of trustees meant that they were, in fact,
not Catholic anymore. After the conference in Rome in 1972, this letter was insulting to
some American Catholic educators.46 For others, any scrutiny of American Catholic
higher education was a welcome development. Individuals such as Dr. S. Thomas
Greenburg of the Institute for Catholic Higher Education “believed that the Catholic
colleges were indeed on the way to the loss of their Catholic identity and had absorbed
the secularist philosophy surrounding them in American higher education.”47 The
formation of the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars in 1977 similarly signaled the existence
of a significant bloc of Catholic thinkers who dissented from the NCEA’s optimistic
assessment of the situation (regarding Catholic identity) on Catholic campuses.
Therefore, the dialogue continued, alternating between periods of respectful productivity
and stalemate driven by suspicion.
Pope John Paul II, elected in 1978, determined early in his papacy to bring clarity
to the discussion through the issuing of an official papal document on Catholic higher
education. In 1980, the Congregation for Catholic Education began the project that would
culminate a decade later with Ex Corde Ecclesiae. The pope’s own career as a university
professor gave him a good understanding of the issues being discussed, but the 1985
schema sent to Catholic professors, presidents, and bishops nevertheless sparked
significant discussion. Gallin asserts that the high number of norms proposed in this early
version of the apostolic constitution (49 separate injunctions) “indicated the overriding
concern of the Roman hierarchy for particular ways that bishops could control the life of
46. Hellwig, 25.
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the university.”48 An additional draft, circulated in 1988, was highly touted by many in
American Catholic higher education. Hellwig states simply that “There was nothing in
this draft that would be unworkable in the US context.” In particular, noticeably absent
was any mention whatsoever of the canonical requirement for teachers of theology to
receive a mandate from the local bishop. Interestingly, by the finished product of Ex
Corde in 1990, this 1988 draft had “disappeared without a trace.”49
In the meantime, the pope had certainly given American Catholic academics
reason for optimism regarding the impending apostolic constitution. In September 1987,
Pope John Paul II had addressed a gathering of leaders of Catholic higher education at
Xavier University of Louisiana, expressing a profound respect and admiration for the
work being done in American Catholic institutions. Especially noteworthy was the pope’s
praise of American Catholic universities specifically in the area of Catholic identity:
“…let us be thankful for the special strengths of your schools—for their Catholic identity,
for their service of truth, and for their role in helping to make the Church’s presence felt
in the world of culture and science. And let us be thankful above all for the men and
women committed to this mission…”50 The pope’s gratitude and his apparent
understanding of the uniqueness of the American context did much to allay fears
regarding the upcoming apostolic exhortation.
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Ex Corde Ecclesiae
The long-anticipated apostolic constitution was promulgated in 1990, after years
of build-up. The document is divided into two parts, with the first being a description of
and reflection on the nature and importance of Catholic higher education. Rejecting the
idea that Catholic universities are inherently hampered by any claims to unique access to
truth that the church might make, John Paul II asserted that “a Catholic University is
distinguished by its free search for the whole truth about nature, man and God.”51 In a
similar vein, though much closer to the questions about freedom that many American
Catholics were asking, was the pope’s promise that a Catholic university “possesses
institutional autonomy necessary to perform its functions effectively and guarantees its
members academic freedom,” with the understanding this freedom must necessarily be
understood in the “confines of the truth and the common good.”52
The initial reaction to Ex Corde was decidedly positive. In her initial response to
the constitution, Gallin stated that “There are no surprises. We were not anxiously
looking for any document, but if there had to be one, this is as good as we could get.”53
At the very least it is clear that Ex Corde did much to stimulate discussion on Catholic
higher education, despite the vibrant dialogue that had taken place on precisely that
subject since at least the Second Vatican Council. As Hellwig notes, in the wake of the
promulgation, “conferences were held about the Constitution, lectures were given, groups
studied it, all with considerable enthusiasm...The general consensus was that the
philosophy of Catholic higher education and of the research potential of the institutions
51. John Paul II, Ex Corde Ecclesiae, August 15th, 1990, 4, http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paulii/en/apost_constitutions/documents/hf_jp-ii_apc_15081990_ex-corde-ecclesiae.html.
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as presented in Part I was very positive and inspirational and would be helpful...There
was also an optimistic sense that the General Norms posed no threat to the
institutions….”54
The misgivings that remained were focused primarily on the second part of the
apostolic constitution, the General Norms. Particularly troubling was the cautionary
statement that “Catholic theologians, aware that they fulfil a mandate received from the
Church, are to be faithful to the Magisterium of the Church as the authentic interpreter of
Sacred Scripture and Sacred Tradition.”55 The notion of a mandate (or mandatum) as a
requirement for Catholic theologians teaching Catholic theology in Catholic institutions
became law for the universal church only as recently as 1983, when a revised edition of
canon law stipulated that “It is necessary that those who teach theological disciplines in
any institute of higher studies have a mandate from the competent ecclesiastical
authority.”56 Though the concept of the mandate had already evolved throughout the
process of the canon law revision as well as the drafting period of Ex Corde itself, it
remained unclear exactly how well it would mesh with the American Academy’s
cherished value of academic freedom. Overall, however, the stipulation in the General
Norms that all of the norms “be applied concretely at the local and regional levels by
Episcopal Conferences and other Assemblies of Catholic Hierarchy…”seemed to account
for the uniqueness of the American context.57
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Ex Corde in America
With the responsibility for implementing Ex Corde in America squarely on the
shoulders of the American bishops, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops set up a
committee consisting of bishops and college presidents to create a list of guidelines to be
voted on by the NCCB general assembly, and subsequently sent to Rome for final
approval. David O’Brien suggests that “the sigh of relief” immediately following the
promulgation of Ex Corde “was followed by renewed alarm,” however, significant efforts
were made to bring bishops and administrators of local Catholic institutions together.58
Such meetings, Hellwig observes, “seemed to add warmth and reduce the tension…”59
Though there were legitimate reasons for uncertainty regarding the mandate, the
American bishops have oftentimes demonstrated a keen understanding of Catholic higher
education in America as it is distinctive from Catholic higher education elsewhere. It is
hard to find any serious indication that an episcopal takeover of Catholic institutions was
forthcoming. O’Brien relates how, at a 1994 discussion at a meeting of presidents, Bishop
John Leibrecht (Springfield-Cape Girardeau) “reported that the bishops had no desire to
interfere in the internal governance of the schools. They hoped to preserve the ‘informal
and dialogical’ relationship of the recent past.”60 This sentiment is far more a nod to the
status quo than it is an example of the bishops’ unwillingness to fight over Ex Corde.
Even in the dynamic era of the Council American bishops had recognized a level of
autonomy in Catholic institutions.
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In 1963, Francis Cardinal Spellman began an argument with the Sacred
Congregation in Rome over the awarding of honorary degrees that would take two years
to resolve. Spellman affirmed the Catholic identity of institutions in the United States
while simultaneously acknowledging that “they should be free to follow their own
traditions and in common with other universities, govern their institutions in accordance
with their own rules.”61 Even in the midst of a relatively highly-publicized inquiry
regarding possible heresy in the philosophy department at the University of Dayton,
“ecclesiastical authority did not intrude into the working of the structures within the
university.”62 With such precedents in mind it is easier to understand that, when the
bishops overwhelmingly approved a draft of ordinances in 1996 that tabled the mandate
for further discussion, they were, by and large, recognizing legitimate concerns of
American Catholic institutions. The passing of the 1996 draft was celebrated as a
“conclusion of the process in a manner that would not prejudice the standing and survival
of the US Catholic institutions.”63
The back and forth between Rome and America, however, was not finished.
Rome’s response, which came to the NCCB in the summer of 1997, was critical of the
American ordinances, largely for not being juridical enough. The issue of the mandate
was, again, center stage. With mounting pressure from Rome, the American bishops set
up a committee to explore “how the Roman requirements might best be met with the least
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damage to the status of the US schools.”64 Despite O’Brien’s observation that “the
American hierarchy was changing as Pope John Paul appointed more conservative men to
key sees,”65 the bishops’ reception of the committee’s proposal again showed great
sensitivity to the specifics of the American context. The American bishops, it seemed,
were required to find some synthesis of the Roman and American positions.
In November of 1999, the NCCB approved The Application of Ex Corde
Ecclesiae for the United States, with the expectation that it would become law in May of
2001. This approval came after a full year of spirited discussion, both within and without
the Bishops Conference. A proposal discussed by the bishops the previous November had
been heavily criticized, with Bishops D’Arcy (Fort Wayne-South Bend), Weakland
(Milwaukee), and Quinn (San Francisco) all among the notable advocates of a less
juridical, more informal approach with an eye on maintaining the status quo in terms of
the relationship between bishops and university administrators. Some university
presidents, similarly, had voiced strong opposition to the current proposal. Edward
Malloy, president of Notre Dame, and J. Donald Monan, S.J., former president of Boston
College, proudly stated that “so many productive activities are taking place on Catholic
campuses today and in dialogue with local bishops,” but lamented that “it would be
tragic” if the proposal “were to result in driving (the church and the universities) apart.”66
Malloy and Monan claimed the bishops had ignored the prescription of Ex Corde
to “(take) into account the Statutes of each University or Institute and, as far as possible
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and appropriate, civil law.”67 The resistance of these two prominent leaders of American
Catholic higher education rested on what they saw as a grave challenge to academic
freedom, namely, the mandate. Regardless of how the bishops defined the mandate,
Malloy and Monan saw it as little more than “an instrument, however ineffective, to
control what is taught and written.”68
The bishops were clearly in a difficult position. On one hand, they recognized
they each had a pastoral responsibility for the authenticity of Catholic teaching within his
diocese. On the other, there was also a clear desire to preserve the best of what was
distinctive about American universities: autonomy and freedom. In “The Application for
Ex Corde Ecclesiae for the United States,” the bishops affirmed that “Academic freedom
is an essential component of a Catholic university.” More strikingly, the integrity of that
freedom on Catholic campuses was made a direct responsibility of the bishops
themselves: “…the diocesan bishop has the duty to recognize and promote the rightful
academic freedom of professors in Catholic universities in their search for truth.”69 Later
in the “Application,” the bishops nevertheless included the requirement for the mandate,
going to great lengths to minimize the potential outcry. In the hope of making it as
palatable as possible, the bishops declared that the mandate “should not be construed as
an appointment, authorization, delegation, or approbation of one’s teaching by Church
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authorities. Those who have received a mandatum teach in their own name…not in the
name of the Bishop or of the Church’s magisterium.”70
Despite the bishops’ significant softening of the language regarding the mandate
found in canon law and Ex Corde, some in American Catholic theology were not pleased.
Controversial theologian Daniel Maguire wrote in an open letter to Archbishop Rembert
Weakland that he simply “will not request either a mandate or an ecclesial blessing…”71
Believing the process for granting the mandatum required a level of theological
competence that many bishops simply did not possess, Maguire characterized the “spirit
and purpose” of Ex Corde as an attempt “to reverse the freedom that came to Catholic
theology before and during the Second Vatican Council.”72 Preferring the oversight of
academic peers to that of theologically amateurish bishops, Maguire, in a rhetorical
flourish, claimed that Ex Corde “slips into magic, implying as it does that nontheologian
bishops will be miraculously endowed with divine inspiration to make up for their lack of
expertise…”73
Moving Forward on the Mandate
Maguire, in making the claim that theologians represent a kind of parallel
magisterium, focusing on the academic while the bishops focus only on the pastoral,
overlooks whatever pastoral responsibility the bishops might have for Catholic students
attending Catholic campuses. At the very least, Joseph Bellacosa is on the right track
when he argues that, despite the varied areas of expertise of the bishops, they are
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71. Daniel C. Maguire, “Academic Freedom and the Vatican’s ‘Ex Corde Ecclesiae,’” Academe
88, no. 3(May-June 2002), 47, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40252166.
72. Ibid, 48.
73. Ibid, 49.

30

“entitled…to a presumption of respect for intellectual, honest and conscientious exertion
in the fulfillment of their responsibilities and ministries.”74 Admittedly, there may well be
an inherent tension between theologians and bishops, regardless of the loyalty of the
individual theologian. Robert Imbelli has argued that, insofar as the bishops are
responsible for “a concern not to adulterate sound teaching with merely human fantasies
and fables,” and theologians are charged with promoting “the ongoing appropriation of
faith’s understanding that can lead the whole Church to authentic doctrinal development,”
it is not surprising that “bishops embody a more conservative interest and theologians a
more progressive one.”75
Though Imbelli confirms that there is, nevertheless, overlap between the functions
of bishops and theologians, he is in very good company in his rejection of the idea that
the office of the bishop somehow overshadows or dominates that of the theologian. No
less prominent a theologian than Joseph Ratzinger declares that “Theology is not simply
and exclusively an ancillary function of the Magisterium…”76 Regarding the tension that
necessarily exists between the hierarchy and theologians, Ratzinger, with no small
measure of hopefulness, rightly asserts that “These tensions…can be productive,
provided that each side sustains them in the recognition that its function is intrinsically
ordered to that of the other.”77

74. Joseph W. Bellacosa, “Ex Corde Ecclesiae: Reflections, Perspectives, and Proposals,” The
Catholic Lawyer 40 (Spring 2001), 315.
75. Imbelli, 231.
76. Joseph Ratzinger, The Nature and Mission of Theology (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993),
104.
77. Ibid, 106.

31

Where does this leave the American church regarding the mandate? It is important
to have a theory of what the co-existence of bishops and theologians for the betterment of
the church should be like. The potential problems regarding the mandate, however, will
only prove solvable or insurmountable in the context of fruitful or dismal relationships
between real people. As Ratzinger noted, the “problems lie in the concrete.”78 As the
American bishops discovered from their vantage point between the Vatican and the
American academy, the post-Ex Corde concrete includes the mandate. James Heft
recalled the Archbishop of Cincinnati telling the faculty at the University of Dayton,
quite simply, that “There is no debate as to whether or not we will have the mandatum.
The question we are now facing is ‘how best can we make it work?’”79 Heft was very
hopeful that the incorporation of the mandate into the life of the Catholic university will
have multiple positive results. Heft believed Catholic theologians need to be reminded
“theology is not exactly like most other disciplines, and that a genuine…relationship to
the faith of the larger Church articulated by the bishops constitutes an integral part
of…Catholic theology.”80 Additionally, Heft was hopeful that the implementation of the
mandate requirement may very well improve Catholic understanding of due process,
which would no doubt ultimately do much to protect the rights of theologians.
Understanding the mandate as “a statement of personal relationship between the
bishop and the individual theologian” and a sign the individual theologian is in full
communion with the church, Heft believed, fairly, that one of the crucial requirements on
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the part of theologians is an awareness of the pastoral implications of their work.
Ultimately, Catholic theologians “should not want to teach Catholic theology except in
communion with the Church, with or without a mandatum.”81 All things considered,
though the theologian is free to present any of a number of points of view in her
classroom, she is nevertheless required by her mandate merely “to present as Catholic
teaching what is Catholic teaching…”82 That this is a decidedly reasonable expectation,
and would not be the catalyst of any major crackdown on American theologians seems to
be confirmed by experience. In June 2012, in their assessment of the implementation of
Ex Corde over the previous ten years, the bishops acknowledged that, thought there was
still work to be done, “our institutions have made definite progress in advancing Catholic
identity.”83 The mandatum was not mentioned once.
The Continuation of Debate
For some, it may be tempting to conclude that the spirited debates surrounding the
implementation of Ex Corde Ecclesiae have finally died down after reaching some kind
of equilibrium. For others, however, the quieting of the storm is due less to a finding of
equilibrium than it is to one ‘side’ being wearied by a never-ending series of setbacks. As
conservative Catholic scholar Anne Hendershott proclaims, “The contentious battles that
once surrounded the release of Pope John Paul’s 1990 apostolic constitution on Catholic
higher education have ended as college presidents quietly refused to implement it, and
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many of the bishops were reluctant to require it. Most seem to have abandoned the
fight.”84 For Hendershott, the last half century has been a bleak chapter in the history of
American Catholic higher education, marked by an ever increasing lack of interest in
authentic Catholic identity. As she sees it, Catholic institutions have largely been singleminded in their desire to emulate the elite amongst their secular peers. As a result,
distinctive Catholic identity has been crushed under the weight of trendier academic
currents that have been, often enough, downright antagonistic toward the Church and its
teaching. As Hendershott sees it, “The students have paid the highest price.”85 While they
should have been guaranteed the chance to engage with Catholic doctrine during their
time on a Catholic campus, Hendershott fears instead that those who should have been
most responsible for handing on the Catholic tradition have given pupils a watered down
education marred by relativism, materialism, and otherwise immoral perspectives.
Hendershott is a credentialed scholar who publishes well-documented work. It
can be, though, easy to dismiss a good deal of what she writes as reactionary or
unrealistic. For instance, Hendershott believes that the Church is not so much in conflict
with ‘the world’ as it is in a fight for its very survival with a fifth column dedicated to its
destruction, or at least its radical redefinition. She points to “a war between those who are
dedicated to the negation of the authority of scripture and the hierarchy of the Church,
and those who are proposing a renaissance of the Catholic intellect and a renewed
appreciation for the continued contributions of the Catholic Church itself.86 As a
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sociologist, Hendershott can be forgiven for having only a layman’s grasp of the diversity
of legitimate ecclesiological perspectives in today’s Church. And yet, when she accuses
thinkers such as retired Archbishop John R. Quinn of having made suggestions which
“would bring the Catholic Church in line with most Protestant denominations and
radically weaken the papacy” simply for advocating “decreased papal authority,
decentralization, more control granted to bishops, and parishioner involvement in the
selection of bishops,” it seems Hendershott is after distinctiveness for the sake of
distinctiveness instead of a distinctive Catholicity.87
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to assume that a scholar like Hendershott is
entirely missing the mark in her criticisms of the Catholic higher education. She is on
some solid footing when she questions the dedication of many Catholic institutions to
offering opportunities for remedial religious instruction for their undergraduates.
Additionally, she is right to laud a sentiment expressed by Gerald Bradley on the question
of balancing a search for truth with the conviction that truth is something that had already
been revealed: “Is it not intuitively more likely and does not experience confirm that
where there is no truth there is more likely to be manipulation? Where there is no truth
there can be no genuine common good. There can only be shifting consensus about this
or that, implying that ‘right’ and wrong’ manifest not things as they are, but interpersonal
power relations. This field is ripe for indoctrination.”88
That there is more work to be done in the area of Catholic institutional identity is
made clearer still by the very public uproars prompted in the past decade by the presence
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of controversial speakers on Catholic campuses. After President Barack Obama gave the
commencement address at the University of Notre Dame and was also honored with an
honorary degree, significant criticism was leveled against the University due largely to
Obama’s pro-choice position on abortion. Charles E. Rice, professor emeritus of law at
Notre Dame, wrote an entire book complaining that Obama’s honor represented an
abdication of the University’s responsibility to uphold Church teaching. For Rice, this
was not an isolated, poor decision but rather the latest in a long descent away from
Catholic identity and toward blatant secularization: “The Obama Commencement was a
culmination of the autonomy process begun at Land O’Lakes in 1967.” For the local
episcopal authority (Bishop D’Arcy of Fort Wayne-South Bend), the event marked the
opening of a “terrible breach which has taken place between Notre Dame and the
Church.”89
In 2016, Notre Dame courted controversy again when Vice President Joseph
Biden and former House Speaker John Boehner were jointly awarded the University’s
prestigious Laetare Medal for their public service, commitment to civility in public
discourse, and willingness to engage with the party across the aisle from themselves.
Whereas an opinion piece in The Washington Post hailed the decision a means of
honoring “political civility,”90 many from within the American Church were less pleased.
National Catholic Register complained that the decision was a “whispered…profession
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of Notre Dame’s pro-choice creed.”91 Again, the local Bishop, Kevin C. Rhoades of Fort
Wayne-South Bend, advised the University not to honor Biden, who is pro-choice.
Catholic News Service noted that many Catholics had reservations about awarding
Boehner and/or Biden.92
Even institutions without the national reputation of Notre Dame have provoked
the ire of many Catholics through their decisions to host certain speakers. Wisconsin’s St.
Norbert College has invited two speakers just in the past few years who have proven
controversial to a national Catholic audience. In 2015, noted feminist activist and author
Gloria Steinem was invited to campus for a public dialogue with author bell hooks. In
2016, then-Presidential candidate Donald Trump was given a campus venue for a
campaign speech. Though the College has typically declared that such invitations are
simply a manifestation of ‘radical Norbertine hospitality,’ many in the American Church
were appalled. While op-eds were written both in favor and in opposition to each
speaker’s presence on a Catholic campus, the petitions circulated online to stop each
event indicate deep-seated disagreement over the proper role of a Catholic
college/university. Reflecting on the Trump visit, St. Norbert President Tom Kunkel
posited that “Our hospitality does not mean we endorse a given candidate or his or her
views. We simply see our role as helping facilitate these important exercises in
democracy….Trump’s visit has sparked countless meaty conversations and mobilized
hundreds of students, as everyone used the occasion to deeply appraise the leading
91. Fr. Raymond J. De Souza, “Notre Dame to Honor Joe Biden and John Boehner: At What
Cost?” National Catholic Register, May 11, 2016.
92. Ann Carey, “Notre Dame Gives Laetare Medal to Biden, Boehner Over Critics’ Objections.”
Catholic News Service, May 16, 2016.
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Republican candidate and his views. And that, I think, is a big part of what a college is
supposed to do.”93 Prior to the Steinem visit, however, the organization TFP Student
Action launched an online protest, claiming that “This issue is not about academic
freedom. This issue is all about being faithful to God. About being true to our baptismal
vows.”94
Similar examples could easily be noted. What should be clear is that there is, even
nearly three decades since Ex Corde’s promulgation, no consensus on the proper
orientation of a Catholic university between the Church and world that has permeated all
levels of the American Church itself. Even if a vast majority of Catholics in the Academy
are agreed that the Catholic university needs to be a place of dialogue with the broader
culture for the benefit of both the Church and the world, it is also clear that those same
Catholic academics have an obligation to consider the impact on the Catholic faithful of
Catholic universities. All Catholic universities would list alumni, students, parents,
faculty, staff, members of the board, and the founding religious congregations among
their stakeholders. It is important that the Body of Christ—the Church in all its variety—
not be left off that list. What is needed, here, is a final consideration of what the Church
needs its universities to be. From there, it will be clearer what the role of the Catholic
scholar has to be. Then, and only then, will it be possible to consider how (or even
whether) such a scholar can be hospitable toward perspectives outside—or even

93. St. Nobert College Press Release, “Donald Trump Campaign Stop Provokes Lively Debate,”
April 5, 2016. Accessed at http://www.snc.edu/magazine/2016spring/trump.html.
94. TFP Student Action, “St. Norbert College to Host Radical and Notorious Pro-Abort Gloria
Steinem—Protest Today,” April 16, 2015. Accessed at https://www.tfpstudentaction.org/petitions/stnorbert-college-to-host-radical-notorious-pro-abort-gloria-steinem-protest-today.
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antagonistic toward—the Church while remaining rooted in the Church’s tradition at the
same time.
The Church’s Need for Hospitable Catholic Universities
The story of the first Christian Pentecost has long been suggested as the beginning
of the church. The story of a crowd made up of speakers of various foreign tongues,
united miraculously through their ability to understand the preaching of the Gospel
offered by the disciples, points decisively toward the unifying impact the Good News of
Christ is intended to have on the world. Read as an inversion of the Tower of Babel story
from Genesis 11, one might see that the church is indeed charged with working to
overcome the disruptive impacts of sin that have hampered humanity since Eden. Such
conclusions about the church’s intended, unifying impact on the whole of humanity have
cast a long shadow over the theology of the past. Without question, a significant portion
of the church’s history has been dominated by theological reflection that sought to
emphasize the faith’s ability to transcend any and all human boundaries. As Edward
Schillebeeckx posits, “Previously, one almost took for granted that the theology of the
Western churches was supraregional and was, precisely in its Western form, universal
and therefore directly accessible for persons from other cultures.”95
Unfortunately, any theology generated in an exclusively Western context proved
ultimately incapable of being truly universal in its appeal. These earlier, universal
reflections simply did not “take up the issues that were the most pressing in many local
circumstances: the burden of poverty and oppression, the struggle to create a new identity

95. Robert J. Schreiter, Constructing Local Theologies (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1999), ix.
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after a colonial past, or the question of how to meet the challenge of modernization and
the commodification of the economy in traditional culture and village life.” Instead, “The
universal theologies were preoccupied with issues not even being raised in local
situations, such as the problem of atheism or secularization.” Any attempts at imposing
such theologies on the entirety of the universal church as normative were destined to fail:
“In each case the universal theology turned out to be less than universal…”96
The church was in dire need, then, of substantial local theologies that might help
it fulfill its evangelical mission within the various cultural contexts that had proven
resistant (for whatever reason) to these earlier universal theologies. Not surprisingly, the
initial efforts by some theologians to address this need were not always well-received. As
Robert Schreiter recalls, “The fledgling contextual theologies were frequently dismissed
in Western academic settings as feeble and immature steps on the way to the
development of a real theology, that is, a critical, rational theology that rose above the
immediate situation to speak universally of God and God’s action in history.”97
There is good reason to be optimistic about the continued/future potential for the
development of local theologies through continued Catholic attention to the engagement
between culture and church. Rausch believes that “The Roman Catholic Church offers an
example of a world communion with the structures necessary to maintain and express the
communion of a world Church as a communion of communions that would be truly
catholic. The challenge is maintaining the proper relationship between the local and the

96. Robert J. Schreiter, The New Catholicity (Maryknoll: Orbis, 2004), 1.
97. Ibid, 84.
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global, the particular and the universal.”98 This is true enough, and the historical
experience of the church ought to provide many helpful precedents as this process
continues. As Richard Gaillardetz helpfully suggests, “One should recall that for the first
two centuries of Christianity, there was no universally agreed upon canon of Scripture, no
developed creed, no universally accepted organizational structures, no standard liturgical
books. Yet in the midst of this widespread diversity, Christians still believed themselves
to be united in faith.”99 In more recent history, Yves Congar has noted the relatively
significant differences between Eastern and Western ‘modes of theologizing: “The East
takes its stand on the Fathers and the Ecumenical Councils, which have stated the
essentials. Philosophy and reasoning serve for training theologians and for discussion;
not, as in Latin Scholasticism, to extend doctrine by new conclusions. Furthermore, there
is little or no reference to a central magisterium…” Nevertheless, Congar still concludes
with confidence that after “More than fifty years of careful study, numerous contacts and
a good deal of reading,” “at the sacramental level, i.e. where the supernatural mystery is
expressed in our world, East and West are the same Church.”100
At all times, though, the broad sweep of the Catholic tradition cannot be seen as
secondary to the development of local theologies. Robert Schreiter has argued strongly
on precisely this point: “Any local theology that is truly Christian has to be engaged with
the tradition, however a church might understand that tradition: the Scriptures, great
conciliar and confessional statements, the magisterium. Without that engagement, there is
98. Rausch, 181.
99. Richard R. Gaillardetz, Ecclesiology for a Global Church (Maryknoll: Orbis, 2008), 86.
100. Yves Congar, O.P, Diversity and Communion (Mystic, Connecticut: Twenty-Third
Publications, 1985), 71, 73.
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no guarantee of being part of the Christian heritage.”101 The Catholic university needs to
contribute to this engagement. A university by its very definition attempts to bring all
domains of the human knowledge into conversation with one another. The various
departments on a Catholic university campus can contribute mightily to the engagement
with cultures required to develop local theologies, while simultaneously safeguarding the
integrity of the Catholic tradition that needs to challenge and be challenged by that
engagement.
Catholic Intellectual Life
At this point, having seen the ecclesiological need for universities capable of
assisting the Church in its post-Vatican II mission, it is possible and worthwhile to make
several remarks on the origin, nature, and significance of the Catholic intellectual life.
First, both Scripture and the historical experiences of Christians testify to the need for a
vibrant intellectual component in the life of the Church. In Matthew’s Gospel, Christ
instructs the Pharisees that a part of the ‘Greatest Commandment’ is the need to love God
“with all your mind.”102 Far more recently, Pope John Paul II’s encyclical Fides et Ratio
has pointed to the divine origin of humanity’s desire to know, which is (in the words of
Paula Powell Sapienza) “a gift that comes from God’s own desire to be known.”103 The
Gospel according to John, in its identification of Christ with the divine Logos, in turn,
supports the notion of Christ as a kind of ultimate ground of all knowing.104
101. Schreiter, Constructing Local Theologies, 95.
102. Matthew 22:37.
103. Sapienza, Paula Powell, “Catholic Intellectual Life: An Opportunity for the Church to
Continue to Learn, in As Leaven in the World, ed. Thomas m. Landy (Franklin, Wisconsin: Sheed & Ward,
2001, 19.
104. John 1:1-3.
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While teaching is certainly a vital task of the Church and of the Catholic
intellectual, Sapienza rightly contends that that is, at best, only half of the story. The
Catholic intellectual life is, for her, “a vocation discerned in prayer, rooted in humility,
and based in dialogue that answers God’s call to behold and interpret God’s action in the
world. Catholic intellectual life, therefore, is an opportunity for the church (in the
broadest sense of the word) to learn….”105 It is the foundational Christian belief in the
Incarnation that supports what many have described as the sacramental principle of
Catholic thought. This principle, according to Richard T. Hughes, “points to the fact that
the natural world and even elements of human culture can serve as vehicles by which the
grace of God is mediated to human beings. This conviction allows Catholic educators to
take the world seriously on its own terms and to interact with the world as it is.”106
Regardless of academic discipline, then, the Catholic scholar is charged with discovering
the sacramental presence of God within their particular area of study. As Michael J.
Himes asserts, “…anything that awakens, enlivens, and expands the imagination, opens
the vision, and enriches the sensitivity of any human being is a religious act. Although we
may not use this language, education is or can be training in sacramental beholding.”107
Though all of the disciplines have the capacity to mediate a sacramental
worldview, this is not to suggest that there is little need for explicitly Catholic content in
either a Catholic university curriculum or in the scholarship of an individual academic. It
is important to note, however, that even the ‘classics’ of the Catholic intellectual can
105. Sapienza, 23.
106. Hughes, Richard T, “Christian Faith and the Life of the Mind,” in Faithful Learning and the
Christian Scholarly Vocation, ed. Douglas V. Henry and Bob R. Agee (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003, 11.
107. Himes, Michael J, “’Finding God in All Things’: A Sacramental Worldview and Its Effects,”
in As Leaven in the World, ed. Thomas m. Landy (Franklin, Wisconsin: Sheed & Ward, 2001, 100.
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crush students and scholars alike while also making a mockery of the Catholic
intellectual vocation. Richard Liddy notes that there “can be a Catholic fundamentalism
of an ideal past that ‘had all the answers,’ leaving us with the sole responsibility of
mindlessly passing on that tradition to the future.”108 Instead of contenting ourselves with
reading the likes of Augustine, Aquinas, and Dante, Liddy argues that “if we truly
understand the meaning of these writers, we will find ourselves invited to do in our
culture what they did in theirs. The point of any authentic tradition is to change us in the
present so that we can articulate the authentic meanings of the tradition into the
future.”109 As such, there is a need for Catholic intellectuals to help their Church engage
with all of the various philosophies, religions, and worldviews of the present.
Obviously, this engagement will enable the Church to learn, but it is equally
obvious that the Church must necessarily counteract those perspectives it considers
harmful. For the Catholic university, this suggests a need for both formative experiences
within the Catholic tradition as well as opportunities to engage the ‘other.’ For the
Catholic intellectual, there appears to be a necessary kind of balancing act. On the one
hand, there must be a grounding in one’s own Catholic intellectual tradition.
Simultaneously, though, one must also carry the riches of that tradition into a critical
encounter with whomever—and whatever—one finds as a result of their scholarship.

108. Liddy, Richard M, “The Catholic Intellectual Tradition: Achievement and Challenge,” in As
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Conclusion
Questions over the Catholic identity of Catholic institutions of higher learning
came to the foreground in the 1960’s, and they have hardly surrendered their place in the
decades since. Pope John Paul II’s apostolic constitution on Catholic higher education, Ex
Corde Ecclesiae, was itself a result of decades of dialogue, and it sparked several decades
more. In the American context, institutional autonomy and academic freedom are
hallowed virtues. Not surprisingly, much of the debate in the years after Ex Corde was
preoccupied with the question of the mandate for theologians. While it might be tempting
to argue that Catholic higher education has found an equilibrium of sorts, there remain
high-profile instances when debate over Catholic identity can quickly turn mean-spirited;
oftentimes, these cases involve speakers and awards, but even something as regular as a
review of the core curriculum can quickly be swallowed up by a broader debate over the
proper place of the Catholic university in the Church and in the world.
How might a theologian help chart a course forward? There are significant
questions that need answering, and the theologian’s perspective must be considered
alongside those of other Catholic intellectuals from other disciplines. How best to ground
a meaningful approach to building a bridge across the divide that often seems to exist
between those advocating open inquiry and those concerned primarily with fidelity to the
Catholic tradition? How to ensure room for freedom of academics while also ensuring a
bishop his ability to be the bishop within a diocese that might include a Catholic
university campus? How can an institution help the Church by exploring new
ecclesiologies, while also supporting the tradition which must serve as the measuring rod
of any ecclesiology in the final analysis? How can an institution welcome people and
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perspectives on campus without compromising the faithfulness of Catholic scholars and,
perhaps more pressingly, Catholic undergraduates?
Ultimately, this dissertation aims to show that in order for a Catholic university to
be truly hospitable (open to the outside while faithful to its own tradition), it requires the
presence of Catholic intellectuals who are truly hospitable. Three notable thinkers who
have pulled this off will be profiled. First, however, there must be a survey of what,
precisely, is meant by hospitality.

Chapter 2: Christian Hospitality, Past and Present

Introduction
To argue, as this dissertation does, that hospitality is a vital key for advancing
debates over identity in Catholic higher education is made difficult by the baggage that
the term hospitality has taken on in popular usage. For many, the word hospitality no
doubt conjures up images of the so-called ‘hospitality industry.’ Wikipedia deftly defines
this ‘industry’ as “a broad category of fields within the service industry that includes
lodging, event planning, theme parks, transportation, cruise line, and additional fields
within the tourism industry,” which no doubt conforms to a very popular notion of what
hospitality is.1 For many people, therefore, hospitality can be reduced to commerce which
capitalizes on the desire for entertainment, first and foremost, and perhaps on comfort
secondarily. Only slightly better is that understanding of hospitality which would define
it as the entertaining of friends and family. What is missing in this popular conception of
hospitality is its function throughout the Christian tradition as a virtue. Unfortunately, as
Christine Pohl has noted, even “most Christians have lost touch with the amazingly rich
and complex tradition of hospitality.”2
In the current cultural climate of the West, it may well be the case that the need
for a widespread retrieval of hospitality—extending far beyond the borders of Catholic
higher education—is desperately clear. Pohl believes that “We…find ourselves in a
1. “Hospitality Industry,” Wikipedia, last modified January 7, 2018,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hospitality_industry.
2. Christine D. Pohl, Making Room: Recovering Hospitality as a Christian Tradition (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 4.
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fragmented and multicultural society that yearns for relationships, identity, and meaning.
Our mobile and self-oriented society is characterized by disturbing levels of loneliness,
alienation, and estrangement.”3 Clearly, a virtue that is capable of encouraging a strong
sense of identity without losing compassion or charity for the other and capable of
respecting clear distinctions without setting ironclad boundaries has the potential to
mitigate the possible ill effects of the current milieu.
Happily, the Christian world has been retrieving its ancient conception of
hospitality over the past several decades. Amy Oden observes that “Conversations,
scholarship, and conferences on hospitality in the last few years have brought attention to
the ways a developed notion of hospitality might contribute to Christian community and
identity, as well as to mission, spiritual growth, and even contemporary worship.”4 While
Pohl’s work has done much to ground this retrieval of the Christian virtue of hospitality,
a great deal of credit must also be given to Henri Nouwen. In particular, his book,
Reaching Out, continues to undergird much of the contemporary discussion of
hospitality. In that work, Nouwen identified three poles “between which our lives
vacillate and are held in tension.”5 These three poles concern one’s relationship with the
self, with others, and with God. For Nouwen, the second pole is that between which
hostility can be transformed into hospitality. Such hospitality, then, “means primarily the
creation of a free space where the stranger can enter and become a friend instead of an
enemy. Hospitality is not to change people, but to offer them space where change can
3. Ibid, 33.
4. Amy G. Oden, And You Welcomed Me: A Sourcebook on Hospitality in Early Christianity
(Nashville: Abingdon Press), 13.
5. Henri J.M. Nouwen, Reaching Out (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1975), 10.
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take place.”6 This hospitality requires charity, therefore, but also no small measure of
integrity. “When we want to be really hospitable we not only have to receive strangers
but also to confront them by an unambiguous presence, not hiding ourselves behind
neutrality but showing our ideas, opinions and life style clearly and distinctly. No real
dialogue is possible between somebody and nobody.”7 Even Nouwen’s pioneering
reflection on hospitality demonstrates how the Catholic intellectual life ought to be
guided in no small part by hospitality, especially if that intellectual life is lived in the
context of a Catholic university.
A real strength of Christian hospitality lies in its ability to serve as “a bridge
which connects our theology with daily life and concerns.”8 As will be seen, hospitality
has sparked a great deal of theological reflection throughout the tradition, and it has also
proven to be a practice necessary for authentic Christian witness. In short, this virtue has
the intellectual substance to pass muster in the academy while also captivating the
imagination of those who labor in the groves of all of the Church’s ministries. For this
chapter of this dissertation, however, particular attention will be given to the potential
impact of hospitality in Catholic higher education. This chapter will begin by exploring
the Scriptural and traditional testimony on hospitality in order to understand what,
exactly, Christian hospitality entails. A consideration of the theology of hospitality will
follow. From there it will be possible to begin examining intellectual hospitality in
particular. Closely allied with this section will be a linking of hospitality with friendship,

6. Ibid, 51.
7. Ibid, 70.
8. Pohl, 8.
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which this dissertation will contend is a necessary linkage due to the circular relationship
between those two virtues. Then, the proper limits of Christian hospitality will be
described before the chapter ends with more explicit consideration of the ramifications of
hospitality for Catholic higher education. Then, and only then, will this dissertation be
able to proceed to an exploration of how intellectual hospitality (and/or friendship)
represented a vital orientation for the engagement with non-Catholic perspectives
undertaken by Merton, Lonergan, and Dunne.
Hospitality and the Old Testament
Despite the absence of the word hospitality in the Hebrew Scriptures, these texts
have nevertheless cast a long shadow on the Church’s understanding of hospitality
because the practice of hospitality is prevalent enough. Understandably, commentary on
hospitality in the Old Testament focuses a good deal of effort on the social customs of
ancient Israel. Indeed, throughout the ancient world, hospitality was often considered a
basic and essential moral practice. Hospitality by the ancients, Pohl asserts, “assured
strangers at least a minimum of provision, protection, and connection with the larger
community. It also sustained the normal network of relationships on which a community
depended, enriching moral and social bonds among family, friends, and neighbors.”9 In
the Greek and Roman view, hospitality was undertaken in a manner which “stressed
formal reciprocal obligations between benefactor and recipient.”10 The Israelite practice
of hospitality was conducted less with an expectation of future reciprocity than with a
certain gratitude for hospitality proffered them in the past. As Oden highlights, the
9. Ibid, 17.
10. Ibid, 18.
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ancient Israelites “understood themselves to be outsiders in Pharaoh’s Egypt, wanderers
in the wilderness, and settlers in the Promised Land. Their corporate identity was deeply
rooted in a sense of being strangers, even though they also understood themselves to be
God’s chosen people.”11
Genesis is the foundational text in any examination of hospitality in the Old
Testament. First and foremost, one finds there the account of God’s creation, and the
charge given to humanity to play the role of caretaker in God’s world. As Pohl states,
“the theological and moral foundations for Old Testament hospitality were tied closely to
Israel’s special relationship of dependence on and gratitude to God.”12 Perhaps of equal
importance, however, may well be the extended reflection that Genesis provides on
Election: God’s special choosing of Israel as His people. Certainly, throughout the
account of the foundation of the covenant between God and Israel, it is clear that God has
lofty plans for Abraham’s descendants. It is in the four sibling rivalry stories of Genesis,
however, that one might see most clearly the dynamic at work in Israelite hospitality. The
stories of Cain and Abel (Genesis 4:1-16), Isaac and Ishmael (Genesis 16, 21), Jacob and
Esau (Genesis 25:19-34; 27-33), and Joseph and his brothers (Genesis 37-50) all indicate
something of how the Elect and non-Elect relate to God. Even a superficial reading of
Genesis makes it clear that God is concerned also with the non-Elect. Cain, Ishmael,
Esau, and Joseph’s brothers each receive notable blessings of various kinds from God,
and Genesis leaves no doubt that those blessings do, indeed, come from God. Similarly,
one cannot read Genesis and come away believing that to be God’s Elect is to be granted
11. Oden, 17.
12. Pohl, 29.
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a life of ceaseless privilege. To the contrary, Abel dies, and Isaac is nearly sacrificed
before ultimately having his plan for his sons usurped. Jacob is exiled for an extended
period of time, is taken advantage of by his uncle Laban, and eventually has to face a
potentially murderously angry older brother. In the most well-developed of the sibling
stories, Joseph experiences something of his own passion narrative before finally being
exalted once and for all in the context of his own family.
Therefore it is hardly a startling claim that each of the four stories also indicates
something of how the Elect and the non-Elect are to relate to one another. Cain’s murder
of Abel provides no blueprint for a relationship between Elect and non-Elect, nor does
the lack of substantial interaction between Isaac and Ishmael. The partial reconciliation of
Jacob and Esau at the end of that narrative is at least an improvement from the previous
two stories, but it is really in the Joseph story that the impact of God’s Election on all
peoples can be best understood. Joseph’s ample blessings are not intended to justify a
sense of superiority on his part. Instead, his gifts are to be employed for the benefit of all.
Election seems to impart responsibility, then, rather than privilege. As such, the Israelites
are charged with witnessing to God’s universal sovereignty and God’s will. Election in
the Old Testament foreshadows, or perhaps even establishes, the tension involved in any
act of hospitality. On the one hand, Election sets the Israelites apart from all other
peoples. On the other, Election made real demands regarding how the Israelites interacted
with others. As Pohl puts it, “Embedded within the covenant between God and Israel was
Israel’s identity as an alien and its related responsibility to sojourners and strangers.”13

13. Ibid, 27.
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In terms of specific instances of hospitality in the Old Testament, the story of
Abraham’s welcome of three guests in Genesis 18 has had “a persistent formative role in
the instruction and motivation of the people of God.”14In his commentary on Genesis 18,
Lee Roy Martin has rightly noted that the Old Testament practice of hospitality is simply
“not sufficient as a contemporary model for hospitality…” Nevertheless, Martin does
note that the Hebrew Scriptures do indeed reveal “a number of theological assertions that
can undergird a contemporary Christian theology of hospitality.”15 In particular, the
Imago Dei, the fundamental relational nature of all humans, human dependence upon
each other, and the notion of all people as sojourners hosted by God are listed by Martin
as potential Old Testament building blocks for a contemporary theological reflection on
hospitality. Martin is rightly suspicious of any theology of hospitality which rules out
vigorous engagement with those outside his own tradition. The challenges posed by
pluralism in the 21st century rightly weigh heavily on Martin’s Old Testament
commentary. Where Martin misses the mark, however, is precisely in the absence of
Election on his list of salvageable theological assertions. As Pohl has noticed, “It appears
that Israelite response to strangers as inclusion or separation hinged, at least in part, on
the capacity of the stranger to threaten Israel’s identity and unity.”16 The Church, like
Israel, is similarly called to straddle the line between distinctiveness as God’s people and
engagement with the world. The Church is called to convert the world, not to become the

14. Ibid, 24.
15. Lee Roy Martin, “Old Testament Foundations for Christian Hospitality,” Verbum et Ecclesia
35.1 (2014).
16. Pohl, 137.
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world indiscriminately. Obviously, however, the Church’s hospitality must also draw
deeply from New Testament insights if it is to hold true to Christ’s Good News.
Hospitality and the New Testament
Unlike the Old Testament, the New Testament includes several explicit references
to hospitality. In a typical example from Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, Paul “urged fellow
Christians to welcome one another as Christ had welcomed them. He challenged the early
believers to ‘pursue’ hospitality; in fact hospitality was a qualification for leadership in
the early Christian communities.” Truly, as Pohl notes, hospitality came to be regarded
by Christians “as a fundamental expression of the Gospel.”17 While the word hospitality
does not appear in any of the four canonical Gospels themselves, hospitality’s
prominence in early Christian practice was nevertheless dependent largely on stories of
Christ or lessons taught by Christ.
Just as Genesis looms large in the Old Testament conception of hospitality, Luke
14 and Matthew 25 are especially influential in the New Testament contribution. In Luke
14, Christ gives clear teaching on inviting people to banquets. Simply put, “hosts who
anticipated the hospitality of God’s Kingdom welcomed the poor, lame, crippled, and
blind, those who were dependent and lived on the margins of the community. While such
hosts expected no immediate benefit, they would ultimately experience God’s repayment
at the resurrection.”18 In the famous passage from Matthew 25 in which the Son of Man
separates the ‘sheep’ from the ‘goats,’ Christ takes a drastic step beyond any of the
ancient Israelite prophets’ calls for just living by identifying Himself with the poor and
17. Ibid, 5.
18. Ibid, 21.
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downtrodden: “I tell you solemnly, in so far as you neglected to do this to one of the least
of these, you neglected to do it to me.”19 As Pohl describes it, “This passage sets up a
fundamental identification of Jesus with ‘the least of these’ and personally and
powerfully connects hospitality toward human beings with care for Jesus.”20
Jesus not only functions as a teacher exhorting His followers to be hospitable,
therefore; He also represents an embodiment of the very hospitality of God. In Pohl’s
words, “Jesus’ gracious and sacrificial hospitality—expressed in his life, ministry, and
death—undergirds the hospitality of his followers.”21Intriguingly, however, Jesus
oftentimes communicates the hospitality of God by playing the role not of the host, but
the guest. As Pentecostal theologian Amos Yong observes, “Jesus characterizes the
hospitality of God in part as the exemplary recipient of hospitality. From his conception
in Mary’s womb by the power of the Holy Spirit to his birth in a manger through to his
burial, Jesus was dependent on the welcome of others.”22 For Yong, the story of the risen
Christ on the Road to Emmaus is helpfully illustrative of this dynamic at work. Christ is
clearly invited by the two disciples traveling alongside Him to be their guest, but it is
nevertheless Christ who blesses and breaks the bread, an act which sparks their
recognition that they “had been guests in the presence of the divine all along. Similarly,
throughout his public ministry, Jesus as the recipient of hospitality is at the same time the
one who heralds and personifies the redemptive hospitality of God.” The very people

19. Matthew 25:45.
20. Pohl, 22.
21. Ibid, 29.
22. Amos Yong, Hospitality & the Other (Maryknoll: Orbis, 2008), 101.
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who welcome Christ into their homes, it seems, “become…guests of the redemptive
hospitality of God.” 23
It is necessary, also, in this consideration of the place of hospitality in the Gospels
to mention the table fellowship that was such a major pillar of Christ’s public ministry.
The joys that the Christian reader of the New Testament can glean from reading the
various stories of Jesus dining with renowned sinners, however, can pale in comparison
to the joy that comes from participating in the ritual meal instituted during Christ’s final
meal with His disciples. It is the Eucharist, after all, which “most fundamentally connects
the hospitality with God because it anticipates and reveals the ‘heavenly table of the
Lord.’” For any participant in the sacramental life of the Church, then, it will be easy to
assent to Pohl’s claim that “A shared meal is the activity most closely tied to the reality
of God’s Kingdom, just as it is the most basic expression of hospitality.”24 Before moving
on to explore the place of hospitality in early Christian thought and practice, however, it
will be worth noting, as Pohl does, that it would be insufficient to reduce the power of a
shared meal (as a glimpse of the hospitality of the Kingdom) to the physical need that is
being satisfied. “Within acts of hospitality, needs are met, but hospitality is truncated if it
does not go beyond physical needs. Part of hospitality includes recognizing and valuing
the stranger or guest.”25 Absent this, it hardly seems possible for the guest to become a
friend, or for any lasting communion to be forged.

23. Ibid, 102.
24. Pohl, 30.
25. Ibid, 31.
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The Early Church Experience of Hospitality
As is the case in Scripture, the early tradition of the Church is sparing in its
explicit references to hospitality. Nevertheless, Oden finds that hospitality is a prominent
topic in early Christian sources: “There is not so much explicit reflection by these early
Christians on the idea of hospitality as there is tacit expectation and practice of
hospitality.”26 Early Christian hospitality extended, as noted above, well beyond the
physical needs of the beneficiary to include social and spiritual needs as well.
Additionally, just as Christ Himself offered hospitality even while a guest in others’
homes, the early Christian testimony suggests an awareness that hosts had needs that
might very often be addressed by the hospitality of their guests. It is also worth pointing
out that early Christians did not think of hospitality as a checklist of possible, isolated
actions. The hospitality of the early Church, according to Oden, was “not so much a
singular act of welcome as it is…an orientation that attends to otherness, listening and
learning, valuing and honoring. The hospitable one looks for God’s redemptive presence
in the other, confident it is there, if one only has eyes to see and ears to hear. Hospitality,
then, is always a spiritual discipline of opening one’s own life to God’s life and
revelation.”27
The ‘location’ of early Christian hospitality was in the “overlap of household and
church.” It was the early Christian notion of Church as a people gathered in a homelike
setting that “was responsible for imitating God’s hospitable and gracious character. God’s
household represented the welcome of Gentiles into the inheritance together with Israel,
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and relations within this new household explicitly transcended ethnic boundaries.”28
Nevertheless, there are indications that the early Church, like ancient Israel before it, was
aware of certain tensions—and perhaps even limits—necessary to any practice of
hospitality. As Bretherton observes, “We see in the Didache a tension within the
Christian tradition of hospitality that surfaces time and again; that is, the prudential
consideration of discriminating between deserving and undeserving strangers.”29 As
Bretherton rightly concludes, however, “the very existence of documents that attempt to
address the problem of the abuse of hospitality points to how, in the early church at least,
hospitality was considered a normative and necessary practice.”30
This clear willingness on the part of early Christians to run the risks of offering
hospitality makes it unsurprising to find that this orientation to welcoming and caring for
the needs of various outsiders became something of a hallmark of Christian identity. As
Oden describes, Christians became known for extending hospitality to the sick, the poor,
travelers and pilgrims, widows and orphans, and also slaves and prisoners.31 Indeed,
Christian hospitality was apparently so pronounced and widely admired that some
opponents of the faith sought to combat its spread by emulating its practice. In the fourth
century, Julian the Apostate observed that it was from Christians’ “benevolence to
strangers, their care for the graves of the dead and the pretended holiness of their lives”
that Christianity had gained much of its momentum. Seeing also that Hellenic paganism
had a correspondingly poor track record when it came to hospitality, Julian worried that
28. Pohl, 42.
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“all men see that our people lack aid from us.” What was needed, then, was for pagan
priests to “Teach those of the Hellenic faith to contribute to public service of this sort.”32
What propelled this distinction that, even in the eyes of the church’s opponents,
set Christians apart? The Old Testament idea of God’s people on sojourn in this world
resonated strongly in the early church. With the Kingdom of God encompassing both
present and future dimensions in Christ’s teaching, it is not surprising that His early
followers took some sojourning cues from their Israelite forebears. The early Christian
voices, Oden notes, “reflect the profound conviction that Christian identity is rooted in
otherness. Before one can truly offer hospitality, one must understand one’s own
marginal position.”33 For Chrysostom, this marginality was close to the heart of the
Christian moral life: “The first virtue, indeed, the whole of virtue, is to be a stranger to
this world, and a sojourner, to have nothing in common with things here and let go of
them, as we would from anything strange to us.”34 Augustine pushes the implications of
this sojourning specifically in the direction of hospitality: “You take in some stranger,
whose companion in the way you yourself also are, for we are all strangers. This person
is a Christian who, even in his own house and in his own country, acknowledges himself
to be a stranger.”35
Even with an awareness of their own status as sojourners, the early Christians no
doubt found hospitality difficult to execute. As already seen, Christ encourages His
disciples to see Him in the stranger, the poor, and the marginalized. Nevertheless, “To
32. Pohl, 44.
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recognize Christ in the guest at the door is not easy. It is rarely the Christ we expect or
the Christ of our imaginings.”36 The identification of the other with Christ, coupled with
the Old Testament insight that all people are created in the Imago Dei made the stakes
high when it came to hospitality in a Christian’s life. Indeed, some early Christian
thinkers went so far as to equate hospitality to true worship of God. As one early third
century source puts it, “Whoever wishes to be pious towards God does good to humans,
because the body of a person bears the image of God.”37 Interestingly, this dedication to
reverencing the Image of God was central enough to early Christian practice that it
covered even hospitality extended to the dead. As Lactantius exhorted his listeners,
“…we will not tolerate the image and workmanship of God to lie exposed as a prey to
beasts and birds. Instead, we will restore it to the earth, from which it had its origin.”38In
her work on early Christian hospitality, Oden detects four distinct stages in its practice.
These stages include the welcoming of the guest, the restoration of the guest through
attention to their needs (physical or otherwise), a stage characterized by dwelling together
in common life, and then a sending forth of the guest. This final stage, as Oden notes,
“suggests that hospitality does not create systems of dependence, but empowers the other
to move on.”39
The early church was also careful not to allow very normal human desires to
interfere with Christians’ hospitable work. Chrysostom encouraged his congregation to
refrain from a practice of hospitality that was constrained by conditions: “…don’t busy
36. Ibid, 50.
37. Ibid, 55.
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39. Ibid, 146-147.
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yourself with people’s lives and doings. For this is the very extreme of stinginess, to nit
pick about a person’s entire life to avoid giving them one loaf of bread…And yet your
Master causes even the sun to rise upon him! And do you judge him unworthy of food
even for a day!”40 Ambrose, similarly, advocated for liberality in hospitality, but also
cautioned against extravagance: “It is a mark of liberality to receive the stranger, to
clothe the naked, to redeem the captives, to help the needy. It is wasteful to spend money
on expensive banquets and a lot of wine…It is wasteful to spend one’s own wealth
merely for the sake of gaining the favor of the people.”41 The monastic rule of Basil
addresses the same concern in the section on “The rule to be followed in serving meals to
guests.” According to Basil, “the desire to please men, and acting for display are strictly
forbidden to Christians under all circumstances, because even a man who observes the
precept but does it for the purpose of being seen and glorified by men loses the reward
for that observance.”42 In the West, hospitality would similarly come to play a substantial
role in its monastic traditions. The Rule of St. Benedict, for instance—which would
eventually inform the Cistercian lifestyle of Thomas Merton—has a section on the
reception of guests as well as exceptions to some of the other rules if made necessary in
the offering of hospitality.
The monastic context of hospitality indicates an evolution in the practice of
Christian hospitality that began in the early fourth century. With the legalization and
subsequent exaltation of Christianity throughout the Roman world, hospitality became
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less of a face-to-face encounter and more of an institutionalized process of directing
resources to those who needed them. While some of this institutionalization had already
begun before Constantine’s conversion, the fourth century saw instances wherein “hostels
provided care for strangers, hospitals were established for the sick, the poor, and
strangers, and monasteries welcomed pilgrims.”43 On the one hand, it is easy to see the
creation of such institutions as a step forward. As Pohl rightly observes, “The increasing
dependence on differentiated and specialized institutions of care was a response to the
increasing scale of need, to the increasing availability of resources given to the church,
and to the church’s related responsibility to the larger population.”44 On the other hand,
though, one has to ask whether anything was lost in the process. In a memorable homily,
Gregory of Nyssa railed against the possibility that Christian hospitality might become
something impersonal: “Let no one say that it is sufficient to send food to people not
involved in our lives. This does not reveal mercy but an outward show in order to remove
such persons from our presence.”45 This homily hints at one of the symptoms of the
institutionalizing of hospitality. The poor were cared for at a distance, while “personal
hospitality was increasingly reserved for visiting dignitaries.”46 With hospitality to the
poor becoming less and less personal, and further removed from households, some of the
core values of the practice of hospitality weakened considerably. As Pohl puts it,
“Commitments to respect and recognition often fade when needy persons are segregated
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out, grouped together, and hidden from view. Such populations are easily overlooked and
quickly forgotten.”47
Theology of Christian Hospitality
Having outlined the place of hospitality in Scripture and also in the early tradition
of the church, it is necessary to make some general theological assertions about the nature
of Christian hospitality before moving on to a consideration of what intellectual
hospitality might entail in a Christian context. At its center, Christian hospitality is built
on the foundational belief that God “delights in us and desires that we receive the joy and
pleasure of God’s own communion.” Hospitality, then, rests on this “overflowing
communion rather than in a scientific rationality or an understanding of an abstract
‘Real.’”48 By virtue of God’s Creation, then, it is possible to say that God offers
hospitality to humanity by giving humanity a place to call home. Because Christian
hospitality is dependent on what Amos Yong calls this “magnanimous hospitality of
God,” it is therefore “founded on the incarnational and Pentecostal logic of abundance
rather than that of human economies of exchange and scarcity.”49
The essential homelessness of Christians, which was one of many keen insights
(noted above) the early Christians had regarding hospitality, seems to outline a clear
tension, if not an outright contradiction. How can one claim that people are given a home
by God while also claiming that Christians are homeless? For Elizabeth Newman, the
resolution of this tension comes from noting that Christians are homeless “only in a
47. Ibid, 79.
48. Elizabeth Newman, Untamed Hospitality: Welcoming God and Other Strangers (Grand
Rapids: Brazos, 2007), 84.
49. Yong, 118.
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sense. We are displaced from locating our identity in our nation, our family, or our
position in society, in order to locate it more fully before God.”50 It remains possible,
therefore, for Christians to revel in—and be grateful for—the loving hospitality of God
while also experiencing something of the marginality which often seems to make
hospitality more genuine. As Pohl claims, “the best hosts are people who recognize their
own frailties and weaknesses.”51
For Bretherton, Christian hospitality as a practice is inherently eschatological in
nature and was inaugurated at Pentecost. It is both “inspired and empowered by the Holy
Spirit, who enables the church to host the life of its neighbours without the church being
assimilated to, colonized by, or having to withdraw from its neighbours.”52 Hospitality,
therefore, is the virtue which guides the church’s engagement with that which is not
church, while simultaneously preserving the integrity of the church throughout that
engagement. It is impossible, therefore, to claim that the entertainment of friends or the
visiting with family are sufficient manifestations of Christian hospitality. As Pohl makes
clear, “Hospitable attitudes, even a principled commitment to hospitality, do not
challenge us or transform our loyalties in the way that actual hospitality to particular
strangers does.”53 In effect, any theology which grounds and advocates hospitality as a
necessary Christian concern must be paired with an intentional practice. To refrain from
the practice of hospitality, furthermore, would be to potentially cut oneself off from a
significant means of encountering God’s grace. Newman captures it well when she writes
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that “the stranger may well be a messenger of God….Such hospitality is sustained not by
human ingenuity but by God, who can come to us in unexpected ways and whose
presence in the stranger might well be as discomforting as it is comforting.”54
The practice of Christian hospitality cannot be cleanly distinguished from the
theology that coincides with it. It certainly can be distinguished, though, from the type of
corporate hospitality that is characteristic of the hospitality industry. Perhaps most
startlingly different about Christian hospitality is the sheer fact that it “is not particularly
concerned with efficiency.” Instead it is content “to be patient and vulnerable with
others…since the aim is to be in God’s abundant time of giving and receiving rather than
in efficient, productive time.”55 It would, admittedly, be difficult to concentrate entirely
on efficiency while also allowing Christ to come in His own good time. The success of
Christian hospitality, then, depends less on hours logged or people helped than it does on
“the degree to which one offers one’s genuine presence with another, to fully enter
another’s world and dwell with another.”56
It is with this in mind that the importance of recognition to hospitality can be most
clearly seen. Recognition, Pohl finds, “involves respecting the dignity and equal worth of
every person and valuing their contributions, or at least their potential contributions, to
the larger community.” When people think of hospitality as something quaint or tame,
Pohl argues, it is at least “partly because they do not understand the power of
recognition.”57 For hospitality to be complete, however, this respect which is so essential
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55. Ibid, 90-91.
56. Oden, 109.
57. Pohl, 61-62.

65

to recognition must be coupled with care. In addition to the dignity of the other, one must
also be aware of his/her need. And who is this other to whom the Christian must be
respectful and caring? Though hospitality may well help one to navigate the tension
between church and world, it also challenges practitioners to expand their notion of
exactly who their neighbor might be. For Pohl, “The twin moves of universalizing the
neighbor and personalizing the stranger are at the core of hospitality.”58
Hospitality and Worship
As noted above, early Christians wasted little time in connecting authentic piety
with the practice of hospitality. The awareness of the Imago Dei in other people made
this connection an intuitive one. Unsurprisingly, then, Christians have long noted a
connection between hospitality and worship. Given the sophistication of some of the
most recent theological work done on this connection, it is important to at least briefly
survey it before moving into an exploration of intellectual hospitality.
Paul Wadell begins one of his books on Christian friendship with a compelling
line of questions: “What does worship do for us? If we find ourselves in communities of
worship week after week, has it made a difference in our lives? Has it changed us? Has it
made us see the world differently?”59 In Wadell’s thinking, worship is an integral part of
a life of discipleship. Worship and morality, for Wadell, have the same goal: “Both want
to initiate us into the truth of Jesus so we can become as much like God as we possibly
can, so resplendent in holiness and goodness that we walk the earth no longer as strangers

58. Ibid, 75.
59. Paul Wadell, Becoming Friends (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2002), 15.

66

or foes of God but as the loyal faithful friends of God…”60 Seen in this light, worship has
a transformative impact on the Christian person. Wadell argues that worship “works to
achieve in us exactly the radical, total conformity of the self to Christ”61 that God desires
from His people, but it seems clear enough that this transformation is not facilitated by
worship simply because of worship’s capacity to be educative. Newman has argued that
worship might best be understood as our “participation in divine hospitality,” just as
hospitality “names our participation in the life of God…”62
There is, then, at the very least a close relationship between worship and
hospitality, as each represents a human participation in God’s own being. Interestingly,
Newman pushes this relationship so far that she actually comes to identify worship itself
as hospitality. Newman understands that this perspective runs contrary to popular
perceptions: “Common assumptions regard worship as motivation for hospitality or as a
place we might garner some useful information about hospitality. But such assumptions
miss the mark; they make worship a means to an end, and they locate hospitality outside
of worship.”63 Put in terms somewhat more conducive to the Catholic context, Newman
argues that Eucharist and hospitality are alike in that they are both “communal acts that
call for bodies willing to give and receive the abundance of God.”64 Newman’s
reflections on this identification of worship as hospitality were spurred, initially, by her
conviction that hospitality has been a much-abused and oft-misunderstood topic in
contemporary culture. Indeed, she takes to task the perspective (which she traces back to
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Kant) which suggests that enlightenment, or even freedom, can only be achieved by
breaking away from any tradition or sense of dogma. Such optimism, Newman maintains,
is unwarranted in the current cultural climate, however. “In our late modern epoch,”
Newman rightly observes, “we can see that a self stripped of context, a ‘universal self,’ is
at the mercy of global economic and political forces beyond its control.”65 In order to
recover a place from which today’s Christian might extend hospitality, then, there comes
an inevitable ecclesiological insight that sees the church as “absolutely necessary.”66
It is when the church is gathered together in worship that it can most clearly be
seen that the church is, in fact, God’s dwelling place. As the New Testament indicates,
‘home’ is not so much a physical place as it is “a people before God.”67 Rather than
constraining the Christian’s ability to be hospitable due to some latent intolerance of
those who are not church, the idea of church as home actually frees the Christian to
practice hospitality by giving her a place from which to extend welcome. If, as Newman
argues, “church names our joining together in the household of God, then worship names
the way we participate in God’s own hospitality.”68 Presumably, if Christians are to offer
a specifically intellectual kind of hospitality, then they will also depend on an
awareness—gained in part by participation in liturgy—of the church as God’s home. The
time is now right to consider what this intellectual hospitality might be, and do.
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Intellectual Hospitality
In the current climate of American higher education, it seems likely that any
discussion of intellectual hospitality would lead to a consideration of tolerance and
inclusivity. Indeed, these concepts loom large on most campuses as universities struggle
to compete for students and avoid being pilloried for being backward, exclusive, etc.
Nevertheless, the perspective that would contrast hospitality and tolerance—rather than
equate them—has been steadily gaining momentum. Bretherton, for instance, argues
simply that “hospitality constitutes a better way of framing relations with strangers than
tolerance.”69 While aware of how the language of tolerance has come to supplant that of
hospitality, Bretherton finds tolerance inadequate for the Christian context. In part, this
inadequacy is because hospitality simply has “more antecedents in Christian social
practice than tolerance, but also, as a practice, it is founded on more explicitly biblical
and theological imperatives.” Additionally, tolerance is simply ill-equipped to engage
with contemporary diversity in moral perspectives.70 Similarly, for Newman, hospitality
is both theologically more sophisticated as well as practically advantageous than
tolerance: “In the practice of hospitality, exercising the virtue of love, we are to give and
receive from the ‘other’ as Christ would. So understood, hospitality is at once more
receptive and more active than tolerance, receptive in that it sees the other as gift and
active in that it seeks lovingly to live, speak, and hear the truth in any given situation.”71
In the cases of the Catholic intellectuals to be surveyed in the remainder of this
dissertation, it is clear that their profound abilities to engage the other did not result from
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a passive tolerance. Instead, their willingness to engage was motivated by (in all three
cases) a Christian’s desire for truth wherever it can be found and a Christian’s yearning to
love (and perhaps even learn from!) one’s neighbors wherever they are to be found.
Elizabeth Newman and a Distinctively Christian Intellectual Hospitality
So what, then, gives intellectual hospitality its potency? For Newman, much
depends on patience. The Christian intellectual must “bear with, (and)…practice
patience, in our conversations with our colleagues and students as we together grope
towards the particular truths at hand.”72 Newman makes a point of mentioning
immediately thereafter, however, that this patient awareness that all are on a similar
journey toward truth must be balanced by a real and robust courage. Jesus never refrained
from speaking the truth, Newman notes, regardless of context; regardless of whether he
played the role of guest or host. The intellectual hospitality of Christians, then, must
create “a space for Christian identity to appear as a whole way of life.” In short, then, if
such hospitality is to be vibrant and impactful, “making distinctions and separating
ourselves in some sense from other convictions, from ‘the world,’ are crucial…”73
The Christian intellectual life takes place within the life of the church. This must
be every bit as true regardless of whether a given Christian intellectual labors on the
campus of a sectarian university. Indeed, the Christian intellectual life occurs within the
life of the church even if it is not housed on any university campus at all. It is an
important form of witness for the Christian intellectual to name her commitment to God
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manifested by her vocation exactly as Christian intellectual. The surroundings may
nevertheless have an impact, obviously, on the dynamics of one’s intellectual pursuits.
Newman sees clearly that Christian intellectual hospitality is not at all for the benefit only
of those receiving welcome. On top of the predictable goods that come from
academically engaging other perspectives, though, comes something else: “Christian
hospitality gives us a vigilant place to stand to see how easily various cultural
assumptions and practices can distort our lives.”74 Without such vigilance, Newman
worries, the Christian intellectual might certainly be swept into unfaithfulness.
Hospitality therefore requires training, in which the Christian intellectual learns “how to
be steadfast in the faith while knowing how to resist that which obstructs the hospitality
of God, a resistance that might well call for a willingness to suffer.”75
One need not look all that closely at contemporary academe in order to find ample
justification for such vigilance. Pluralism, it is said, serves a global economy by making
all distinctiveness seem insignificant. Postmodernism, in the same vein, “has produced an
ethic rooted primarily in the individual and his or her choices.”76 While this ethic might
seem, initially, to be liberating, it actually serves to enslave one to a particularly narrow
tradition of thought which is subject entirely to the individual’s own notion of how his
identity ought to be created/developed. If such a tradition were to go entirely unchecked,
how could any authentic hospitality, or even pluralism for that matter, be possible?
Scientism, also, seems to pose a significant challenge to the faith of the Christian
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intellectual. By neatly separating facts and values, it would seem to lead to a worldview
entirely unrelated to the world in which anyone actually lives. Perhaps more damning is
another effect illustrated by Newman’s consideration of the problems posed by seeing
evolution as the description of how the world is and is intended to be. The very plenitude
of God would be denied, and hospitality, of course, would seem to be absurd: “It would
be better to look out for oneself and protect one’s own family and belongings.”77
With such varying intellectual trends and schools of thought vying with one
another in the academy, however, it is not at all difficult to see why many might see an
equation of hospitality with tolerance as useful. Newman correctly discerns that this
equation underwrites “the polity of our liberal democratic nation-state. By practicing such
hospitality, Christians embrace the politics of liberalism, all the while failing to notice
that it is a politics.”78 If the politics underlying the Christian attempt to practice
hospitality in the American context is built on assumptions that individuals themselves
are the ultimate (or the only) source of meaning and morality, the bar for hospitality truly
needs only to be set as high as tolerance. As Newman notes, “Liberalism therefore is
necessarily yoked with pluralism: there are plural understandings of the good.” It is
undoubtedly the virtue of tolerance, then, that can provide some semblance of social
cohesion in society with such disparate notions of morality and the proper ends of human
life.79 Naturally, Newman is bound to recognize the clear possible good of pluralism: it
allows multiple voices to be heard, and forces perspectives to be sharpened through
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engagement with different—and potentially even hostile—outlooks. There is tremendous
insight in her observation, however, that pluralism cannot provide the tools to make any
grounded conclusions regarding these differences: “pluralism has absolutely no way to
discern between the true, the good, and the beautiful and the false, the bad, and the
ugly.”80 Pluralism, then, is no guarantor of a higher education. To the contrary, Newman
argues that it actually “shuts down true learning. By imposing a ‘culture of choice,’
pluralism underwrites a market approach to education, fueled by self-interest and
competition. Such an approach makes desiring and loving the good unlikely.”81
Luke Bretherton and the Necessity of Tradition
Newman’s work leads her to the conviction that all disciplines require a kind of
catechesis “before there can be genuine debate.”82 What is required, it seems, is for the
individual intellectual to have a place to stand while engaging in the push and pull of
academic discourse. In his work on the importance of continued Christian witness in the
midst of contemporary diversity (with its attendant relativism) of moral perspectives,
Luke Bretherton seems to make a similar observation. Bretherton notes that Alasdair
MacIntyre, for instance, has found that any “rational enquiry into morals is inherently
tradition-bound and must take account of its social context.”83 While post-moderns might
predictably bristle at any suggestion of moral standards that transcend the particularities
of context, it is nevertheless the case that moral standards are, as such, universal. To
engage with the standards of another, then, is really to bring one tradition into
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conversation with another tradition. As Bretherton again summarizes MacIntyre: “It is
traditions that are the repositories of standards of rationality, which in turn enable
appropriate moral deliberation and action in accord with the natural law.”84 Such a
framing of the matter makes rational moral debate possible, in MacIntyre’s view. The
process, to be sure, is nevertheless a complex one. First, the “protagonists of each
tradition must learn the language of their rivals’ tradition….” Second, each side must
give “an account or history of the other in terms defined by the other, thus demonstrating
that it properly understands the other within the other’s own criteria of evaluation.”
Finally, each tradition must evaluate “itself in the light of its rival and (judge) whether its
own account of the truth is inferior to that offered by its rival.”85
Bretherton also engages with Germain Grisez’s conclusion that “all traditions,
despite great variation of culture, and the problems of sin, share a general, or universal,
ethic based on practical reason.”86 Thus for Grisez, then, there is an underlying
consistency binding all traditions together that makes MacIntyre’s fears of fragmentation
unfounded. Interestingly, then, Grisez would argue that there is no ultimately significant
difference between what a disciple of Christ holds to be morally upright and the moral
sensibilities of non-Christians. As Bretherton summarizes, “In effect, Grisez is saying
that Christ simply republishes the moral law.”87 Whereas MacIntyre envisions any
progress in dialogue over moral disputes between traditions to be very difficult, Grisez
detects enough common ground stemming from practical rationality that such progress
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could be gained relatively easily. Rather starkly, though, Bretherton himself rejects
Grisez’s perspective as utterly unfaithful: “To resort to a general ethic to justify Christian
moral claims demonstrates a lack of faith in Christ.”88 Christologically, Bretherton’s
rejection of Grisez is strong. Nevertheless, one wonders if Bretherton would be better off
considering a somewhat more inclusivist awareness that God’s Word may well cast a
shadow far longer than even His most devoted disciples might realize.
Bretherton is surely on more stable theological ground in his skepticism regarding
MacIntyre. He notes, correctly, that MacIntyre allows for the possibility of one tradition
being vindicated over and against another, but “there is always the possibility that another
tradition might arise which can usurp the former victor.” Such insecurity, Bretherton
contends, is incompatible with faith in the Gospel. “There is no room for slipping into
such insecurity in Christianity: the gospel is good news precisely because the future is
already achieved in Christ and we can now trust that goodness and justice will prevail
against all that oppose their establishment.”89
Instead, Bretherton relies on the ecclesiological work of Oliver O’Donovan to
inform his conception of Christian intellectual hospitality as proper response to ethical
disputes with non-Christians. Bretherton argues that O’Donovan provides an
ecclesiological model which “can account for both the church’s distinctiveness from, and
the possibility of the church sharing its life together with, its neighbours.”90 Given the
ability of ‘the world’ to become ‘church,’ Bretherton recognizes this is a fine line to
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walk: “In this age, no clear dividing lines can be identified between Christians and nonChristians; all such division will only become clear at the eschaton.”91 It is ultimately, for
Bretherton, Christian hospitality which is necessary to straddle both distinctiveness and
the possibility of communion:
Importantly, the motif of hospitality maintains the key eschatological tensions of Christian
specificity. It does not force a harmony either through abstraction: that is, the term does not
dissolve the eschatological tension by appealing to some universal principle (love, justice, and so
on); neither does it demand that Christians enter into relations with their neighbours on the basis
of a rivalry between competing traditions. Rather, the motif highlights the central and substantial
concerns already discussed; that is, it allows for Christians to retain their specific criteria for
evaluating the veracity of moral claims, while at the level of moral practice experiencing both
continuity and discontinuity with their neighbours.92

Amos Yong and a Pneumatological Hospitality
While Bretherton arrives at the importance of intellectual hospitality in
considering ethical disputes between traditions, Pentecostal theologian Amos Yong
comes to the same realization via his work to develop a vigorous theology of religions.
Broadly speaking, Yong acknowledges that while “there are valid arguments for forms of
Christian sectarianism that can serve as correctives to Christian expressions that are
overly accommodating to cultural dynamics and fads,” he also sees clearly that “there are
also unhealthy fundamentalisms shaped by religious convictions and forms of life that are
immune to external criticism.” What is needed, then, is a means of facilitating
introspection on the part of the church. Yong contends that “the space for self-reflexivity
and criticism is opened up precisely in the hospitable encounter with the stranger, the
alien, and even the religious other.”93 With a pneumatological emphasis befitting his
tradition, Yong argues that “the many works and tongues of the Spirit of Pentecost open
91. Ibid, 113.
92. Ibid, 128.
93. Yong, 53.
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up to many practices vis-à-vis the religions.”94 It is, therefore, the Spirit that animates the
Christians’ side of any meaningful engagement with the other. “…the Christian doctrine
of hospitality provides a rich framework to think about how the many tongues, gifts, and
works of the Spirit enable and empower a wide range of Christian practices with regard
to other religious traditions in general and people of other faiths in particular.”95
Yong considers the theological suppositions of what he considers the exclusivist,
inclusivist, and pluralist perspectives on the theology of religions, and proceeds then to
examine what practices the beliefs of each seem to support.96 Yong surveys both
Scripture and tradition in piecing together his pneumatological theology of interreligious
engagement, and ultimately draws conclusions that sound commensurate to Bretherton’s.
Namely, “the requisite posture is much more paradoxical in affirming both
countercultural opposition and hospitable openness…In this case, countercultural
opposition means maintaining a distinctively Christian communal identity, but hospitable
openness means interacting with rather than isolating ourselves from our neighbors.”97
Thinkers as diverse as Newman, Bretherton, and Yong have contributed much to
the recent retrieval of hospitality in general, and also to a more specific defining of what
Christian hospitality might mean in an intellectual sphere. In particular, all three would
be wary of a crude conflation of hospitality with tolerance. For all three, hospitality
implies a radical openness that is possible only when one knows where home is, and also
something of what it is that makes home distinctive. It will no doubt strike the reader that
94. Ibid, 57.
95. Ibid, 65.
96. See Yong, 65-98.
97. Ibid, 125.
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none of these three thinkers writes from an explicitly Catholic perspective. This absence
of Catholic voices will not continue long into the next section of this chapter, much less
the remainder of this dissertation as a whole. It will be seen in the chapters on Merton,
Lonergan, and Dunne that their own journeys as Catholic intellectuals reflected an
authentic Christian hospitality. All three were eager to engage the other, to love and to
learn. And for all three, this hospitality was not inhibited by, but was indeed spurred by,
the content of their own Catholic tradition. At this point, attention must be paid to another
Christian virtue, one which has long been closely related to hospitality.
Friendship and Hospitality
It has already been noted that this modern retrieval of hospitality was sparked in
no small part by the work of Henri Nouwen. It is worth mentioning again at this juncture
that, in Nouwen’s definition of hospitality, it is clear that Christian hospitality is oriented
toward the transformation of enemies into friends. Although hospitality cannot coerce a
recipient into friendship, there is an openness to friendship which is integral to the
practice of Christian hospitality.98 On the one hand, there is certainly reason to suspect
that this connection of hospitality and friendship is detrimental to hospitality. After all,
hospitality has clearly entailed significant risk for Christian practitioners as often as not.
There is an obviously selfless element to it. Friendship, on the other hand, has not always
found a home in Christian thinking, precisely because it seems to pale in comparison to
the selfless agape of the Gospel. “In friendship we see an exclusive, preferential love
based on what people find attractive in one another. In agape we see an inclusive,

98. Nouwen, 51.
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universal love that goes out to anyone regardless of whether that love is returned,
regardless of whether we find the person easy to love or not.”99
The work of Paul Wadell on Christian friendship can add significant texture to the
relationship between friendship and hospitality noted by Nouwen. For Wadell, though
agape and friendship may move in different directions, it is not necessary to see them in
opposition to one another. “As such, friendship can school us in the virtues because it
demands getting outside ourself, it demands developing a horizon of interests and
concerns beyond the confines of the self. Friendship enlarges the self, but only to the
degree that it focuses on another precisely as other.”100 Indeed, for Wadell, morality itself
can only be understood as something which happens to someone in relationship with
others. “Morality is an implication of otherness, and this means we can only be moral
when we learn to appreciate what is not ourselves.”101 When one is hospitable—and open
to the prospect of friendship—there is significant exposure to risk. The world must
necessarily become a bigger place, and there is no guarantee that one’s previous
understandings and suppositions will continue to be tenable in precisely the way they had
been. “It is impossible to risk such hospitality without feeling a loss of self, without an
initial sense of disintegration, for that is exactly what happens.”102
Wadell’s insights make it rather easier to see what exactly is at stake when
Christian hospitality is being ventured. There is clearly much that can be gained from a
hospitable encounter with those who might help one better understand himself, God’s
99. Paul Wadell, Friendship and the Moral Life (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press,
1989), 70.
100. Ibid, 80.
101. Ibid, 145.
102. Ibid, 146.
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creation, or even God Himself. How much difference can be ‘absorbed’ within the
context of Christian hospitality, however? How much broadening of horizons ought one
risk in the interest of friendship? It is Newman, though, who articulates best the nature of
the dilemma when it comes to intellectual hospitality: “The challenge, in terms of
hospitality, is to discern when our differences ought to be embraced and when they need
to be transformed.”103 Indeed, when precisely is friendship a realistic possibility when
Christian hospitality is offered? It will be necessary to expand a bit on the relationship
between hospitality and friendship here before considering further the importance (and
advantages) of friendship.
Newman examines this relationship in the midst of an overarching explanation of
the dangers posed to Christian hospitality by individualism. “That we are created for
communion with God and others means that we are part of a tradition in which we are
dependent on others…to demonstrate to us what we are to be. Such a politics does not
depend on individualism but rather on friendship.”104 An awareness of humanity’s telos,
then, orients the Christian’s life toward the prospect of friendship, and it is this
orientation which makes hospitality possible. At the same time, though, Newman also
contends that friendship is dependent on hospitality. She sees that “hospitality involves
taking delight in the dynamics of giving and receiving such that we become more fully
capable of delighting in the love of God. Without such hospitality, friendship is not
possible.”105

103. Newman, Untamed Hospitality, 178.
104. Ibid, 141.
105. Ibid, 142.
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Wadell’s work confirms Newman’s suspicion that friendship and hospitality
relate in a dynamic, clearly non-linear way. It would be too simplistic, it seems, to say
only that hospitality leads to friendship or that friendship facilitates hospitality. As
already seen, Wadell considers friendship to be something of a school of the moral life, in
that it forces the human person to look beyond the self. “The plot of the moral life,”
Wadell posits, “is to move beyond the security but hopelessness of egotism to the risk but
enrichment of hospitality, and this is one thing friendship achieves.”106 Wadell also seems
to suggest that the offering of friendship can simply be a part of hospitality: “There are
people dying for attention, people silently screaming out for a moment of recognition, a
chance to be befriended. For us to befriend them is to give them the attention of love, to
rescue them with the gift of life sometimes only a stranger can give.”107 While there may
well be a certain intuitive consistency to supposing that hospitality must come first with
friendship following, the above demonstrates that there is an equally potent movement
beginning with friendship and leading to hospitality. If, as Wadell argues, “There is a
disintegration of the self in friendship because there is also a redefinition of self,” then it
is exactly friendship which ought to help Christian hospitality be a great deal more than a
means of entertaining those whom one already likes.108
Friendship
The previous chapter makes clear that this dissertation was undertaken largely out
of concern for a Catholic university’s ability to be true both to its own Catholic identity

106. Wadell, Friendship and the Moral Life, 147.
107. Ibid, 159.
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as well as to the rigorous demands of being not only a university but also a part of the
Catholic Church’s encounter with—and even witness to—the world. This second chapter
has followed with very little of that clear institutional orientation. As will become clearer
in the remaining chapters, this dissertation contends that it would be utterly foolish to
suggest that something as complex as a Catholic university can straddle the demands of
both identity and mission if an individual Catholic scholar cannot remain faithfully
Catholic and hospitable to the other. As such, the remaining chapters will each be
devoted to profiling a Catholic intellectual who—to one degree or another, and in his
own unique ways—remained rooted in the Catholic tradition while engaging with those
outside that same tradition. As such, this second chapter’s extended consideration of
hospitality would seem incomplete (especially given the previous section) if more time
were not spent examining further the Christian’s need for friendship.
In the farewell discourses of John’s Gospel, Christ makes a claim that may well
seem to be hard to reconcile with the high Christology of that text. “I do not call you
servants any longer, because the servant does not know what the master is doing; but I
have called you friends, because I have made known to you everything that I have heard
from my Father.”109 This passage has heartened Christian readers ever since, and indeed
has occasionally informed Christian thought on humanity’s proper end. Aquinas, for
instance, believed “we can, are called to be, and must be friends of God. That is what our
life is, a life of ever-deepening friendship with a God who is our happiness…”110 For
Wadell, God draws us into this friendship with Himself through a process in which
109. John 15:15.
110. Wadell, Friendship and the Moral Life, 120.
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people learn to be friends with one another. When friendship with God is achieved, “we
give ourself away, we surrender to the Spirit, and in that surrender our most exquisite
individuality is secured, for we come to be what God in perfect love has always wanted
us to be.”111 Longtime missionary Christopher Heuertz and Pohl put it more concisely,
stating that “Friends of God love what and whom God loves.”112 They also provide a
meaningful addendum to Wadell’s notion that human friendship serves as a school of
morality in which people learn to be friends of God. Reflecting on the experience of
trying to aid women fleeing the commercial sex industry in South Asia, Heuertz describes
the great pain he felt when one of the women to whom his mission had offered hospitality
betrayed and robbed them. Even in failing to cultivate friendship, however, Heuertz
found himself ‘schooled in morality.’ “Slowly we were being reconciled to God’s vision
of faithfulness and love. Through the pain of loss we came to realize the joy of giving
ourselves in love and friendship.”113
Nevertheless, it is Wadell’s contention that without friendship, life morally is not
worth living. Of course, this might easily be reconciled with Heuertz’s experience. His
earlier experiences of friendship had no doubt given him a much clearer idea of what had
been lost when he was betrayed and robbed by a previously prospective friend. Indeed,
even in failing in the offering of friendship, Heuertz experienced something of the
breaking out of oneself that Wadell argues is necessary for the moral life. “It is never
enough,” Wadell posits, “just to be ourselves, we have to grow, to be transfigured from
111. Ibid, 121.
112. Christopher L. Heuertz and Christine D. Pohl, Friendship at the Margins (Downers Grove:
IVP Books, 2010), 30.
113. Ibid, 37.
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sinners into friends of God.”114 And the human person, it is worth adding, is never
capable of effecting this transfiguration alone. God’s grace, obviously, is of paramount
importance. Friendship with others, too, is indispensable; “there simply is no other way to
come in touch with the goods that make us whole than through relationships with those
who share them.”115 It is in the moral life, nurtured by friendship, that one discovers
when she is at her best. What love will bring her to fullness? For Wadell, then, morality,
which depends on friendship, is not simply one compartment within one’s life. Instead,
“it is the whole of life viewed a certain way, seen as the story of how men and women
through their beliefs, convictions, and actions, through their loves, passions, and
attachments, together make themselves into someone they had not been before.”116
Given Wadell’s strong statements on the necessity of friendship for morality and
the extreme significance of morality for achieving one’s telos, it is perhaps important to
note that these insights ought not lead one to conclude that friendship is primarily about
selfishly looking after one’s needs. American culture, however, is greatly influenced by
both consumerism and materialism, which can distort a healthier understanding of what
Christian friendship ought to entail. In the first place, “they seriously misunderstand what
a good friendship is. In the ideology of consumerism, the primary purpose of any
relationship is to fulfill our needs, but this fundamentally redefines what a friendship is.”
Such an understanding would surely lead one ‘friend’ to manipulate another. Materialism
and consumerism also undermine friendship in that they form “in people qualities of
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character that are the antithesis of what good friendship requires….If we believe what we
own matters more than who we love, we will hardly be unselfish enough to seek the good
of another for her or his own sake or find joy in expending ourselves for their well-being,
which is exactly what friendships require.”117
In a very real way, friendship is a kind of sacramental encounter. The love of a
friend makes real the love that God also has for a person. This sacramental nature of
friendship, coupled with Wadell’s notion of friendship as a school of virtue, moves
friendship to a place far more central to the Christian life than many have previously
accorded it. Undoubtedly, friendship has a close relationship to hospitality. The Christian
learns hospitality by being a friend, even as it is an initial gesture of hospitality that
makes friendship possible. What, then, might the implications of this relationship be for
the church as a whole? In Wadell’s estimation, “If the church is faithful to its identity as
the friends of God, it should be a befriending community that not only welcomes all who
come to it but also offers them a place where the grammar of intimacy and friendship can
be learned.”118 As the church’s ability to be hospitable goes, so too, it would seem, goes
its willingness to befriend.
Limits of Hospitality
Hospitality has been proposed as a vital tool that Catholic higher education ought
to employ to more effectively navigate questions of institutional identity in a way in
keeping with the riches of the Catholic tradition. Hospitality’s roots in both Scripture and
the early history of the church have been explored. The nature of Christian hospitality has
117. Wadell, Becoming Friends, 48-49.
118. Ibid, 53.
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been found to clearly contrast with the far less risky hospitality of the ‘hospitality
industry.’ Moving closer to the central matter at hand in this dissertation, Christian
intellectual hospitality has been considered as well, drawing from the work of three
recent Christian scholars. Finally, the relationship of hospitality to friendship has been
defined as a kind of circular interchange. Before concluding this chapter with a section
linking hospitality explicitly to Catholic higher education, it is a good time to briefly
remember that Christian hospitality—despite being inspired by the loving plenitude given
by God and motivated by a selfless charity for fellow people as Christians continue their
pilgrimage—does in fact brush up against very real limitations. Hospitality creates a
space wherein communion between even erstwhile antagonists can find grounds for
communion and friendship. In order for that space to be structurally sound, it has to be
constructed of something real. Intellectually, it seems, hospitality must necessarily imply
formation in a tradition of thought and some commitment to that tradition in order for any
communion to be substantial.
Nevertheless, a certain sadness accompanies any limitations on Christian
hospitality. While studying Christian communities noted for their hospitality, Pohl
discovered that most had initially resisted any idea of boundaries. Only gradually did they
find that “certain guidelines, certain boundaries were necessary to be able to continue
offering hospitality.” Even so, these same communities retained an obvious ambivalence
regarding these same limitations that they had placed upon themselves. They were, at
best, “a concession to human finiteness, and they were never imposed without regret for
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the cost and loss involved.”119 It is hard for practitioners of Christian hospitality to square
boundaries of any kind with the kind of gracious plenty that seems so characteristic of
God’s love. Indeed, what limits, one might ask, did Christ place upon Himself as He
underwent his Passion? Limiting hospitality, Pohl notes, “seems to undermine what is
fundamental to the practice.”120 As much as a Christian might be on her guard to make
sure she never turns Christ Himself away, and as much as that same Christian be
desperate to incarnate something of God’s own hospitality, there is no shame—or sin—in
remembering that she is, by nature, limited. Pohl acknowledges that “Although
boundaries are difficult to impose and sometimes contested by hosts and guests, ignoring
limits can be a form of arrogance, a refusal to recognize finiteness.”121
More to the point of this dissertation is Newman’s caution regarding inclusiveness
pushed too far: “Christian hospitality disappears when the distinction between church and
world is collapsed.”122 Newman is a strong advocate of retaining a sense of discipline in
Christian hospitality. Any practice of hospitality, Newman rightly sees, “is going to be
exclusive in some sense. Since such practice will always be rooted in a broader tradition
regarding the way the world is and regarding the good and the true, it is going to
necessarily exclude other kinds of hospitality.”123 Without a disciplinary way of
functioning as the body of Christ, Newman worries, “the church risks becoming a
collection of individuals who might share common beliefs or common likes but who
cease to be a visible, political body. Undisciplined hospitality easily becomes superficial,
119. Pohl, 129.
120. Ibid.
121. Ibid, 134.
122. Newman, Untamed Hospitality, 43.
123. Ibid, 165.
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often judging poorly out of false desires, such as the desire to be liked.”124 There may
well be times, then, that even an act of rejection on the part of the Christian may well be
an act of hospitality. While such an act of calculated rejection might be said to protect the
integrity of the church in some way or another (depending on the reasons for the
rejection), it seems clear that it may also protect the integrity of the rejected person’s
freedom. Should she not have a right to freely choose, or reject, that which is,
authentically, Christ’s church at its best and most genuine?
Links to Catholic Higher Education
Elizabeth Newman criticizes a significant swath of Christian (Catholic and
otherwise) higher education on the question of identity. What she terms “woefully
inadequate” ways of talking about Christian identity stem, in her thinking, from a
“malformed theology” that rests on the conviction that faith and knowledge “are separate
entities or exist in separate spheres.”125 In the case of particular institutions, that is a
conviction this dissertation shares. It would, of course, be difficult to take a university’s
Catholic identity seriously if that identity did not extend down into the part of the
university’s life that dealt with teaching and learning. This is not simply a case of
Catholic higher education being different for difference’s sake. As Newman puts it
elsewhere, “The vocation given to Christian institutions is the same one given to
Christians individually. It is, in the words of the encyclical Veritatis Splendor, a ‘vocation
to perfect love.’”126 If this is the case, then it is surely clear that the politics of Catholic
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higher education must run counter to the highly-individualistic politics of the time. No
small part of this counter-cultural bent ought to be the Catholic university’s comfort with
speaking of the proper ends of a Catholic university education. Monika Hellwig once
suggested that “If we look at higher education in terms of Christianity, then the goal for
students is not the moment of graduation but the moment they die. What have they done
with their lives? The goal should be a lifetime engagement in search of the reign of
God.”127
Of course, such explicitly religious language certainly will make many in the
broader academic world uncomfortable, as it will seem to be potentially exclusive of
those who do not, for whatever reason, subscribe to that language. The true danger,
however, may well lie in a universalist rationalism which would “(maintain) that true
intellectual discourse requires the privatization, or even abandonment, of explicitly
religious language.”128 It is actually this kind of a position which threatens Catholic
institutional identity and has the potential to seriously flatten the intellectual landscape of
American higher education as a result. Newman, in a manner not unlike this dissertation,
believes strongly that “the practice of Christian hospitality can give us language, skills,
and virtues that enable us to speak more truthfully about Christian higher education.”129
Rather than contribute to more exclusion or a dumbing down of the Catholic university’s
intellectual atmosphere by amplifying the religious language used to express its identity,
however, exactly the opposite becomes likely. “To invoke the Christian practice of
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hospitality,” Newman explains, “…is to call attention to a complex tradition, a story, a
concrete place even, from which we think, come to know, engage the other, and generally
move forward in our intellectual pursuit of truth.”130
It is been made clear that hospitality—as the Christian tradition has always
understood it—simply does not rely “upon a hostility to givenness. Rather, hospitality
delights in and is even defined as the welcoming of the other as gift. To practice this kind
of welcome, we must see our own condition as gift, as something we did not simply
create or construct, nor as something essentially oppressive.”131 As Pohl succinctly notes,
“Hospitality requires some material resources.”132 When it comes to intellectual
hospitality, perhaps the most important resource is having a place to stand. That is to say,
the most important resource for a practitioner of Christian intellectual hospitality, and
indeed the most valuable thing that practitioner has to offer, may well be the intellectual
tradition which makes such hospitality possible in the first place. As Newman posits,
“making distinctions and separating ourselves in some sense from other convictions, from
‘the world,’ are crucial if hospitality is going to be a truly vibrant practice.”133
Oden acknowledges that “The virtue and practices of hospitality do not emerge
automatically in most communities. They must be cultivated.”134 This would no doubt be
the case every bit as much in a contemporary Catholic university as it ever was in a
medieval monastery. Some of the practical steps that an institution might take will be
addressed toward the end of this dissertation. Between now and then, however, it must be
130. Ibid.
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shown that this idea of Christian intellectual hospitality is, in fact, workable on any level
whatsoever. Noting the dependence that many have on institutions for imparting
hospitality, Pohl states that while this may lessen the amount of personal investment and
responsibility required, something important is missing: “But hospitality requires both
personal and communal commitment, and settings which combine aspects of public and
private life.”135 If a Catholic university has any hope of being truly hospitable, then, it
will require the presence of dedicated Catholic intellectuals who themselves manage to be
intellectually hospitable. What would such intellectual hospitality look like? Each of the
next three chapters will examine the hospitality of a noted Catholic intellectual in the
hope of drawing systematic conclusions on the nature of a specifically Catholic
intellectual hospitality.

135. Pohl, 151.

Chapter 3: Thomas Merton’s Monastic, Global Hospitality

Introduction
In November 1958, Trappist monk, American public intellectual, and famous
Catholic author Thomas Merton wrote a letter to Pope John XXIII which reflected
Merton’s developing sense of his vocation and also would serve to define much of his
activity for the ten remaining years of his life. Ten years earlier, Merton’s spiritual
autobiography, The Seven Storey Mountain, had been received with great acclaim, despite
a pronounced renunciation of the world, which may actually have contributed to its
popularity in the years immediately after the Second World War. In the interim, Merton
had sought greater solitude in a monastery bursting with new additions to the Trappist
order attracted in no small part by his own writing. Drawn to a contemplative vocation,
Merton’s outlook was radically altered by the experience of being master of scholastics
and then, several years later, master of novices. In a sequence rather reminiscent of
Wadell’s description of friendship as a school of charity, Merton found his relationship to
the aspiring monks as their teacher to be utterly transformative. Merton explained to the
Pope that he had “come to see more and more what abundant apostolic opportunities the
contemplative life offers, without even going outside the monastic cloister.”1
Merton desired to share his contemplation with the world. Indeed, he desired to be
enriched through his exchanges with various intellectuals from throughout the world, but
he was also firmly convinced that he had something to offer them as well. Merton
informed the Pope that he had had “the experience of seeing that this kind of
1. William H. Shannon and Christine M. Bochen, editors, Thomas Merton: A Life in Letters (New
York: HarperOne, 2008), 103.
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understanding and friendly sympathy, on the part of a monk who really understands
them, has produced striking effects among artists, writers, publishers, poets, etc., who
have become my friends without my having to leave the cloister.”2 And it was, truly, as a
Catholic monk that Merton engaged with an almost incredibly wide range of people with
an equally wide range of backgrounds and perspectives. Reassuring the Pope that his
vision for his somewhat peculiar vocation had received the approval of his superiors at
Gethsemani Abbey and within the Cistercian order, Merton described his calling as “an
apostolate of friendship.”3
This chapter suggests Merton as an exemplar of precisely the kind of intellectual
hospitality described at length in the previous chapter. Merton corresponded, visited, and
was visited by friends of various faiths and friends with seemingly no faith at all.
Throughout the entirety of his apostolate, Merton maintained his Catholic convictions
even as he enriched them with the insights his exchanges garnered. In 1965, the heart of
the period in which Merton was pursuing the apostolate of friendship, he wrote in
Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander that he found in himself “not the slightest inclination
to be anything but ‘Catholic.’ Any further question of other institutions, other
organizations, appears to me to be totally ludicrous. I believe in the Church. I am in the
place where Christ has put me. Amen. On the other hand, I wish I had more
charity.”4Moreover, this chapter will contend that it was actually the content of his
Catholic worldview—specifically the Christological conclusions that he would draw later
2. Ibid, 104.
3. Ibid.
4. Thomas Merton, Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander, (Turnbridge Wells, Kent: Burns & Oates,
1995), 250.
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in life, as the previous quote just begins to suggest—that enabled his apostolate of
intellectual friendship in the first place. In turn, this dissertation will proceed to argue that
Merton’s example may have lessons for the Catholic intellectual life generally, and
indeed for Catholic higher education in particular.
In some ways, though, it may seem odd to suggest a useful connection between
Merton and Catholic higher education. On the one hand, Thomas Del Prete has long
argued that Thomas Merton provides an attractive foundation for a spirituality of
education. Despite the ‘pithiness’ of Merton’s explicit references to education as such,
“they become magnified enormously in scope and depth when set against the rich
background of Merton’s life, his spiritual and social writing, his creative expression, and
his Christian contemplative perspectives nurtured in the midst of the twentieth century.”5
On the other hand, however, Merton has sometimes been declared an intellectual without
the refinement characteristic of academe. G.T. Dempsey has rather strongly asserted that
“despite being intensely bookish,” Merton himself was simply “not a scholar.”6 Dempsey
goes back to Merton’s MA thesis at Columbia University to find early evidence of “the
lack of the necessary knowledge in depth of the subject matter and a disregard for
historical contextualization and causation” that “remained hallmarks of Merton’s work
throughout his life.”7 Truly, it is not difficult to find the word impulsive used to describe
Merton in any commentary on his life. Merton himself was well enough aware that he

5. Thomas Del Prete, Thomas Merton and the Education of the Whole Person (Birmingham:
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7. Ibid, 355.
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had a habit of writing too much too soon.8 And yet, it is important to remember that what
may have been recorded in journals or even sent in letters were not always—or even
often—Merton’s ultimate conclusions on a given topic. Merton biographer Michael Mott
notes that Merton had long had a habit of testing alternative perspectives by getting and
gauging reactions from others.9 Perhaps to some extent the relationship(s) Merton was
forming at a given time was a matter of greater urgency to him than the immediate
consistency and lasting tenability of his assertions.
Nevertheless, Merton’s bookishness (amateurish though it may have been), the
development of his perspective on solitude and contemplation, and his insight regarding
the true self have all contributed to make Merton’s writings classics—in some cases
instantly so. While Merton may have lacked some of the polished critical analysis of a
seasoned scholar, he nevertheless had an impressive ability “to learn from others yet
think for himself, even as an impressionable college student.”10 Additionally, the use of
Merton as an exemplar of sorts for academicians seems justifiable also on the grounds of
the intellectual activity that Merton’s work has inspired in the decades since his death.
Within a mere eleven years after his death, Elena Malits notes that there were already
“some sixty-seven doctoral dissertations or master’s theses on Thomas Merton” either
finished or in progress.11 As of this writing, some fifty years since Merton’s death, he

8. Michael Mott, The Seven Mountains of Thomas Merton, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1984),
373, 525.
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continues to be read, continues to inspire, and remains an exemplar of astonishing
curiosity and literary output. It is with this in mind that this chapter proceeds.
Friendship and the Early Merton
Thomas Merton was born in France in January 1915, to an American mother and
a New Zealander father. Merton’s childhood was characterized by frequent travel and
significant autonomy, both of which resulted in part from the loss of both parents before
he had entered college. After a disastrous year at Cambridge during which he fathered a
child out of wedlock, Merton moved to the United States, where he would soon enroll at
Columbia University. Over the course of the following decade, Merton’s path would lead
him through a conversion to Catholicism, and even through discernment of a vocation to
the Trappists. Merton’s life as a Trappist (until his death in 1968) was characterized in no
small part by his career as a prolific author of works of Catholic spirituality, social
commentary, and monastic witness.
While conducting the research for his impressively comprehensive biography of
Merton, Michael Mott found that many of the people with whom he spoke had found
something perhaps both disarming and mesmerizing in their respective encounters with
Merton. For many of these people, Mott relates, there was a clear sense “that when
Merton talked to you he made you feel—at least for the time—that you were his most
intimate confidant, that he opened himself to you and you opened yourself to him in a
way which made it an exchange like no other, and that this friendship could not be
duplicated by either of you with anyone else.”12 If Merton truly possessed such an intense
charisma, it may go a long way toward explaining the success of the apostolate of
12. Mott, xxvi.
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friendship which dominated his latter years. At the same time, though, Mott does also
suggest that Merton had a peculiar ability to “(hide) himself in a blaze of selfrevelation.”13 This is less likely an indication of consistent disingenuousness on Merton’s
part than it is simply a clear sign that the quality of Merton’s interactions with others
changed markedly over time. As a young man, Merton’s intensity was in no small part a
symptom of his desire to assert himself over and above his various youthful insecurities.
Later on, however, this intensity is a reflection of the earnestness with which he sought
the communion of true friendship with others.
This section of the chapter will outline some of Merton’s earlier forays into
friendship, so as to better contextualize later on the relationships that were part of his
apostolate of friendship, his attitude toward them, and the impact they had on him.
Throughout The Seven Storey Mountain, Merton displays an almost incredible capacity
for recollection. Obviously, any autobiographical work must be read critically, and it is
clear that Merton is interpreting (sometimes decades after the fact) various events in his
life in terms of Providence at work in the story of his conversion. In the early chapters of
The Seven Storey Mountain, Merton paints vivid portraits of the family members who
impacted him most greatly. Strikingly absent from his account of the young Merton’s
life, however, are any really meaningful friendships. Of course, this could simply be part
and parcel of Merton the monk casting judgement upon Merton the boy, as is typical
enough in his autobiography. And yet, another factor here is that Merton the orphan
seems to have resisted to the utmost almost anything which might have grounded him, or

13. Ibid, xxv.
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encouraged him to look beyond himself. As Merton recounts, “The death of my father
left me sad and depressed for a couple of months. But that eventually wore away. And
when it did, I found myself completely stripped of everything that impeded the
movement of my will to do as it pleased. I imagined that I was free.”14 Straight through
the dismal experience of his single year at Cambridge, Merton does not give the reader
much reason to believe that any of his friendships were actually lasting, or even
substantial.
Things would certainly change on that front in Merton’s recalling of his days at
Columbia. It was there that Merton found friendships capable of inspiring in him
something beyond self-interest. Nestled amidst his Columbia memories is Merton’s
acknowledgement that “God has willed that we should all depend on one another for our
salvation, and all strive together for our own mutual good and our own common
salvation.”15 Thus, Merton would eventually be convinced that it was no mere accident
that he enrolled at Columbia, nor was it simply the peculiarities of personality that held
his social circle together: “So now is the time to tell a thing that I could not realize then,
but which has become very clear to me: that God brought me and a half a dozen others
together at Columbia, and made us friends, in such a ways that our friendship would
work powerfully to rescue us from the confusion and the misery in which we had come to
find ourselves…”16

14. Thomas Merton, The Seven Storey Mountain (New York: Harcourt, 1998), 94.
15. Ibid, 194.
16. Ibid, 195.
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The nexus of this group of friends, at least at its beginning, was the classroom of
Professor Mark Van Doren, whom Lawrence Cunningham describes as the “most
influential” friend from this period in Merton’s life. Van Doren, according to
Cunningham, brought Merton “into intimate contact with the world of literature, guiding
him through the classical tradition” and encouraging Merton’s interests in many of the
most important literary influences of Merton’s life.17 While Van Doren receives a full
measure of praise in The Seven Storey Mountain, even he may not have been as crucial a
friend for Merton as Robert Lax. It would be impossible to miss the lingering love and
even admiration that Merton the monk retained for Lax in his descriptions of him
throughout the autobiography. When Merton describes “the secret of (Lax’s) constant
solidity” as being “a kind of natural, instinctive spirituality, a kind of inborn direction to
the living God,” it is clear that Lax represented something to which Merton himself
aspired.18 Indeed, in the arena of goals and aspirations, Merton credits Lax with imparting
to him the insight that there is only one legitimate life goal for any self-respecting
Catholic: sainthood.19
Wherever Merton would find himself on his peculiar path toward sainthood, he
was apparently always able to rely on the support of his close cadre of friends from
Columbia. Merton remained intensely loyal to them, even as they were every bit as loyal
to him throughout extended periods characterized by a very monastic lack of
communication. As Mott puts it, “When (Merton) turned his back on the world in 1941,
17. Lawrence S. Cunningham, Thomas Merton & the Monastic Vision (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
1999), 8.
18. Merton, Seven Storey Mountain, 198.
19. Ibid, 260.
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he made no such rejection of his friends, and his friendships survived the long silences.”20
When Merton was ordained in 1949, several of his Columbia friends were in attendance,
having made the trek to Kentucky. It is impossible to know how Merton’s life would
have turned out had it not been for his decision to enroll at Columbia, or had it not been
for the friendships he built there. What is clear, though, is that Merton had at least a
Columbia-inspired conception of the importance of friendship when he began to
articulate the summation of his life’s work as an apostolate of friendship by the end of the
1950s.
Solitude
And yet, it would be a gross oversimplification to suggest that there is a neat
progression from the college friendships of the 1930s to the intellectual friendships of the
1960s. While there is undoubtedly a connection, it must be remembered that for a good
deal of time in between Merton was quite focused on finding greater solitude, devoting
more time to contemplation and being rather far removed from any opportunity for
making new friends.
Of course, much of what Merton writes indicates that monasticism—as he
understood it—did not mean Gnosticism, and that solitude—as he experienced it—did
not mean selfish isolation. Merton was keenly aware of the danger of making solitude
simply a type of isolation. If isolation is the only thing solitude had to offer, it would be
very difficult to see how solitude could ever be a legitimate means of Christian
discipleship. After all, so much of the Gospel message relies on being in relationship to
others. Without the chance to encounter other people created in God’s image, how could
20. Mott, 219.
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one possibly learn to love like Christ? Solitude would be little more than a selfish attempt
to retreat from the world that God created. As a result, Merton developed a much more
sophisticated notion of solitude. Instead of forcing solitude to mean isolation, Merton felt
that a person was solitary “at the moment when, no matter what may be his external
surroundings, he is suddenly aware of his own inalienable solitude and sees that he will
never be anything but solitary.”21 Indeed, Merton would eventually look upon even John
Henry Newman as a solitary of sorts, insofar as Newman had suffered the “kind of
rejection which liberates (solitaries) into a realm of a final perfection, a uniqueness, a
humility, a wisdom, a silence that is definitive and contains all that they have ever
said.”22 Far from being a rejection of people, the embrace of solitude was “not to escape
other men but in order to find them in God.”23
It took some time for Merton to arrive at an understanding of solitude that
included room for many other people. In 1946, for example, Merton wrote that “for
myself, I have only one desire and that is the desire for solitude—to disappear into God,
to be submerged in His peace, to be lost in the secret of His face.”24 Read in tandem with
some of the world-rejecting passages of The Seven Storey Mountain—which he was
working on at the time—it is hard to escape the conclusion that Merton was not terribly
optimistic about humanity at this point. At the very least, people were a distraction from
cultivating a relationship with God. Of course, the end of 1946 would mark five years in
the monastery for Merton. He would not leave Gethsemani Abbey for any reason
21. Lawrence S. Cunningham, editor, Thomas Merton: Spiritual Master (New York: Paulist Press,
1992), 242.
22. Merton, Conjectures, 24.
23. Thomas Merton, New Seeds of Contemplation (New York: New Directions, 1961), 53.
24. Thomas Merton, The Sign of Jonas (New York: Image Books, 1956), 26.
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whatsoever until August 1948, when he left for a grand total of six hours to conduct
business for the Order.25 It was Merton’s literary career that would eventually open up
the lines of communication for him to conduct his apostolate of friendship. With an irony
that has been frequently noted, however, it was precisely his literary successes that
helped to make Gethsemani a setting wherein it was exceedingly hard for Merton to find
the solitude he craved. He would sarcastically observe that at the monastery’s post-war
peak there were “two hundred and seventy lovers of silence and solitude…packed into a
building that was built for seventy.”26
Merton had hardly become entirely misanthropic. Cut off to a considerable degree
from his Columbia friends by the normal restrictions of life as a Trappist, there are clear
instances when Merton felt very much attached to the monks of his community. He once
seemed even a bit surprised at his own reaction when a group of his fellow monks left
Gethsemani to start a new foundation in 1947: “I am certainly not detached enough from
them to be immune to a little pain at the thought that I will never see them again.”27
Overall, however, Merton’s pain here seems rather a sign of familiarity with the
departing monks than friendship. Merton nonetheless found something very comforting
in this monastic familiarity. His burgeoning career as a successful writer was forcing him
into consistent communication with the world of publishing, and Merton did not feel
entirely edified by these exchanges. Instead, they seem to have reinforced the conviction
that had helped to propel Merton toward the monastery in the first place: that people are

25. Mott, 205.
26. Thomas Merton, Jonas, 14.
27. Ibid, 64.
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depressingly petty and ceaselessly self-serving. “Even my contacts with the outside—
with the world of writers and of people who publish and of people who insult one another
for the sake of art—have their advantages. To see how seriously men take things and how
little they profit by their seriousness. Their tragedy makes our mediocrity all the more
terrible.”28
His brief sojourn from Gethsemani in 1948 did do something to shock Merton’s
sensibilities regarding others. Merton found himself face to face with the world, which
was perhaps “no longer so wicked after all.” Instead, Merton “went through (Louisville),
realizing for the first time in my life how good are all the people in the world and how
much value they have in the sight of God.”29 Over the next few years, the newly-elected
Abbot, James Fox, would offer Merton a number of allowances that gave him some
limited time in solitude, either in the community’s rare book vault or even through
permission to walk alone in the woods. Despite the impact that his brief time in
Louisville had had on Merton’s assessment of people, it seems that Merton was still
thinking of them as—at best—obstacles to his own vocational path. This assessment is
shared by the late Anne Carr, who believed that “for the Merton of 1949, (there was) no
genuine sense of real Christian community and its goodness or its importance in the life
of faith. And there is certainly no sense that community can be an aid to or a genuine
expression of one’s relation to God.”30

28. Ibid, 83.
29. Ibid, 98.
30. Anne E. Carr, A Search for Wisdom & Spirit: Thomas Merton’s Theology of the Self (Notre
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 21.
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This would eventually change, and drastically so. By the time Merton was living
full time in his hermitage on the grounds of Gethsemani, he was cognizant of how
differently he understood solitude then compared to years earlier. “In a sense, a very true
and solitary sense, coming to the hermitage has been a ‘return to world,’ not a return to
the cities, but a return to direct and humble contact with God’s world.”31 Rather than
isolation, solitude had come to mean connectedness for Merton. Indeed, Merton
understood that his solitude could be part of an authentically Christian vocation if “it will
help you to love not only God but also other men.”32
Merton declared the era he lived in to be a time of anxiety. Even though a life in
solitude was not by any means an attempt to become complacent with the status quo,
there is a very strong sense in Merton’s writing that true solitude may afford the seeker
with some level of serenity. Merton believed that true solitude would not make all of the
problems in someone’s life go away, but they would “cease to be (problems).”33 Many of
Merton’s contemporaries certainly did not agree with this sentiment. Especially for those
friends involved in the peace movement of the mid-1960’s, “there was a widespread and
lasting feeling…that Thomas Merton was in the wrong place at a critical time.”34 Paul
Elie suggests, however, that the best evidence of the “rightness” of Merton’s hermit life is
simply “the sudden clarity of his writing.”35

31. Thomas Merton, The Intimate Merton, ed. Patrick Hart and Jonathan Montaldo (San
Francisco: Harper, 1999), 258.
32. Merton, New Seeds, 52.
33. Ibid, 53.
34. Mott, 429.
35. Paul Elie, The Life You Save May Be Your Own (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2004),
370.
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Merton strongly believed that solitude helped to teach him how to love. The
spiritual life of a Christian in solitude is not intended to obliterate any problems that
might trouble the human soul. Rather, silence helps to put those troubles in their true
context. “We are not meant to resolve all contradictions but to live with them and rise
above them and see them in the light of exterior and objective values which make them
trivial by comparison.”36 Though he does not expound on what he means by objective
values in this context, it is safe to assume that what he means includes God.
The Christian solitary must seek to encounter God where the faithful know He is:
within all people. It is for this reason that Merton felt that “the smoke-screen of words”
that blurred humanity’s perspective of true reality had to be cleared away. Such an
undertaking could only happen in solitude. As if to respond to the classic critique of the
solitary life that monks hate the world, Merton described true reality as being something
quite beautiful indeed: “…the nakedness of reality…is neither a matter of terror nor for
shame. It is clothed in the friendly communion of silence, and this silence is related to
love.” Rather than the Gnostic understanding of the created world as inherently evil, in
solitude we are taught “to know reality by respecting it where words have defiled it.” 37
Impressive as this already is, Merton felt that this new vision of reality would help
the solitary in all relationships. “When we have really met and known the world in
silence, words do not separate us from the world nor from other men, nor from God, nor
from ourselves…”38It is clear that solitude is not about withdrawing into some world of

36. Cunningham, Spiritual Master, 243-244.
37. Ibid, 244.
38. Ibid.
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spiritual fluff and fantasy. Instead, it is about learning to be, in a world that is because of
God. What had changed, for Merton? What transpired between the 1940s and the 1960s
that developed his understanding of solitude from something that helped to preserve and
protect an individual’s walk with God from the temptations and distractions wrought by
other people, into something that deepened one’s sense of connectedness to, or even
communion with, others? Even more basically: what led Merton away from his earlier
rejection of the world and toward his later work in the apostolate of friendship, actively
seeking out and engaging with friends throughout the world and all along the ideological
spectrum? While there were no doubt multiple factors involved, this chapter contends
that the single most significant was Merton’s newfound role, throughout the 1950s, as a
teacher.
Teaching
With the publication of New Seeds of Contemplation—an update on the original
Seeds of Contemplation—in 1961, Thomas Merton took time to reflect on what had
changed for him in the twelve years since the original. In particular, Merton
acknowledged that the original had been hampered by its own author, in that he had had
“no experience in confronting the needs and problems of other men. The book was
written in a kind of isolation, in which the author was alone with his own experience of
the contemplative life.”39 What had changed was not that Merton had left solitude behind,
but that his solitude had been “modified.” One of these modifications involved Merton’s
encounter with, as he put it, “the perplexity of novices and scholastics of his monastic

39. Merton, New Seeds, ix.
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community.”40 By the 1961 revision, Carr asserts, Merton had removed “all suggestion
that other people represent a danger to contemplative union with God.”41
The casual reader of Merton might begin to think of Merton’s mystical
experience—several years before New Seeds of Contemplation but not published for
another half-decade—at the corner of Fourth and Walnut in Louisville, during which he
became aware of the profound proximity of all people to God and of his own deep love
for those same people.42 And yet, as significant as that event may have been for
propelling (or at least reflecting) a change in Merton’s orientation to the world, it seems
that even that famous moment did not develop in a vacuum. Instead, Merton’s insight at
Fourth and Walnut was made possible by his experiences as a teacher at Gethsemani. In
1951, Merton had been appointed master of scholastics, meaning that he was to play a
crucial role in the spiritual formation of the young monks intending to seek ordination to
the priesthood. In 1955, Merton was appointed master of novices, a post he would fill for
an entire decade.
Teaching would change the course of Merton’s literary career, his vocation, and
even his outlook on humanity in general. From the beginning, Merton found great joy in
the building of relationships with the young monks in his charge. Merton was unsure if he
was of much help to them, but he quickly appreciated the positive impact they had on
him. Merton felt that he had discovered that “the kind of work I once feared because I
thought it would interfere with ‘solitude’ is, in fact, the only true path to solitude.” Rather

40. Ibid, x.
41. Carr, 33.
42. Merton, Conjectures, 156.
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than being a classroom full of distractions preventing Merton from being as
contemplative as he ought to have been, the young monks were demonstrating to Merton
precisely how a relationship—a friendship, even—can be a school of charity in precisely
the manner Wadell describes. And Merton was perfectly aware of it. “What is my new
desert?” Merton would ask. “The name of it is compassion. There is no wilderness so
terrible, so beautiful, so arid and so fruitful as the wilderness of compassion.”43 Merton
was encountering the scholastics from his vantage point as an always-aspiring Christian
solitary, and this very perspective was well-suited to observing a profound communion—
not only with his fellow monks, but with potentially anyone and everyone: “Now that I
know them better, I can see something of the depths of solitude which are in every human
person, but which most men do not know how to lay open either to themselves or to
others or to God.”44
Struggles of a Monastic Author
When the Merton collection at Bellarmine College Library was opened in 1963,
Merton’s friend and mentor Dan Walsh read a paper Merton had prepared for the
occasion, which offered a summary of Merton’s literary output up to that point:
“Whatever I may have written, I think it can all be reduced in the end to this one root
truth: that God calls human persons to union with Himself and with one another in Christ,
in the Church which is His Mystical Body.”45 The apparent serenity of that statement
gives no indication of the tremendous difficulties Merton’s writing career caused him
during his life as a monk; and it is important to emphasize here that, despite the various
43. Merton, Jonas, 323.
44. Ibid, 326.
45. Mott, 392.
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hats which Merton may have worn over the course of his life, he was, as Lawrence
Cunningham has argued, a monk first and foremost.46
While the reader of Merton’s journals may well be left with the impression that
Merton was consistently hanging on the brink of leaving either Gethsemani or even the
Cistercians altogether, it is important to temper that impression by holding it alongside
the realities which kept Merton where he was. Indeed, it seems that Merton always took
seriously his obligations as a member of his community. As Michael Mott points out,
“Had Thomas Merton been as neurotic, quixotic, and generally unpredictable as he has
been portrayed at times, no one as shrewd as Dom James would have entrusted him with
the post of either master of scholastics or master of novices. Nor, for that matter, would
the abbot have chosen Father Louis as his confessor.”47 For his own part, Merton seems
to have been very much aware of the manner in which the community, and in particular
his superiors, kept some of his shortcomings in check far better than he could manage on
his own. In a 1954 letter to Abbot Fox, Merton expressed his hope that Fox would
“always tell me frankly when I am not doing what you want, because that is my one big
safeguard, on which everything depends…”48 Over a decade later, fearing a potentially
more lax abbot might be elected upon Fox’s retirement, Merton wrote to Archbishop
Thomas McDonough of Louisville, apparently in the hope that McDonough would keep
him reined in should the new abbot give him too much freedom: “With the possibilities
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of new policies around here, I think I had better draw my own lines in case they are not
drawn for me…”49
This letter indicates an awareness on Merton’s part of what his vocation was, but
an interesting level of caution regarding the way it might be manifest. It is not difficult to
see why this should be the case. Implicit in the act of writing is the feeling that you have
something worthwhile to say. Similarly, to have your writing published is to secure a
legacy. Obviously, there can be a tremendous amount of pride built into the processes of
writing and being published, and for Thomas Merton the Trappist, this was a source of
self-doubt. He was simply unsure of the purity of his intentions, hearing in his head the
sarcastic rebuke: “Admiration, admiration—You are my ideal—you are the one, original,
cloistered genius, the tonsured wonder of the Western world.”50 Early attempts to
reconcile his writing and his vocation were not productive, either. “God defend me from
the stuffy academic language and from the pious jargon I feel I got into…on the theory
that, since I was a monk, I had to write that way. NO! That is NOT the way to write! It
does NO good.”51
His inability to find peace on this question did even lead him to consider a change
of order: “Should I move somewhere where I can find solitude and silence and peace to
be alone with God in a pure tranquility that is impossible for a Cistercian?”52 Though he
does not mention his writing in this passage as the source of his misgivings, it seems
likely that it was a major contributing factor. And yet, writing would also be a part of the
49. Mott, 514.
50. Merton, The Intimate Merton, 48.
51. Ibid, 49.
52. Ibid, 53.
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peace he would come to find, little by little, because he became convinced that he was not
writing for himself: “Since I belong to God and my life belongs to Him and my book is
His and He is managing them all for His glory, I only have to take what comes and do the
small part that will be allotted to me….”53 In moments of clarity, Merton was able to see
the good resulting from his writing. “Now I see what it is all leading up to: to the
happiness and the peace and the salvation of many people I have never known. There is
no greater joy than to be drawn into union with God’s great love for the souls of
men.…”54 Already (June 1948), Merton was starting to develop some basic
understanding of writing as a form of contemplative prayer. In addition to the multitude
of anecdotal accounts of the impact Merton’s writings have had, Ephrem Arcement
agrees that Merton’s writing was vital for many: “…this dual vocation of monk and
writer would become a uniquely influential source for the exercise of his own prophetic
spirituality and contribute significantly to his own personal integration.”55 William
Shannon adds that Merton’s writing “enabled him to articulate, for himself and for others,
his ongoing experience of what it meant to be a Catholic and a monk in a fast-changing
world wherein both Catholicism and the monastic life were being scrutinized, both from
within and from without, in a way that was unprecedented…”56
None of this is to say, however, that there were not days when it all seemed
useless again. Indeed, Merton’s journal is full of instances where he ‘rediscovers’ things
(like humility, or the centrality of Christ), and it appears to work that way with vices as
53. Ibid, 55.
54. Ibid, 56.
55. Arcement, xx.
56. William H. Shannon, Silent Lamp: The Thomas Merton Story (New York: Crossroad, 1992),
16.
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well as virtues. “The business of being poisoned in spite of yourself by the pleasure you
take in your own work! You say you don’t want it, but it gets into your blood anyway.”57
At times, Merton seemed skeptical about the encouragement to write that he received
from his Superior. “That afternoon, when (the abbot) was in Louisville at the
Archbishop’s, I got a check for nine hundred dollars on The Seven Storey Mountain, so I
gave it to him the next morning. He told me to go on writing.”58 When he had
reservations about writing, it continued to trigger doubt about his entire life as a
Cistercian: “To make an Order, a spiritual tradition, the center of my life is not enough.
Contemplation is not enough….In other words, I need to get rid of everything. Here I am
compelled to keep my hands full. And if I write, I am bound to live submerged in
books.”59
Though Merton’s spiritual life may have been one long trajectory overall toward
contemplation of God in solitude, it is already quite clear that this trajectory holds true
only in a general sense. Some days were clearly better than others. It is for this very
reason that Merton’s writing was so important to him. The written word helped him give
glory to God (and guidance to readers) when times were good, and his habit of keeping a
journal helped him come to some understanding when times were bad. Writing became
for him a means of examining his conscience. This was of great help to him: “Every book
I write is a mirror of my own character and conscience. I always open the final printed
job with a faint hope of finding myself agreeable, and I never do.”60
57. Merton, The Intimate Merton, 57.
58. Ibid, 59.
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Merton came to see that his writing was a key factor in his ongoing spiritual
conversion: “And yet it seems to me that writing, far from being an obstacle to spiritual
perfection in my own life, has become one of the conditions on which my perfection will
depend.”61 He was well aware that the life of an author-monk was unlikely to be easy, but
his awareness of God’s ability to work through him intensified: “It must come somehow
from the Holy Ghost.”62 In coming to terms with his vocation Merton also drew strength
from the liturgy. He was able to make a connection between Christ in the Eucharist and
himself, put on display in the form of his writing: “One of the results of all this could
well be a complete and holy transparency: living, praying, and writing in the light of the
Holy Spirit, losing myself entirely by becoming public property just as Jesus is public
property in the Mass.” Making the connection between this idea and his ordination to the
priesthood, Merton hoped that “this is an important aspect of my priesthood—my living
of my Mass: to become as plain as a Host in the hands of everybody. Perhaps it is this,
after all, that is to be my way of solitude.”63
Merton had developed a substantial theological framework to justify his unique
vocation. After signing a deal that promised four books to his publisher, Merton felt that
“…my work is my hermitage because it is writing that helps me most of all to be a
solitary and a contemplative here at Gethsemani.”64 Writing therefore continued to be the
dominant factor in Merton’s spiritual development. “This Journal…Apparently I have not
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yet written enough of it to become completely solitary and to be able to do without it.”65
There is agreement amongst commentators that Merton was not mistaken when he
suggested that writing may have been a necessary part of his vocation. Malits suggests
that “The effort to articulate what was happening in his life was for him essential to the
process of self-discovery. That enterprise actually served to shape Merton’s identity,
because writing about himself consciously engaged the man in the task he described as
trying ‘to be what I am.”66
It was because of his writing as well as his life as a Trappist that Merton became
comfortable being an active monk. Instead of creating an image of solitude in his mind
and finding a way to work toward it in reality, he learned to achieve the solitude that God
granted him. Merton learned that “One must be in some sense a hermit before the care of
souls can serve to lead one further into the desert. But once God has called you to
solitude, everything you touch leads you further into solitude.”67 Solitude, in the true
sense of it, did not depend on the degree of isolation, or on geography at all. Instead, it
was something that was always available to a person who had pursued his/her proper
vocation.
With its many bumps in the road and probably more than a few wrong turns,
Thomas Merton’s story is one of authentic Christian conversion. He never ceased trying
to find a closer relationship with God. Despite the potential tension between his roles as
author and monk, Merton was fortified by the one, and the other, on an alternating basis.
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Without his writing, Merton may not have lasted at Gethsemani. Without the Trappist
lifestyle (and certainly without his fellow Trappists), Merton would have struggled to
advance to the point where an eremitic existence could be more than a hasty retreat from
the world. It seems that this insight, which Merton shared in The Sign of Jonas, is
genuine: “If I am to be a saint—and there is nothing else that I can think of desiring to
be—it seems that I must get there by writing books in a Trappist monastery.”68
The Formation of the Whole Person/The True Self
If Merton was committed, despite his moments of doubt, to this idea of sainthood
through Trappist authorship, then it was because he believed that that path would allow
for him to be precisely who God created him to be. Michael Mott has claimed that “a
battle with a kind of self-consciousness” was “the chief struggle of Merton’s life…”69
This does not seem to be an exaggeration, as Merton spent a good deal of effort on
defining what was, and what was not, the true self. Cunningham points out, for instance,
that Merton believed “identifying the Cartesian ‘ego’ with the true self was a fatal error
of judgment.”70 Merton himself wrote that “There is an irreducible opposition between
the deep transcendent self that awakens only in contemplation, and the superficial,
external self which we commonly identify with the first person singular.” Contemplation,
then, “is precisely the awareness that this ‘I’ is really ‘not I’ and the awakening of the
unknown ‘I’ that is beyond observation and reflection…”71
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Del Prete summarizes the difference between the true self and false self by saying
“The false self tends to identify itself in terms of its external activity, its output; it must
be engaged in doing something in order to experience itself as real. The true self simply
is. It does not have to do in order to be....The difference is that its doing is motivated by
love, reflected in the quality (not quantity) of its actions.”72 Discovery of the true self is
not to be equated to any process of mere psychological self-realization or intellectual
adjustment. It is, simply, the discovery of what one is already in the eyes of the Creator.
Merton’s monastic vocation, similarly, was not aiming for his detachment from the
various things that exist in God’s creation. “We do not detach ourselves from things in
order to attach ourselves to God, but rather we become detached from ourselves in order
to see and use all things in and for God.”73Merton contended that much in the world gave
glory to God simply by being what it was created to be: “For in being what God means it
to be it is obeying Him. It ‘consents,’ so to speak, to His creative love.”74 For people,
things are more complex, because “God leaves us free to be whatever we like.”
Nevertheless, humanity’s prospects are not fundamentally different than those of the trees
or birds: “For me to be a saint means to be myself.”75
Contemplation
This chapter has so far examined Merton’s understanding of Christian solitude,
and why it was a crucial part of his own vocation. From there it was shown that Merton’s
72. Del Prete, 40.
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solitude did not rule out the possibility of his being an author. To the contrary, Merton
came to see writing as something he could not discard, as it was simply part and parcel of
who God intended for him to be. As such, it was in writing as a monk that Merton was
able to share something of his solitude with the world. Being an author-monk was the
path by which Merton would learn to identify with the point vierge, the untainted—
though often buried—presence of God within all people.76 At this point, the time is nearly
right to begin considering the intellectual exchanges which characterized Merton’s
apostolate of friendship while also propelling his vocation as a monk who was
simultaneously both an author and public intellectual. What is needed first, however, is a
brief survey of what Merton understood contemplation to be.
According to its back cover, Thomas Merton’s New Seeds of Contemplation
seeks to “awaken the dormant inner depths of the spirit so long neglected by Western
man,” and to “nurture a deeply contemplative and mystical dimension in our spiritual
lives.” If one expects that book to be Merton’s systematic approach to contemplation,
some kind of detailed 12-step process, there is sure to be disappointment. In Merton’s
opinion, such a book would not be possible, “For contemplation cannot be taught. It
cannot even be clearly explained. It can only be hinted at, suggested, pointed to,
symbolized.”77 Rejecting the idea that contemplation might be heavily systematized,
Merton would comment elsewhere that “To restrict the contemplative monk to one set of
narrow horizons and esoteric concerns would be in fact to condemn him to spiritual and
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intellectual sterility.” 78It is telling, then, to note that the chapter in New Seeds called
“What is Contemplation?” is only five pages long, while the chapter on “What
Contemplation is Not” is nearly eight pages.
It is at the crescendo of that second chapter that Merton dispels the notion that
contemplation is a means of accessing some kind of perpetual bliss for the remainder of
one’s life. Quite to the contrary, Merton felt that contemplation was something that could
awaken “a tragic anguish and (open) many questions in the depths of the heart like
wounds that cannot stop bleeding.”79Though this is not, at face value, a ringing
endorsement of contemplative experience, Merton explains why there is a necessary
element of pain: contemplation is a kind of iconoclasm. It is fair to use this term,
iconoclastic, because “In the end the contemplative suffers the anguish of realizing that
he no longer knows what God is.”80 While New Seeds represents some of Merton’s most
mature thinking on contemplation, it is clear to see that such apophatic thinking had long
captivated Merton’s imagination. St. John of the Cross was a strong influence on Merton
in his early days as a monk, and later readings of Meister Eckhart and Julian of Norwich
ensured the presence of an apophatic (the ‘negative’ approach to theology which seeks
always to preserve the fundamental mystery of God) strain to Merton’s theology.
Nevertheless, the Incarnation has given humanity things that can positively be said about
God, and Christ’s Gospel makes clear to what the Christian ought to aspire. Merton’s
notion of contemplation reflects this reality, especially given Merton’s reliance on the
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Pauline notion of how, for the contemplative, “It is now no longer I that live but Christ
lives in me.”81
Merton’s contemplative experiences gave him a profound awareness of the
presence of God. Such awareness could not help but transform Merton’s outlook, his
thinking, and of course his writing as well. Arcement has written insightfully on the
prophetic aspect of Merton’s spirituality. Arcement contends that Merton’s contemplation
was inevitably going to spill over the walls of Gethsemani: “Through the transformation
of the self into an authentic existence, the transformation of the world becomes possible,
(Merton) thought. The two transformations together form Merton’s integrated vision of
God’s desire for recreating the world in God’s image and likeness—of reconciliation.”82
Merton’s contemplation gave him “spiritual insight into the reality of things.”
Merton did not believe that he was an author and public intellectual in spite of his
solitude, nor did he think that this was in spite of his contemplation. To the contrary, he
wrote, agitated on behalf of justice regarding numerous causes, and engaged with various
intellectual perspectives because of his contemplation. “By being firmly rooted in a life
of contemplation, (Merton) understood, the monastic vocation blossoms into a prophetic
witness to the kingdom of God.”83 Merton wrote, then, in part because of his desire to
share the fruits of his contemplation, which he saw “not only as the nourishment
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necessary for his own monastic and solitary vocation, but as a desperately needed
antidote to the various poisons in contemporary Western life.”84
Social Consciousness
It is for this reason that Merton’s seemingly unique vocation as an author-monk
who was also a renowned intellectual had a real consistency to it. Thomas Del Prete
asserts that Merton’s growing social consciousness and voice were “not out of step with
his growth toward greater identification with others…nor did it reflect a major
discontinuity with his sense of vocational commitment or the spiritual insight represented
by his meditative writing.”85 It therefore seems a rare, though perhaps minor, misstep by
Cunningham where he states that Merton’s “thirst for imageless union with God” merely
“coexisted” with his “wide-ranging reading and his insatiable desire for a deeper
understanding of God.”86
That being said, it does seem as though coexisted might be an appropriate word
for the early years of Merton’s life at Gethsemani, when it seemed that his primary goal
may well have been a yearning for God through renunciation of the world. After all, one
can find the seeds of Merton’s social consciousness already germinating in the pages of
The Seven Storey Mountain. Michael Mott argues, perhaps rightly, that Merton’s teenage
dalliance with communism was likely a means for Merton to soothe an aching personal
conscience by appealing to an apparently nascent social one.87 By the time Merton wrote
his autobiography, however, and was able to express his contempt for a situation in which

84. Carr, 6.
85. Del Prete, 93.
86. Cunningham, Monastic Vision, 46.
87. Mott, 99.

120

Hollywood was glorified and Harlem maligned, there can be little question that his social
consciousness had at least begun to bloom.88
Arcement contends that Merton worried whether the church of his time had “an
adequate platform for effective prophetic communication(.)”89 As Merton enjoyed the
spiritual growth that came through greater degrees of solitude and contemplation, he
came to see that he was perhaps uniquely well-placed to help the church speak
prophetically. It is not difficult to see which social ills pressed most heavily on Merton.
The Cold War certainly weighed on him, as did questions of war in general. Merton was
also alarmed by some aspects of the astonishing technological advances of the mid-20th
century, particularly when those advances were seen “in the context of unbalance with
the other aspects of human existence in the world,“ wherein “the very splendor and
rapidity of technological development is a factor of disintegration.”90 Such disintegration
had, in Merton’s mind, left much of humanity feeling adrift, to the point that “there are so
many of everything that one lives in a state of constant bewilderment and fear. One
cannot begin to commit himself to any definite love, because the whole game is too
complex and too hazardous and one has lost all focus. So we are carried away by the
whirlwind, and our children are even more helpless than we ourselves.”91
Merton’s hope that the church retained the means for prophetic communication,
coupled with his ongoing reflections over the ills of life in the modern world, left him
primed to be impressed anytime he saw someone exercising the kind of charismatic
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prophesying that he himself would eventually undertake. Merton is not being
melodramatic, for instance, when he writes with verve that simply seeing the witness of
Daniel Berrigan “restores one’s hope in the Church.”92 Merton did not think of the church
as a kind of corporation which had a message (prophetic or otherwise) to export to people
who simply did not have it. Instead, Merton had a natural instinct, no doubt honed during
his years as a teacher at Gethsemani, for meeting people where they were. In his book on
Merton and education, Del Prete posits that the study of other cultures was crucial for
Merton in that it helped him to engage those other cultures, but it also helped him to
better understand himself.93 By the time his apostolate of friendship was in full swing, he
would engage Russians, Western Europeans, Latin Americans, Indians, Middle
Easterners, and others. This was part and parcel of his own spiritual development, but it
was also reflective of this growing social consciousness over the course of the 1950s.
Before looking at the apostolate of friendship itself, it is necessary to examine further the
rootedness—geographically but also intellectually—that makes Merton a worthwhile
exemplar for the Catholic intellectual life even today.
Rootedness in Tradition
It has already been shown how Merton relied on his rootedness in Cistercian
community life to protect himself from his own flights of fancy. Indeed, the Trappist
emphasis on stability in particular was surely a protection against the kind of restless
traveling that characterizes so much of The Seven Storey Mountain. Interestingly, though,
Merton was equally dependent on an analogous check within the intellectual realm.
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Obligations to Gethsemani may have kept Merton from roaming geographically, but it
was the Catholic tradition—as Merton understood it—that kept him from being
overwhelmed by the multiplicity of perspectives with which he would dialogue over the
course of the apostolate of friendship’s life.
Near the beginning of No Man Is an Island, Merton writes that he had no
intention to divorce from Catholic tradition, but that he would not blindly accept any
unexamined truths that that tradition passed to him.94 Similarly, in his Author’s Note to
New Seeds of Contemplation, Merton expresses the hope that it “does not contain a line
that is new to Christian tradition.”95 On the one hand, such statements might seem like
bland reassurances to his superiors and to the Trappist censors who closely examined all
of his published work. In truth, however, Merton was especially cognizant of the dangers
that his vocation as solitary author-monk would pose if he were completely detached
from his community, the church, or its tradition.96 By the time he wrote the materials that
make up Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander, Merton was finding himself “more and more
convinced that my job is to clarify something of the tradition that lives in me, and in
which I live…”97 Around the time Conjectures was being published, Merton would note
in a letter to Marco Pallis that “I agree entirely that one must cling to one tradition and to
its orthodoxy, at the risk of not understanding any tradition.”98 Just over two years later,
Merton would answer with clear approbation a letter in which Amiya Chakravarty, then
at Smith College, had written that “The young scholars here realize that the absolute
94. Thomas Merton, No Man Is an Island (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1982), xiv.
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rootedness of your faith makes you free to understand other faiths…Your books have the
rock-like inner strength which sustains the Abbey of Gethsemani, which can challenge
violence and untruth wherever they may appear.”99
Of course, in agreeing with any assertion that he was a man of the Catholic
tradition, Merton was absolutely not perceiving that tradition as something set in stone, as
if it were merely a series of truths that were being preserved in an unchanging form from
one era to the next. To the contrary, Merton thought of the Catholic tradition as
something very much dynamic and alive. It is important to note here that, in New Seeds of
Contemplation, Merton saw fit to pair tradition with revolution in one of his chapters:
“The biggest paradox about the Church is that she is at the same time essentially
traditional and essentially revolutionary. But that is not as much of a paradox as it seems,
because Christian tradition, unlike all others, is a living and perpetual revolution.”100 The
Catholic tradition was, in Merton’s thinking, a vast, communal response to the Good
News of Christ that could never be exhausted, never be finalized in this world. Merton
was no mere religious syncretist, nor did he eventually grow indifferent to the real
differences between religious traditions. Instead, he was firmly rooted in the monastic life
of Gethsemani Abbey, and notes frequently in various writings that his engagement with
the other was always “designed to help him deepen his own Christian monastic life.”101
Thus, if one desires to classify Merton and his literary corpus, it is perhaps best to
describe him as a monastic theologian. Whatever truths he discovered, he sought them—
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always—in the hope that they would further his spiritual journey. His intellectual
encounters and the writings they produced therefore reflect this emphasis on the
experiential. In Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander, Merton writes that he is not trying to
analyze Protestant thought as a Catholic so much as he was rather “a Catholic sharing the
Protestant experience—and other religious experiences as well.”102 Merton would write,
with no small amount of pride, that he was convinced that a Protestant would “have
greater security and clearer light if he were in my Church, but he does not see this as I do,
and for this there are deeper and more complex reasons than either he or I can
understand. Let us try to understand them, but meanwhile let us continue each in his own
way, seeking the light with all sincerity.”103 As a result, Merton could be highly critical of
that “vapid and careless friendliness that accepts everything by thinking of nothing.”
Instead, he wanted to be the best Catholic dialogue partner that he could by affirming the
truth in his partners’ worldviews.104
This position, and the willingness to engage the other to which it led, was a
natural outgrowth of Merton’s theological reflections. Cunningham emphasizes Merton’s
pneumatological perspective as a significant force behind his apostolate of friendship:
“He did very much accept…that the Spirit moves all over the world, and from quite
disparate experiences by quite diverse people one learns to deepen the contemplative
life.”105 Cunningham also notes, however, what this chapter would hold up as the key
theological insight behind Merton’s apostolate of friendship: “(Merton) was aided in this
102. Merton, Conjectures, 6.
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quest by his conviction and experience that Christ as the Word, Christ as wisdom,
permeated the entire cosmos.”106 This Christological position lies beneath much of
Merton’s desire for his apostolate to have a unifying impact on the peoples with whom he
would dialogue. “In Sophia,” Merton would write in New Seeds, “the highest wisdomprinciple, all the greatness and majesty of the unknown that is in God and all that is rich
and maternal in His creation are united inseparably…”107 Just as Christ is the unification
of God and man,108 so too does Christ as Wisdom bestow a powerful, underlying unity to
all the peoples of the world, regardless of their intellectual positions.
As intrigued as Merton may have ever been by non-Christian perspectives, he was
adamant about what they were missing: “I may be interested in Oriental religions, etc.,
but there can be no obscuring the essential difference—this personal communion with
Christ at the center and heart of all reality as a source of grace and life.”109 Merton would
not agree that Christ was simply missing in other traditions, however: “Christ is the
fulfillment of the latent desires and aspirations of all religions and all philosophies. One
must transcend them all to come to Him: yet in Him one finds all that was good and true
in every other religion.”110 It was Christ, then, that ‘kept Merton Catholic.’ It was also
Christ that allowed Merton to venture into the apostolate of friendship, with all of the
interreligious dialogue therein. Still further, though, it would still be Christ that Merton
would find in the fruits of that dialogue. John Wu would notice this very dynamic in a
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1961 letter to Merton, in which he observed that Merton was “so deeply Christian that
you cannot help touching the vital springs of other religions.”111
Forming the Apostolate of Friendship
In 1957, during what Cunningham rightly considers “a critical moment in
Merton’s intellectual and spiritual maturity,”112 Merton wrote in his journal what may
well have been something of a mission statement for his apostolate of friendship: “If I
can unite in myself, in my own spiritual life, the thought of the East and the West…I will
create in myself a reunion of the divided Church and from that unity in myself can come
the exterior and visible unity of the Church…We must contain both (East and West) in
ourselves, and transcend both in Christ.”113 If the world were to be transformed, Merton
thought, he would himself need to be transformed first.
If his apostolate were to have any success on this monumental front, Merton
would obviously have to work from within the context of his monastic life—and his
monastic vows. He simply would not be able to match the globe-trotting tendencies of
many of his friends and correspondents. Indeed, from the time Merton entered
Gethsemani in 1941, he would not leave again until 1948, when he was gone for a grand
total of six hours on a business trip on behalf of the Order. In the ten years after that,
almost every time Merton would leave Gethsemani, it would be in order to go to a
hospital for care due to one of Merton’s many ailments. The only exceptions in this
period were two trips to Louisville to obtain American citizenship, a trip to Ohio to scope
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out a location for a new possible foundation, and a trip to Minnesota for a conference.
Other monks were present with Merton on each of these excursions.114
By the late 1950s and into the 1960s, however, restrictions at Gethsemani had
loosened considerably.115 Merton’s apostolate may well have never happened had they
not. In March 1958, Merton would learn something significant about friendship from a
sermon by one of his confreres. Merton would write that “my worst and inmost sickness
is the despair of ever being able truly to love, because I despair of ever being worthy of
love. But the way out is to be able to trust one’s friends and thus accept in them acts and
things which a sick mind grabs as evidence of lack of love—as pretexts for evading the
obligation to love.”116
It was perhaps only with this lesson on friendship—so reminiscent of Wadell’s
description of friendship as a school of charity—that Merton began assembling his
apostolate of friendship in the 1950s. It was in this decade, as Cunningham describes, that
Merton, “well before the openness deriving from the Second Vatican Council, began to
formulate ideas and strategies that would not only allow him to enter into dialogue with
other Christians from other traditions, but would also help him learn how to relate to
other cultures and to religions that were not Christian.”117 Already in 1954 Merton would
declare to fellow monk Jean Leclercq that “I do not like the idea of an isolated, and
spectacular, apostolate.”118 Six years later, Merton would report to his longtime friend
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that “A very fine little hermitage has been built in a nice site; it is for the purpose of
dialogue and conversations with Protestant ministers and professors, but it also serves for
solitude and I have at least a limited permission to use it part-time.”119
If by 1960 the apostolate of friendship was up and running, it was because of
many developments over the course of the previous decade. For this chapter’s purposes,
it is important to highlight two. First, 1958 marked the beginning of Merton’s relatively
brief but deeply impactful—on both men, it seems—correspondence with Boris
Pasternak. Though they would exchange only six letters, Merton discovered through
these letters the kind of love that might be expressed and the kind of experiential bond
that might be found linking people of widely divergent perspectives.
The second major factor was undoubtedly Merton’s pitching of his idea for an
apostolate of friendship to Pope John XXIII. Writing to Pope John only months after his
famous experience at Fourth and Walnut, Merton had clearly come a long way in seeing
that his might be a uniquely well-placed voice both for the purposes of communicating
prophetically as well as seeking to strengthen the bonds of love between Catholics and
others. By April 1960, Merton would similarly inform the Abbot General, Dom Gabriel
Sortais, of his apostolate, though interestingly only after Pope John had written of his
approval of Merton’s vision and sent along several gifts to Gethsemani. Merton’s
apostolate of friendship was underway.
Merton the Letter-Writer
As famous a writer as Merton was in his day, and as popular as he remains even
today, it must be remembered that he required a good deal of practice before his writing
119. Ibid, 89.
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became all that good. Indeed, even on the cusp of his gargantuan success with The Seven
Storey Mountain, Merton was no stranger to strong critiques of his work. Evelyn Waugh,
who would edit the English edition of Merton’s autobiography, visited Gethsemani
Abbey in December 1948. Though Merton passes Waugh’s recommendation for his
future literary career off as something of a compliment in The Sign of Jonas, it is a
backhanded compliment at best: “Evelyn Waugh, who came to visit Gethsemani in
December…thought that it would be a good idea for me simply to put books aside and
write serious letters, and to make an art of it.”120 Merton never gave up on books, but
letter-writing would occupy a major place in Merton’s life, up until his death. Once The
Seven Storey Mountain was published, Merton enjoyed, or rather suffered from, an
excess of fan mail. Happily for him, the vast majority of it could be answered with a
simple card with a form response assuring the recipients of Merton’s prayers.
Eventually, however, letter-writing became something more important for
Merton, who seems to have always had a deep-seated yearning for human contact,
despite his simultaneous thirst for greater solitude. It has been estimated that Merton had
some 2100 correspondents.121 While many of these can hardly be said to plumb the
depths of Merton’s best thinking, there is nevertheless an astounding range of people
included in that number. “He wrote to poets; to heads of state; to popes, bishops, priests,
and lay people; to monks, rabbis, and Zen masters; to Catholics, Protestants, Anglicans,
and Orthodox Christians; to Buddhists, Hindus, Jews, and Sufis; to literary agents and
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publishers; to theologians and social activists; to old friends and young ones, too.”122
While all of Merton’s writings seem to be autobiographical to one degree or another,
reading his letters is a powerful means of getting to know the man, and seeing how his
thinking developed over time. Of course, there are plenty of unpolished thoughts in his
various letters, but the “flashes of intuition” they contain are nevertheless valuable for
seeing Merton’s growth, be it spiritual, intellectual, or otherwise.123 For Thomas Del
Prete, Merton’s writing of letters was simply a part of his quest for becoming
authentically himself via learning as much as he could of the experiences of others:
“Letter writing enabled him to explore and support the exploration of the genuine and
personal in himself and others.”124
Even those letters which are among the more utilitarian of the Merton corpus
often reveal a great deal about him and about how he typically approached the realities of
friendship. Merton’s lengthy correspondence with his literary agent, Naomi Burton
Stone, illustrates clearly Merton’s willingness to share his vulnerabilities with those who
were close to him. “They became close friends. She acted as ‘sister’ and sometimes
‘mother’ to him. He valued her counsel, even the occasional scoldings she found it
necessary to give him. In a way he does with no other correspondent, he shared with her
his concerns, his needs, his fears.”125 Despite the incredible efforts Merton had been
pouring into writing since his childhood, he maintained throughout his life a certain
naiveté about the world of publishing. Burton Stone helped him navigate the murky
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waters which he could not, especially from within the monastery. In a February 1947
letter, Merton acknowledged this dependence, when he writes “I hope all this does not
communicate my own mental fog to you, on whom I depend for clarification and clear
vision!”126 In a May 1956 letter, Merton confided to her that, at least up to that point, he
did not consider himself a skilled communicator. “You don’t know yet that for me
communication is not communication but a narcissistic gesture of some sort at which I
happen to be quite clever. Do you think that I have ever in my life communicated with
another person? Sacramentally I hope, but not in writing.”127 Presumably, by the time he
wrote his ‘apostolate of friendship’ letter to Pope John several years later, Merton felt
rather differently about his ability to converse meaningfully with other people.
Merton’s teaching responsibilities within the monastery motivated him to keep up
a rigorous study of primary sources from within the Catholic (and especially the
monastic) tradition. Letters also afforded him an opportunity to deepen his knowledge of
the tradition. His nearly two decades-long exchange with Jean Leclercq was a major
source of insights and resources for Merton’s lifelong quest for authentic renewal within
his Order.128 Scholar of Christian mysticism Etta Gullick’s correspondence with Merton
demonstrates a clear influence on Merton’s monastic studies as well. In particular, it
seems that Gullick was instrumental in developing Merton’s assessment of Meister
Eckhart. In June 1961 Merton would write her that while he liked Eckhart, he found that
“now and again (Eckhart) leaves one with a sense of being let down, when he goes

126. Ibid, 66.
127. Ibid, 73.
128. Hart, xii.

132

beyond all bounds.”129 Forty-five days later, Merton would thank her effusively for
sending him additional resources on Eckhart, at least one of which he considered “a book
of enormous and providential importance…”130 By April 1966, Merton would confess to
her that he had “read a lot of Eckhart and am more and more convinced of his
greatness…”131
Letters also allowed Merton to stay abreast of the Catholic tradition’s cutting
edge. Daniel Berrigan was a longtime friend (mainly through correspondence) whom
Merton admired for his poetry but also for his tireless social justice activism. Some of
Merton’s hardest words for the Church were written in his letters to Rosemary Radford
Reuther, who seems to have taught Merton something about the reality of Catholic
feminism, among other things.132 Letters were also the most effective means for Merton
to remain connected to the Catholic peace movement during the Vietnam War.
Exchanges with Dorothy Day and James Forest did much to keep Merton advised of any
and all developments, even after Merton’s Trappist superiors ordered him to cease
writing on matters of peace. After Pope John XXIII promulgated his encyclical Pacem in
Terris, Merton wrote sarcastically to Forest that “The Pope is lucky he does not have to
be approved by the censors of our Order, he would never get by them!”133
Perhaps the most significant of Merton’s correspondences, though, was that with
Boris Pasternak (mentioned briefly above). Merton clearly admired Pasternak a great
deal, as Pasternak’s courageous stand against Stalinism represented a clear prophetic
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witness along the lines which Merton himself would strive to follow.134 Given Merton’s
earlier reservations, as seen in his letter to Naomi Burton Stone cited above, regarding his
ability to communicate meaningfully through letters, his brief relationship with Pasternak
appears to have marked a change. The other possibility, of course, is that the letters with
Pasternak did not so much reflect a change as they themselves enabled that change to
take place. Each man would send only three letters to the other, but there is a clear
intensity in their contents. In August 1958, two months before his letter to Pope John,
Merton would tell Pasternak that “With other writers I can share ideas, but you seem to
communicate something deeper. It is as if we met on a deeper level of life on which
individuals are not separate beings. In the language familiar to me as a Catholic monk, it
is as if we were known to one another in God.”135 As far as Merton was concerned,
conversing with Pasternak had taught him a great deal about the human experience, and
perhaps even the human’s task before God. “No, the great business of our time is this: for
one man to find himself in another one who is on the other side of the world. Only by
such contacts can there be peace, can the sacredness of life be preserved and developed
and the image of God manifest itself in the world.”136
Merton’s epistolary engagement with the Islamic world provides an excellent
example of precisely the kind of intellectual hospitality that makes Merton’s apostolate of
friendship feature so significantly in this dissertation. Admittedly, Merton’s most
substantial grappling with Islam—and Islamic mysticism in particular—was conducted
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with Louis Massignon, who was not a Muslim. Nevertheless, Merton learned a great deal
from Massignon’s work, and incorporated much of what he learned in his own writing. If
Merton can be considered a spiritual master of the 20th century, it must be because of his
insights regarding the quest for the true self. Some of the richest passages he wrote on
this topic rest significantly on the notion of le point vierge, which Merton took from
Massignon.137 The expression, which Merton refrained from translating to English, refers
to “At the center of our being…a point of nothingness which is untouched by sin and by
illusion, a point of pure truth, a point or spark which belongs entirely to God, which is
never at our disposal, from which God disposes of our lives, which is inaccessible to the
fantasies of our own mind or the brutalities of our own will. This little point…is the pure
glory of God.”138
Merton’s friendship with Polish writer Czeslaw Milosz is also worthy of at least
brief examination here. This exchange rivaled Merton’s correspondence with Pasternak
in its intensity, and it offers a clear glimpse of how critical Merton’s very best of friends
were willing to be of Merton. Michael Mott describes the strong impact Milosz had on
Merton’s reading choices and perhaps even on his literary taste.139 Milosz would pull no
punches if he thought something Merton had written to be of low quality. More
interesting, though, is Milosz’s accusation from 1960 that Merton was too naïve in his
reflections on the natural world. “In other words,” Merton interpreted the critique, “he
thinks I am not Manichaean enough.”140 Mott interprets Milosz’s complaint as an
137. Ibid, 357.
138. Merton, Conjectures, 158.
139. Mott, 356.
140. Merton, Conjectures, 139.
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expression of his own search for a spiritual guide.141 Whether or not Mott is correct, it is
obvious that Merton and Milosz did not always treat one another gently, to the
enrichment of both.
This section has provided only a sketch of Merton’s ‘career’ as a letter writer. It
was primarily in the writing of letters that Merton’s apostolate of friendship was carried
out. As such, there are letters in which Merton appears quite vulnerable, and letters in
which Merton’s compassion reaches its fullest expression. Throughout his letters Merton
demonstrates his grounding in the Catholic tradition, even as his awareness of the
dynamism of that tradition allowed him to yearn constantly for a fuller, deeper
understanding of his faith.
The Apostolate of Friendship in Person
Though Thomas Merton’s apostolate of friendship was carried out primarily
through the mail, Merton was able to meet with a fairly astounding number of his friends
during the last decade of his life in particular. The number is astounding, of course,
because of the nature of Trappist life generally, as well as Merton’s aforementioned
yearning for ever-greater solitude---tempered at all times, though it was, by his persistent
need for human contact. Not surprisingly, his epistolary relationships often laid the
groundwork for his encounters in person, which ended up being a significant part of
Merton’s apostolate in their own right. As was the case with Merton’s letters, Merton’s
guests at Gethsemani—and the rare friend for whom he ventured forth from the
monastery—represent a wide range of personalities and worldviews. For the purposes of
this chapter, seeking as it does to survey Merton’s development as a Catholic intellectual
141. Mott, 357.
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throughout his apostolate, it might be helpful to begin with one of the significant
friendships Merton would be able to grow; that with Zen scholar D.T. Suzuki.
It is not at all shocking that Merton would have been attracted to Zen. As
Cunningham points out, Zen’s fundamental goal of “the penetration of the illusion to the
non-Self” fit neatly with Merton’s understanding of the Christian contemplative life.
Zen’s track record of emphasizing discipline without much along the lines of theological
dogma also made it easier for Merton to explore as an unfailingly devout Catholic.142
Merton initiated his correspondence with Suzuki in March 1959, with a letter sharing his
humble suppositions regarding Zen with Suzuki, who responded with a letter containing
his own suppositions regarding Christianity. Merton, who was never afraid of a rhetorical
flourish, would gush to Suzuki that “it seems to me that Zen is the very atmosphere of the
Gospels, and the Gospels are busting with it. It is the proper climate for any monk, no
matter what kind of monk he may be.”143 Simultaneously, though, it is interesting to note
how much energy Merton puts into his descriptions of Christian beliefs as he shared his
own tradition with Suzuki: “The Christ we seek is within us, in our inmost self, is our
inmost self, and yet infinitely transcends ourselves. We have to be ‘found in Him:’ and
yet be perfectly ourselves and free from the domination of any image of Him other than
Himself.”144 Ultimately, as has been seen in previously noted exchanges, what Merton
seems to have been after was a sense of common experience that might transcend the
apparent differences between Merton’s Catholicism and Suzuki’s Zen. Only one month
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into their correspondence Merton shared with Suzuki his hunch that he had pinpointed
such an experiential commonality: “With us, this stress on freedom, God’s freedom…is
the thing that corresponds to Zen in Christianity. The breakthrough that comes with the
realization of what the finger of a koan is pointing to is like the breakthrough of the
realization that a sacrament…is a finger pointing to the completely spontaneous Gift of
Himself to us on the part of God…”145
In June 1964, Merton received word that Suzuki, then 94 years old, would be in
New York, and would like to meet him. Rather unexpectedly, it seems, Merton was
granted permission to make the trek from Abbot Fox. While Merton’s journals reveal that
he was very anxious about returning to a city that had figured so greatly in his premonastic life and about the possibility of being recognized, they also reveal that his
conversations with Suzuki were well worth the risks. “These talks were very pleasant,
profoundly important to me—to see and experience the fact that there really is a deep
understanding between myself and this extraordinary, simple man whom I have been
reading for about ten years with great attention. A sense of being ‘situated’ in this
world.”146 As was the case with Pasternak, Suzuki was another whom Merton had come
to know ‘in God.’ On the purely intellectual level, Merton’s writings demonstrate the
degree to which his engagement with Suzuki modified his thinking on non-Christian
mysticism. Whereas he had once been entirely negative on the prospect of genuine
mystical experience outside the church, he would eventually grant that Zen mystics may,
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despite their lack of refined theological language, have “experienced the presence of God
in what they speak of as knowing the inmost self.”147
The trip to New York was an exceptional moment in Merton’s apostolate of
friendship. In the vast majority of cases, if Merton was going to interact face to face with
a person or with a group, it was going to take place at Gethsemani. Cunningham notes the
consistency with which groups from various schools and seminaries made the trek to
Kentucky in order to speak with Merton. Cunningham finds in his research that “the
meetings had more of the quality of mutual exchange and common prayer in line with
Merton’s desire to further a dialogue of friendship.”148 Merton was no scholar, and his
conferences with people outside his own community were not academic conferences.
Serious intellectual exchange would take place, but it would always take place in a
prayer-filled context where Merton was apparently always looking to forge friendships,
find common ground, and make whatever spiritual advances were possible through a
comparison of experiences. An especially illustrative example of the kind of dialogue for
which Merton was best-suited is the ‘Fellowship of Reconciliation’ retreat at Gethsemani
in November 1964. A truly ecumenical gathering in which numerous traditions were
represented, Merton intentionally avoided a rigid agenda because “What we are seeking
is not the formulation of a program, but a deepening of roots.”149
Unfortunately, it is obviously impossible to know what trajectory Merton’s
apostolate of friendship would have followed had he lived longer. Merton could be
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unpredictable. For several months in 1966, Merton carried on a romantic relationship
with an engaged woman, a nurse he had met on one of many trips to Louisville for
medical attention. Merton’s journals indicate the significant degree to which she (called
simply ‘M’ in the journals) dominated his attention for those months. He wrote her often
and met up with her frequently, also. These face-to-face meetings often required Merton
to take advantage of his friends, who generally seem to have been amused initially by the
romance between priest and nurse, but later aggravated or even fearful for Merton’s wellbeing.150 The affair undoubtedly adds important complexity to any consideration of
Merton. At times, Merton suggests that there was something quite beneficial for his
spiritual development in this relationship. M, for instance, seems to have done something
to heal the wounds caused by the young Merton’s inability to forge entirely meaningful
relationships with women: “In the light of M.’s love I realize for the first time how
deeply I was loved back in those days by girls whose names I have even forgotten.”151
Once the relationship had begun to diminish, however, it seems that Merton was willing
to assess things apart from what he felt for her: “How evident it becomes now that this
whole thing with M. was, in fact, an attempt to escape the demands of my vocation…I
did not stand the test at all but allowed the whole essence to be questioned and tried to
change it. I could not see I was doing this.”152
Thomas Merton was killed in Bangkok in December 1968 in an apparent accident
in which Merton was electrocuted after coming into contact with a faulty fan after
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showering. Merton had, just before, addressed the monastic conference that had called
him to Thailand. Abbot Primate of the Benedictines Rembert Weakland administered
Last Rites to Merton, whose remains were returned to the United States in an American
bomber. He had traveled throughout the East, attending conferences, giving retreats, and
expanding his network of friends. Though there has been speculation that Merton’s death
was a result of suicide or foul play, there appears to be no hard evidence to support such
claims. Others have suggested that Merton, had he lived, would have left the Trappists,
left Catholicism, and/or remained in the East. It is difficult to support such hypotheses,
given Merton’s deep embrace of Catholic spirituality, and the degree to which his life at
Gethsemani clearly suited him—despite his seemingly constant expression of a desire to
be elsewhere. Merton was very much aware of his own shortcomings, and he was also
aware of the need he had for the rootedness provided for him at Gethsemani.
Preliminary Conclusions
Thomas Merton’s apostolate of friendship was a rigorous undertaking that
allowed Merton to better plumb the depths of his own Catholic tradition even as he
represented that tradition to interlocutors of any and seemingly all intellectual homes.
The friendships Merton forged through his apostolate most certainly involved risk on his
part, especially given his awareness of his own inability to communicate meaningfully
with others for much of his own life. Nevertheless, Merton intentionally created the space
necessary to help transform people with worldviews quite different from his own to
become friends. Whether Merton was the one doing the reaching out, or if he was the one
being reached out to, the basic underlying ingredient of his hospitality was an abundance
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of goodwill. Regardless of a person’s intellectual perspective, Merton had a clear gift for
welcoming the other into dialogue. Merton’s intentionality on this front was no doubt
aided considerably by his deep sense of his almost unique vocation as a Trappist monk
sharing his contemplation with the rest of the world, to the enrichment of both that world
and his own monastic spirituality. Thomas Merton saw his apostolate of friendship as
needing to avoid both the temptation to engage in a simplistic apologetics as well as the
temptation to collapse into an unthinking acceptance of all things. The Catholicism of
Thomas Merton in The Seven Storey Mountain is therefore noticeably different than that
of the man who wrote, say, Conjectures of a Guilty Bystander. In his autobiography,
Merton saw his embrace of Catholicism as a summit that he had reached once and for all.
By the time he wrote Conjectures, Merton seems no less enthralled with his Catholic
worldview, but he had a profoundly different understanding of how his faith oriented him
to the world. Conjectures, as a result, gives full expression to Merton’s sense that he
needed to share the riches of his contemplative Catholic perspective with the world
around him. That world, as Merton could see with the clarity of his increasing social
consciousness, needed Catholic insights. What Merton had also come to see, though, was
that his Catholic perspective had benefitted from—and would probably continue to
benefit—from the insights of his various friends. The friendships he maintained and the
friendships he forged during his first decade in monastic life drew him out of any narrow
conception of himself as monk that he may have once entertained for himself. His
friends, similarly, could come to expect that they would be brought into serious
engagement with the riches of Merton’s Catholic tradition.
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Merton’s great spiritual insight regarding the nature of the true self was an
additional boon to his apostolate of friendship. As Merton grappled with the questions
and challenges posed to him through letters and face to face encounters, he endeavored to
experience more than a straightforward intellectual refinement. On top of that, he desired
to have any attachment within him to something other than God to be burned away. His
immersion in the apostolate of friendship, on top of his normal monastic lifestyle, forced
him to remain oriented to the other. Just as in Wadell’s conception of friendship as a
school of charity, Merton’s relationships with people both within and far away from
Gethsemani trained him to be more hospitable, even as his hospitality enabled him to be a
better friend.
Obviously, this chapter represents only a brief survey of Merton’s apostolate.
Much more correspondence could be mentioned, and many more meetings at Gethsemani
as well. This chapter has tried to zero in on a few notable examples that demonstrate the
kinds of dialogue Merton engaged in while also showing the manner in which these
exchanges broadened his horizons both spiritually and intellectually. Above all else, it is
crucial for the remainder of the dissertation that this chapter succeeded in showing that
Merton’s intellectual hospitality—and subsequent intellectual friendship, did not occur in
spite of his Catholic faith, but because of it. Were it not for Merton’s particular
understanding of solitude, contemplation, and Christology, it is clear that the apostolate
of friendship would not have happened. For Catholic institutions of higher learning that
strive to be both authentically Catholic and true universities, Merton’s example
intellectual hospitality is a potent one. As a convert who became a Trappist who became
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a public intellectual, Merton’s path of Christian discipleship was by no means a common
one. Nevertheless, the particularity of Merton’s outlook as a Catholic was his very
doorway into hospitable dialogue with the rest of the world. The Merton corpus is a
gigantic testament to the university’s responsibility to invite students into and strengthen
their grasp of a tradition which might serve as their intellectual home. Important
decisions regarding things like possible changes to core curricula and invitations to guest
speakers must be seen in light of that responsibility.

Chapter 4: Bernard Lonergan and the Hospitality of Cognition

Introduction
That Thomas Merton represents an excellent exemplar of the kind of intellectual
hospitality of which a Catholic thinker might be capable will hardly come as a surprise to
anyone at least somewhat familiar with his life and/or works. Indeed, Merton’s corpus
could be used to powerful effect by any university trying to inspire faculty or students to
greater heights of hospitality in their own work. And, though it would be difficult to
replicate the many characteristics and strengths which contributed to Merton’s
hospitality, there are no doubt intellectuals on Catholic campuses who can match at least
some of them. As a sporadic thinker, however, Merton does not necessarily provide a
clear blueprint or method to follow.
As such, this chapter is going to attempt a survey of a very different kind of
Catholic intellectual, who was anything but sporadic. Indeed, Bernard Lonergan was so
methodical a scholar that he did, quite literally, write the book on method. Unlike
Merton, Lonergan will give a clear path for an individual scholar to follow in the interest
of being a more hospitable thinker who is better able to befriend the intellectual other. As
important as this is in itself, perhaps more significant is that Lonergan’s work will also
suggest a path that universities might follow in the interest of making their entire
curricula a training in hospitality. Historically, the Catholic tradition has demonstrated a
fundamental orientation to hospitality in its striving for a synthesis of all knowledge.
What better way to make room for another philosophy or school of thought than to bring
144
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it into an all-encompassing engagement with the best of what Catholic thought has to
offer? How better to make friends with the other than to give them the gift of our best
while simultaneously seeking to incorporate any and all truth that they have to offer in
return?
The ability of Catholic university curricula to offer students an integrated
education which enables them to synthesize all of what they learn into a coherent
worldview has been strained over the past half a century. The fragmentation so
characteristic of contemporary thought may well pose one of the gravest threats to the
Catholic identity of a Catholic university. Alasdair MacIntyre argues that “the distinctive
calling of the American Catholic university” should be “to challenge its secular
counterparts by recovering both for them and for itself a less fragmented conception of
what an education beyond high school should be…”1 After lamenting the nature in which
such fragmentation is able to perpetuate itself throughout academe, MacIntyre complains
that while “Each part of the curriculum is someone’s responsibility,” there does not seem
to be anyone who “has a responsibility for making the connections between the parts.”2
Bernard Lonergan has also been critical of fragmentation in the Academy, and has
questioned whether there is, even, someone capable of doing the connecting. Too much
specialization, in Lonergan’s estimation, “very easily results in a notion of education as
the information belt supplying students with a great number of pieces and leaving to them
the task of putting together what the professors cannot put together themselves.”3
1. Alasdair C. MacIntyre, “The End of Education: The Fragmentation of the American
University,” Commonweal (October 20, 2006).
2. Ibid.
3. Bernard Lonergan, Topics in Education (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 17.
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That such fragmentation could hinder Catholic higher education as much as it has
secular higher education would likely have come as a shock to those schooled in Catholic
institutions in the decades immediately prior to the Second Vatican Council. The standard
Catholic university education was built in no small part upon the foundation provided by
the neo-Scholastic synthesis that resulted from a revival of Thomistic thought toward the
end of the 19th century. Though this synthesis, as will be seen, was often enough
criticized as being a peculiarly parochial function of an insular Catholic Academy, the
kind of integration it aspired to can rightly be seen as indicative of an instinct for
intellectual hospitality. Of course, this instinct can, and perhaps regularly was, hijacked
for purposes rather more triumphalist than hospitable. Regardless, despite its once
commanding presence within Catholic universities, the synthesis would not survive the
1960’s. Ever since, the search has been on for a suitable replacement that might define a
thoroughly Catholic education in the way that Thomistic thinking once did. This chapter
will contend that the thinking of Bernard Lonergan is uniquely suitable for a timely
renewal of education in the Catholic intellectual tradition, with Lonergan’s understanding
of human cognition serving as the basis for a new method capable of integrating a
curriculum. The goal is to describe the potential for hospitality latent in the older,
Thomistic school of thought characterized by Aquinas himself, and show how
Lonergan’s thought might ground a similarly hospitable synthesis of knowledge across
the disciplines. It is important to note that this chapter is not advocating a reinstitution of
the old neo-Scholastic synthesis. This chapter is also not trying to consider neoScholasticism from a vantage point characterized by naiveté, or misplaced nostalgia. The
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shortcomings of the neo-Scholastic synthesis, and the manner in which it was
implemented, are readily acknowledged.
In its contention for a greater application of Lonergan’s thinking to Catholic
higher education, this chapter is in good company. John C. Haughey, SJ posits that
Lonergan’s work “has not been sufficiently plumbed to assist in answering the question
about what it means to be educated in light of the Catholic intellectual tradition.”4 The
post-Vatican II Church (and the universities which serve it) cannot thrive through a
simple reversion to the old neo-Scholastic synthesis. This is, somewhat ironically,
illustrated clearly in Pope Paul VI’s proposal of Aquinas as “a model to theologians, not
only because of the profundity of his doctrine, but also because of his openness to the
world and his respect for truth from whatever source.”5 In his own time, Aquinas was
capable of providing an integrated philosophical system precisely because his thought
was neither parochial nor reactionary. For Lonergan, the vitality breathed into the Church
by the Council—if it is to prove enduring—“requires a genuine assimilation of what is
new in modern science, scholarship, philosophy, and theology. It requires the careful
preservation of what is still valid in the older traditions.”6 Much of Lonergan’s work can
be characterized as a striving for this kind of assimilation.

4. John C. Haughey, SJ, Where is Knowing Going? The Horizons of the Knowing Subject
(Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2009), xi.
5. Romanus Cessario, OP, A Short History of Thomism (Washington: Catholic University of
America Press, 2012), 33.
6. Michael McCarthy, “Toward a Catholic Christianity: A Personal Narrative,” in In Search of the
Whole, ed. John C. Haughey, SJ (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2011), 155.
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Bernard Lonergan
It is often noticed that seemingly everything Thomas Merton ever wrote was
fundamentally autobiographical in nature. While the same may well be true of any writer,
the reader of Lonergan can easily lose track of the man behind the method. Despite that,
or perhaps because of it, it is important to trace, briefly, something of Lonergan’s
biography in order to understand how his particular brand of intellectual hospitality came
about. As was the case with Merton, Lonergan’s path included a whole series of
important people, books, and ideas, that would all contribute something to the thought of
this impressively capacious thinker.
Bernard Lonergan was born in December 1904 in Quebec, to a hardworking
father and a pious mother. After attending a local, ungraded elementary school, Lonergan
attended a Jesuit-run high school in Montreal. Receiving a classical education at this
boarding school, Lonergan was afforded the opportunity to skip grades because of his
already apparent academic gifts.7 It was also during his time in high school that Lonergan
discerned a vocation to the priesthood, choosing specifically to enter the Jesuit novitiate
in Ontario in 1922. After the novitiate was completed, Lonergan was sent in 1926 to
study philosophy at Heythrop College in England. Later on, Lonergan would recall that
“My early education, up to about the age of 21 was in a classicist tradition.”8 Denied the
ability to study method at Heythrop and at the University of London where he was
enrolled as an external student, Lonergan studied the classics but also mathematics and
logic. Additionally, it was at this point that Lonergan was to receive his formal

7. Richard M. Liddy, Transforming Light: Intellectual Conversion in the Early Lonergan
(Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1993), 5.
8. Ibid, 8.
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introduction to philosophy, which would be, as was customary of the time, by way of the
neo-Scholastic system that continued to dominate Catholic education and religious
formation.
Always a voracious reader, Lonergan also received his first exposure to the
writings of John Henry Newman while at Heythrop. Timothy Hanchin posits that it was
from Newman (as well as Augustine) that Lonergan received “an enduring insight that
would direct his life’s work: the starting point for philosophy should be an account of
concrete, lived experience rather than metaphysics.”9 Liddy, relatedly, refers to Newman
as “The major influence on Lonergan’s thought during his early years…”10 Some of
Newman’s impact on Lonergan was no doubt attributable to Newman’s style: “Newman
evidenced an uncanny ability to enter into the minds and views of his opponents. Before
refuting liberal views he always insisted on presenting them with their full force.”
Lonergan would later assert that Newman “encouraged me to look difficulties squarely in
the eye, while not letting them interfere with my vocation or my faith.”11
Some of the impact, however, was surely due to the specific content of Newman’s
writings as well. In the book which was to be a favorite of Lonergan’s, Grammar of
Assent, the core issue “was the nature of the human mind. What does it mean to know?”12
For the future author of Insight, this was a topic of considerable interest. In Liddy’s
estimation, echoing Hanchin, it was Newman’s method that would have the most
enduring influence on Lonergan: “the focus on the concrete, the interior, the facts of
9. Timothy M. Hanchin, “A Trinitarian Vision of Education: Bernard Lonergan’s Hermeneutics of
Friendship and a Catholic University for Our Time” (PhD dissertation, Boston College, 2015), 44-45.
10. Liddy, Transforming Light, 16.
11. Ibid, 18, 19.
12. Ibid, 19.
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consciousness, as of primary importance, as distinct from what philosophers or scientists
‘say’ about knowledge. This principle became in Lonergan’s writings the notion of selfappropriation. It is on the basis of our knowledge and appropriation of our own mental
processes that we…come to express…who we are as human beings.”13
Lonergan would continue to discover other influences as he pursued his studies
and pursued his expanded awareness of the centrality of method. In 1930, Lonergan read
J.A. Stewart’s Plato’s Doctrine of Ideas. Stewart’s interpretation of Plato would begin to
propel Lonergan away from the nominalism which had been attractive to him for some
years. In particular, it seems that Plato led Lonergan to what would be a lifelong
conviction of the significance of understanding to the process of human knowing. Having
struggled with concepts, Lonergan found in Plato that “Concepts then are rooted in
‘grasping the intelligible in the sensible,’ as Lonergan would later put it.”14
Augustine, too, would prove a key influence in Lonergan’s ongoing intellectual
formation. The great Bishop of Hippo’s influence would prove to be multi-faceted for
Lonergan both in light of what Augustine’s own thought offered him, but also because it
facilitated Lonergan’s turning of attention to the work of both Aristotle and Aquinas.
Augustine’s profound awareness of the many twists and turns of his lifelong search for
truth indicated a “commitment to introspection, to coming to terms with the facts of his
own consciousness and the inevitability of those facts.”15 Lonergan would later posit that
Augustine “knows more about consciousness than Thomas does,” but he simply lacked

13. Ibid, 39.
14. Ibid, 45.
15. Ibid, 72.
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the technical vocabulary to express what he knew.16 Regardless, Augustine’s experience
of conversion—not only religious but intellectual—would intrigue Lonergan so much
that he would, in Insight, use “Augustine’s change of mind in 386 as a paradigm on the
transformation that he is seeking to facilitate in the minds of ‘sufficiently cultured’
readers of the twentieth century.”17
In 1935, Lonergan would write that “The intelligibility of reality itself needs an
explanation. The sole explanation is that there is an ultimate identity of intelligence and
reality…”18 This burgeoning conviction of realism would eventually lead Lonergan to a
re-assessment of the scholasticism with which he had not been much impressed as a
younger man. Lonergan required a philosophical framework that was attentive to the
workings of human cognition as he understood them, and his expanding engagement
through the mid-1930’s with Thomas Aquinas would give him such a framework. As
Hanchin points out, “In Aquinas, Lonergan found not only a model of unceasing inquiry
similar to his admired Newman and Augustine, but also a more profound account of the
workings of the human mind.”19 By that point, Lonergan was already convinced of the
centrality of understanding, but it would be Lonergan’s reading and reviewing a
dissertation by one of this professors that would turn him on to another decisive step in
knowing: judgment. Lonergan would write in his review that his professor, Leo W.
Keeler, “especially tries to show that for St. Thomas the apprehension of a nexus is one
thing, the act of assent is another; the former dwelling in the purely intelligible world, the
16. Ibid, 73.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid, 82.
19. Hanchin, 45.
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latter affirming the objective existence of the intellectual content.” It was from this
distinction, Lonergan believed, that it could “be deduced that we err, not so much
because we apprehend false things, but because we are too precipitous in assenting.”20
A fellow student in Rome had introduced Lonergan to the work of one of his own
former professors, Joseph Maréchal of Leuven. Maréchal was fearless in his
appropriation of Aquinas and his application of Thomism to the problems of
contemporary philosophy. He held that “a comprehensive and modern critique of
knowledge revealed the objective dynamism of human knowledge, culminating in
objective judgments of existence.” The Catholic, then, should fear nothing of engaging in
such a critique of knowledge, because it could “arrive at the basic Aristotelian and
Thomistic metaphysical positions.”21 Lonergan learned from Maréchal that human
knowledge functions as a process of “acts of experiencing, understanding, and judging to
limited knowledge of reality and then the cycle of knowing begins to fill out perspectives
or to rise to higher viewpoints.”22 Through his engagement (which appears to have been
mainly through conversation with his classmate in Rome) with Maréchal, Lonergan was
primed for a deep dive into the mind of Aquinas. In order to contextualize Lonergan’s
engagement with Aquinas, it is necessary to give a lengthy overview of Thomism in both
medieval and modern times. Only then can Lonergan’s own Thomistic orientation be
understood, and only then will it be clear what intellectual hospitality might have looked
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like to Catholic intellectuals in the first half of the 20th century compared to those of the
latter half.
The Common Ground of Catholic Higher Education
The reintroduction of Aristotelian philosophy into the West during the Crusades
set into motion a chain reaction which would alter Western Christianity forever
afterward. With Augustine continuing to dominate Catholic thought, universities (Paris,
notably) were necessarily going to become battlegrounds between traditionally Christian
and Aristotelian principles. Alasdair MacIntyre gives a concise overview of the
showdown: “Where Aristotle asserted the eternity of the world, Christianity assigns to it a
beginning at the moment of creation; where Aristotle ruled out the separate immaterial
existence of the soul, and where Averroes’ interpretation of the De Anima, although it left
room for the resurrection of the dead, reinforced the denial of any survival of the soul
apart from the body, Christianity was committed to belief in such survival.”23
Compounded by differing perspectives (between Aristotle and Augustine) on the question
how people come to know, the understanding of truth, and the relation between error and
morality, it is no surprise that Aristotelian philosophy was a matter of grave concern to
many churchmen of the time.
What was needed, therefore, was a concerted effort to engage, hospitably, with
Aristotelian thought. That Aquinas ‘baptized’ Aristotle has become something of a
truism. What he truly accomplished, however, is better understood as a synthesis of
Augustinian and Aristotelian thought. “He judged Augustinianism by its standards; he
23. Linda C. Kondrick, “Thomism and Science Education: History Informs a Modern Debate,”
Integrative and Comparative Biology, 48, 2 (August 2008), 207.
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judged Aristotelianism by its standards. He integrated the two in a way that allowed a
compromise to be brokered between the two camps that were entrenched in their own
traditions.”24 Aquinas’s notion of the human being as a whole composed of both body
and soul helped him overcome what he found to be a major shortcoming in Augustine’s
thought. As MacIntyre summarizes, in Aquinas “an Aristotelian account of nature…was
not merely harmonized with an Augustinian supernatural theology but shown to require it
for its completion, if the universe is to be intelligible in the way in which parts relate to
wholes.”25
Just as Aquinas engaged Augustine critically, he did the same with Aristotle.
Rachel Goodrich contends that the originality of Aquinas “consists partly in the fact that
as a metaphysician he adopts an ‘existentialist’ as distinct from an ‘essentialist’
approach.” While both Aristotle and Plato perceived essence as the core of reality
(arguing that beings consisted of form and matter), Aquinas went further and affirmed
“an act-of being which is prior to essence and constitutes the living actuality of each
existent thing.”26 In noting this same development in Aquinas’s thought, Lonergan asserts
that Thomas “was going beyond Aristotle in a profound and radical fashion.”27
Readers of Aquinas will soon realize, though, the extent of what he accomplished
in crafting a synthesis of Aristotle and Christianity: Aquinas incorporated ideas from a
wide range of sources. Etienne Gilson refers to the “extreme diversity” of his sources:
“St. Thomas borrows now from Aristotle, now from Avicenna, and now from St. John
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Rachel M. Goodrich, “Neo-Thomism and Education,” British Journal of Education Studies 7,
1 (November 1958), 27, 28.
27. Lonergan, Topics in Education, 94.
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Damascene or St. Augustine. No matter how eclectic we suppose him to be, he cannot
have collected thoughts so infinitely varied without modifying them considerably.”28
Aquinas, it seems, simply had a mind with a gift for drawing, hospitably, multiple
streams of thought together. But what, then, did this synthesis produce? What is
Thomism?
There has been, historically, no small difficulty in answering precisely that
question. Part of that difficulty is a result of how prolific Aquinas was. Over the course of
his career Aquinas produced “theological syntheses, disputed questions, biblical
commentaries, commentaries on Aristotle, commentaries on other classical works
commonly in use at medieval universities, polemical writings, treatises on specific
subjects, letters and requests for expert opinions on particular issues, liturgical works,
sermons, and prayers.”29 What do these diverse writings suggest, in sum? For Romanus
Cessario, OP,Thomism is “a theological and philosophical movement that begins in the
thirteenth century, (and) embodies a systematic attempt to understand and develop the
basic principles and conclusions of St. Thomas Aquinas in order to relate them to the
problems and needs of each generation.”30
This is the work of the Thomist, then, just as synthesis was once the work of
Thomas himself. Theology, for Aquinas, was all about “ordering truths to the one
Truth…”31 For Thomas, the universe in its totality was best understood as a hierarchy,
and his task as a philosopher was “to place each class of beings in its proper grade. To do
28. Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1956), 77.
29. Cessario, 10.
30. Ibid, 13-14.
31. Ibid, 9.
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this, one principle of universal value must always be kept in mind: that the greater or less
can only be appraised and classified in relation to the maximum, the relative in relation to
the absolute.”32 There can be no being without God, in Aquinas’s system. “There is no
being save the divine being in which all creatures participate; and creatures only differ
from one another by reason of their greater or lesser degree of participation in the divine
being.”33
The thinking of Thomas Aquinas can rightly be described as a kind of realism.
Thomas, and the Thomists who follow him, “defend the reality of creation, and hold the
conviction that from the visible things of the universe the human mind can know the
existence of God.”34 The human mind is capable of true perception of the universe, just
as the human mind is capable of reasoning its way toward knowledge of humanity’s true
end: God. Ultimately, then, there can be for Thomas no divergence between revelation
and reason: they both come from God. Just as faith and reason cannot contradict one
another, however, either one cannot proceed without the other: “They can neither
contradict each other nor ignore each other nor be confused with each other. In vain will
reason justify faith. It can never transform it into reason. The moment faith gives up
authority for proof, it ceases to believe and begins to know. And in vain would faith
move reason from without or beguile it from within. Reason can never cease to be
itself.”35 Should reason begin to accept anything other than a definitive proof, it will yield
at once to faith. The two are utterly distinct, then, but necessarily complementary. This
32. Gilson, 360.
33. Ibid.
34. Cessario, 23.
35. Gilson, 23.
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complementarity no doubt contributes to Thomism’s attractiveness as a philosophy
around which to build a university education. Before that would happen in the American
context, however, Thomistic thought would need to regain the momentum it had lost by
the end of the eighteenth century.
Pope Leo XIII’s 1879 encyclical Aeterni Patris would prove to be the definitive
document behind the revival of Thomistic thought. Leo was not any less troubled than his
predecessor, Pius IX, by the intellectual currents of the time. Leo felt that anyone
considering the problems facing the Church (and the world) “must come to the
conclusion that a fruitful cause of the evils…lies in this: that false conclusions concerning
divine and human things, which originated in the schools of philosophy have now crept
into all the orders of the State, and have been accepted by the common consent of the
masses.”36 Just as Thomas had become the master of original Scholasticism by being the
great synthesizer he was, so too would neo-Scholasticism allow the Church to discern the
good from the bad in contemporary thought. Rather than fearlessly engaging with
contemporary philosophy, however, Leo’s revival of Thomistic thought would be
oriented to a sifting of wheat—what the Church already had—from the chaff—what the
world had to offer.
Leo’s successors would continue to carry the neo-Scholastic torch. For example,
Gleason recounts how, shortly before his death in 1914, Pope Pius X “made it clear that
when he had earlier said St. Thomas was to be studied ‘particularly,’ he really meant

36. Leo XIII, Aeterni Patris, August 4, 1879, 2, http://w2.vatican.va/content/leoxiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_04081879_aeterni-patris.html.
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‘exclusively.’”37 This sentiment, especially coming from a reigning Pope, definitely
suggests something of a reactionary nature to the neo-Scholastic project. Rather than a
system of thought through which the Church might seek to confidently welcome an
engagement with outside perspectives, neo-Scholasticism began to be treated as a kind of
pinnacle, suggesting that Catholic thought was something that had already reached an
accomplished gold standard. Rather than the courageously expansive hospitality of
Aquinas, neo-Scholasticism would approach the other not with a spirit of seeking truth
wherever it might be found, but rather with the bearing of one convinced of having
already fleshed out the totality of truth. The Code of Canon Law, revised in 1917,
similarly “commended to professors of philosophy and theology the methods, doctrine,
and principles of…Thomas Aquinas.” Benedict XV would lend his support to the quasiofficial status of neo-Scholasticism by referring to it as “the preferred doctrine of the
Church.”38
The revival would not make its most dramatic ascent until the 1920’s. On the
heels of the first World War, Enlightenment-style optimism was no longer in vogue. “The
nineteenth century’s confidence in reason, optimism about human perfectibility, and
belief in progress…were utterly shattered by the cataclysmic shock of the Great War and
the outbursts of revolutionary fury that accompanied and followed it.”39 When neoScholasticism came to dominate Catholic higher education, it likely did as much to
distinguish a Catholic university education as did the presence of priests and vowed
37. Philip Gleason, Contending with Modernity: Catholic Higher Education in the Twentieth
Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 112.
38. Cessario, 27.
39. Gleason, 114.
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religious staffing university faculties. After all, this school of thought “reasserted the
capacity of reason to comprehend reality, the unity and harmony of the world…(and) It
provided Catholic intellectuals with an ideology that expressed the intelligibility of the
world and the Catholic community’s optimism and Americanism…” All this, of course,
at a time when “many prominent American intellectuals had denied that intelligibility and
become disillusioned…”40
With an optimistic view of human nature and the capabilities of reason, neoScholasticism “criticized the age for its skepticism, irrationalism, disillusionment,
individualistic capitalism, and totalitarian socialism.”41 The revival of Thomistic thought
gave a philosophical basis for an obviously-Catholic faith commitment that impacted the
full range of human endeavors: social, political, economic, and cultural. Catholic scholars
of the time were well-equipped, then, to confidently engage the world around them. Such
confidence is entirely conducive to intellectual hospitality as it encourages the scholar to
undertake the engagement. Not surprisingly, neo-Scholasticism therefore had
ramifications that extended well beyond the classroom. Luca Sandona, for instance, has
described the impact of a Thomistic, natural law approach to economics, especially after
the Second World War: “In particular, the economic growth of Germany and Italy was
related to the identification of social justice as the main aim of public policy. The
application of (natural law approach) ideas of equal opportunity and the recognition of
individual effort improved individual and societal well-being and reduced inequalities in

40. Patrick W. Carey, American Catholic Religious Thought: The Shaping of a Theological and
Social Tradition (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2004), 81.
41. Ibid, 82.
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income distribution.”42 Patrick Carey demonstrates the broad influence of neoScholasticism strictly within the American context, pointing out that it “supplied the
natural law tradition for John Ryan’s social ethics; it also provided the intellectual
foundations for John Courtney Murray’s understanding of church-state relations and for
Gustave Weigel’s approach to Christian unity.”43 Undoubtedly, in a relatively short span
of time Thomistic thought had re-emerged in a big way, and neo-Scholasticism had come
to dominate Catholic thinking, and therefore Catholic higher education as well
Philip Gleason rightly takes to task any commentators willing to overlook the
intellectual seriousness of the neo-Scholastic revival. It was far more than simple “partyline philosophizing.” As Gleason argues, “It was, in fact, a very large and important
school which at its height supported 25 specialized philosophical journals throughout the
world and engaged the commitment of thinkers the quality of whose work makes it
impossible to dismiss the whole phenomenon…”44 Indeed, there is no reason to reject out
of hand the educational experience on the student side, either. Alice Gallin lauds the 1953
introduction of a new curricular program at the Catholic University of America, called
“Theology, Philosophy, and History as Integrating Disciplines in the Catholic College of
Liberal Arts.” This program sought to use those three disciplines as a means of tying the
content of all coursework together for the students, proudly demonstrating the unity of
knowledge that neo-Scholastic thinking continued to defend. Reflecting on the success of

42. Luca Sandona, “Once Upon a Time: the neo-Thomist Natural Law Approach to Social
Economics,” International Journal of Social Economics 40, 9 (2013), 803. For an overview of Lonergan’s
own work on economics, see Frederick Lawrence, “Between Capitalism and Marxism: Introducing
Lonergan’s Economics,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 63, 4 (2007), 941-959.
43. Carey, 87.
44. Gleason, 116.
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this program (and others that it spawned at various Catholic schools), Gallin suggests that
“Seriously, this may well have been the best intellectual experience we ever offered our
students in Catholic colleges.”45 Such a program, reflecting the neo-Scholastic confidence
regarding the ultimate harmony of all truth, is a clear example of the old synthesis’s
ability to encourage intellectual hospitality. Regardless of a given student’s predilection
for one subject area over the other, the curriculum itself was structured in such a way as
to encourage the student to be open to connecting lessons from one discipline to all the
others. The honeymoon between Catholic higher education and neo-Scholasticism,
however, was not to last.
The collapse of the neo-Scholastic synthesis by the end of the 1960’s would
drastically alter the landscape of Catholic higher education. Indeed, it is one of the major
assumptions of this chapter that Catholic higher education has still not entirely
‘recovered.’ Still, one need not look too hard to find clear reasons for the dissolution of
the philosophical system that had given a Catholic university education its focus and
distinctiveness. Already at the beginning of the embrace of neo-Scholasticism by
Catholic universities in the 1920’s there was wide-ranging skepticism (despite the
impressive academic output of Thomists noted above) regarding its worth as the
backbone of a modern university curriculum. Outsiders to Catholic higher education
often had “the impression of (its) being a school of philosophy accepted purely out of
obedience…” As Gleason tellingly asserts, “in many cases that impression was fully

45. Alice Gallin, O.S.U, “Theology in the Liberal Arts Curriculum of a Catholic College or
University,” in Catholic Theology in the University: Source of Wholeness, ed. Virginia M. Shaddy,
(Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1998), 107.
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justified.”46 While instruction in neo-Scholastic philosophy may have taught over a
generation of Catholic university students how to think, there is good reason to suspect,
also, that its prevalence may have stunted the growth of American Catholicism’s overall
academic profile. For some Thomists, the synthesis represented something of a pinnacle
of human thought. It did not represent simply the best that humanity had done; it was the
best that humanity could do. There is little room for intellectual hospitality in such a
mindset. As a result, there was precious little authentic dialogue between neoScholasticism and the other intellectual currents of the time, such as pragmatism,
idealism, and neo-orthodoxy.47 Even if the neo-Scholastic synthesis had survived, it is
reasonable to suppose that it would have nevertheless guaranteed Catholic universities a
secondary status among the nation’s institutions of higher learning.48
In his assessment of the neo-Scholastic collapse, Liddy points to the dual specter
of academic specialization and fragmentation that had already begun to loom in the
middle of the century. Liddy suggests that “a battle emerged at Catholic universities
between those advocating an overarching integrating vision that tended to be ‘imposed
from on high’ and…those eager to embrace the products of modernity: individual
autonomous departments with scholarly competence in specialized disciplines.” Within a

46. Gleason, 116.
47. Carey, 86.
48. The evolution of theology on Catholic university campuses beyond neo-Scholasticism was a
more complex process than this dissertation can cover in full detail. Even as early as the 1920's there were
indications that an exclusively Thomistic curriculum would not suffice forever. Efforts to include studies of
Scripture, Patristics, history, and literature in the study of theology, coupled with the growing desire to
elevate theology's status as an academic discipline, ensured that neo-Scholasticism's collapse was not
purely a result of forces outside of Catholic theology departments, but also forces within. For a fascinating
survey of the early efforts to bolster theology curricula at Catholic colleges, see Sandra Yocum Mize,
Joining the Revolution in Theology: The College Theology Society, 1954-2004 (Lanham, Maryland:
Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), 31-61.
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short span of time, Liddy contends, “the church’s massive commitment to neoScholasticism could not hold its own. (It) could not win the support of the powerful
specialized departments of the universities to be their integrating language.”49 Had neoScholasticism been able to oppose growing academic specialization with a united front, it
may have been a fair fight. No such unity existed, however, which “in itself was bound to
unsettle its curricular function, for it was not unitary to start with…how could something
called ‘Neoscholasticism’ serve to integrate and synthesize Catholic liberal arts
education?”50
In addition to the tensions between different neo-Scholastic schools of thought,
Gleason highlights two additional factors leading to the collapse of the synthesis. First,
neo-Scholasticism was crushed, in a sense, by its own weight: “No form of philosophy
taught on such a scale could escape being vulgarized in the process, especially if, as in
this case, the aim was to teach it as a comprehensive system.”51 With students required to
take ample courses in philosophy at Catholic schools throughout the country, it cannot be
surprising that some teachers assigned to these courses simply were not as effective as
others. Additionally, the prominent papal role in the neo-Scholastic renewal described
above did not make the synthesis more palatable to those outside Catholic universities.
Especially after something of an ecclesiological paradigm shift during Vatican II, papal
endorsements would hardly be enough to ensure neo-Scholasticism’s popularity even
among Catholics at Catholic institutions. “Thomism was…well on its way to being

49. Richard M. Liddy, “Can Lonergan Replace Aquinas?” Commonweal (June 14, 1996).
50. Gleason, 300.
51. Ibid, 299.
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dismissed by Catholics themselves as ‘official ideology,’ the teaching of which amounted
to little more than ‘indoctrination in the party line.’”52
At this point it may be worth pausing briefly to ask, why is any of this talk of a
neo-Scholastic collapse important? If it was, ultimately, overwhelmed by specialization,
is it not better to assume that the right side won? To whom should this talk of
fragmentation matter? For MacIntyre, the answer is as sweeping as it is straightforward.
“It should matter to anyone who thinks it important what conception of human nature and
the human condition students have arrived at by the time they enter the adult
workplace—and therefore to any Catholic. For each of the academic disciplines teaches
us something significant about some aspect of human nature and the human condition.”53
A synthesis of knowledge, characterized in part by hospitality between the disciplines,
allows the insights of each department to enrich the university’s overall narrative of what
it means to be human. Whatever its failings, the neo-Scholastic synthesis allowed for
such an appropriation of insights across the curriculum. In order to work toward a new
means of integrating knowledge, Liddy suggests that Catholic universities require “a
specifically philosophical vision strong enough to build bridges between faith and
contemporary specialized knowledge.”54 In order to completely understand what the neoScholastic synthesis did for Catholic education, Liddy argues that one must see the true
nature of the void its collapse has left behind: it is a “vacuum of meaning.” In effect,

52. Ibid.
53. MacIntyre.
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Catholic Education 3, 4 (2000), 521.
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there is “no consensus on the very meaning of ‘knowing’ and how human knowing in one
area of specialization is related to every other area and to the rest of human living.”55
If Liddy is correct in his assessment of the climate of higher education, then he
has also demonstrated why Catholic higher education could not reasonably content itself
with a reactionary reinstitution (whatever that would look like) of neo-Scholasticism. To
combat the fragmentation of knowledge caused (in part) by rampant academic
specialization, it could hardly prove effective to proceed as if the fragmentation had not
happened in the first place. Nor would it be to follow Aquinas’s own lead, given that he
“met the contemporary Aristotelian scientific world on its own turf.”56 Despite its virtues,
neo-Scholasticism was hamstrung by its unfamiliarity with “modern scientific and
scholarly ways of questioning. It was also severely hampered by an intuitionist view of
knowing: reality is ‘out there’; all you have to do is take a good look at it. It had little
appreciation for the complex structure of human experiencing, human understanding, and
human judging.”57 In that area of human cognition, no modern Catholic scholar has made
a more significant contribution than Lonergan. With the neo-Scholastic synthesis gone,
Lonergan’s mapping out of “the basic human cognitive processes which underlie all
disciplinary methodologies” offers significant possibilities for a new integrative
framework.58 Such a framework may well be capable of hospitable engagement with a
variety of disciplines and perspectives, in the spirit of Aquinas’s engagement with
Aristotelianism.
55. Liddy, “Can Lonergan Replace Aquinas?”
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
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Aquinas and Lonergan
Neo-Scholasticism once seemed capacious enough to provide Catholic thinkers
with an intellectual framework for not only the study of the world but also for the
incorporation of truth wherever it could be found. As such, as a philosophical framework
it possessed a real potential for intellectual hospitality, even if the reality of its function in
the Catholic Academy often fell far short of anything that might be termed hospitable. To
observe that neo-Scholasticism belongs to the past rather than the future is not to declare,
then, that Aquinas has outlived his usefulness. To the contrary, there have been a number
of intriguing signs of life on the Thomistic front, occasionally in the form of friendly
assessments of Aquinas’s relevance in fields other than theology and philosophy. For
instance, Sandona has enumerated a number of recent sources which regard a natural law
approach as “a trustworthy epistemological basis for a new form of social economic
thinking.”59 Sandona himself has advocated a more widespread appropriation of
Thomistic applications in economics, suggesting it might be “particularly important to
promote sustainable development, foster a balanced allocation of wealth and construct a
stable financial and monetary system regulated by a supranational authority”60 In the hard
sciences, Linda Kondrick argues that even a partial retrieval of Thomistic thinking on
faith and reason might prove beneficial to those struggling to integrate what they know
by faith with what they learn in the laboratory: “Students who feel they must choose
between faith and reason, between religion and science, can be introduced to another

59. Sandona, 798.
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alternative, a holistic paradigm that allows the two, science and religion, to complement
one another.”61
Similarly, to suggest that Catholic higher education might systematically
appropriate the work of Bernard Lonergan to fill the ‘vacuum of meaning’ left behind by
neo-Scholasticism is not to simplistically move beyond Aquinas, either. Ultimately, it is
certainly the case that Lonergan was “both critical and respectful of the achievement of
scholasticism. In (his) view, one of scholasticism’s great achievements was integration of
faith and reason.”62 Indeed, Lonergan was particularly indebted to Aquinas. As David
Tracy remembers, “it is not insignificant that Bernard Lonergan…spent (his) early
scholastic years trying to rediscover the mind and spirit of Aquinas at the most creative
period of the Thomist revival.”63 Lonergan’s own doctoral dissertation (on grace)
afforded him the opportunity to “reach the mind of Aquinas first on a single question,
then on a much wider front.”64 Perhaps most importantly, Aquinas taught Lonergan a
great deal about the task of a theologian. Specifically, it was Aquinas who showed
Lonergan what it meant for a theologian to operate scientifically:
(Aquinas) started from data; he next proceeded via a whole series of theoretic techniques to reach
a strictly theological resolution of the problems set by the seeming contradictions of the original
date. In short, he attempted and sometimes achieved not dogmatic certitude but that partial,
analogous, incomplete but real theoretic understanding proper to the theologian.65
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61. Kondrick, 210.
62. Cyril Orji, The Catholic University and the Search for Truth (Winona: Anselm Academic,
2013), 116.
63. David Tracy, The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970),
30.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid, 38-39.

168

It was actually his study of Aquinas that led Lonergan to reflect more deeply on the
knowing of the knower. As Tracy relates, Lonergan concluded that any final accuracy in
his conclusions on Aquinas “could only be adequately achieved after he had established
some real grasp of the subjective pole—the actual performance of Aquinas’s own
intellect.”66 In effect, rather than focusing entirely on, say, “the metaphysical expression
of Aquinas’s cognitional theories,” Lonergan would come to critically analyze first “the
psychological facts and epistemological implications which gave birth to that
metaphysics. And then—but only then—for the metaphysics which brought that mind to
self-expression.”67That this was an intention behind Insight is clear. In its introduction,
Lonergan acknowledges that there is something seemingly backward in the approach that
he proposed to take to mapping out human cognition: “Among contemporary scholastics
there is a broad agreement on metaphysical issues, and at the same time a strongly
contrasting divergence on epistemological questions. This disparity may lend my work an
appearance of wrong-headedness, for instead of approaching what is doubtful from what
is assured I begin from knowledge and reach metaphysics only as a conclusion.”68 At the
book’s very end, Lonergan considered that he had demonstrated a clear continued
relevance for the thought of Aquinas: “…I would say that it is only through a personal
appropriation of one’s own rational self-consciousness that one can hope to reach the
mind of Aquinas, and once that mind is reached, then it is difficult not to import his
compelling genius to the problems of this later day.”69
66. Ibid, 50.
67. Ibid, 51.
68. Bernard Lonergan, Insight (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 21.
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169

It was in studying Aquinas that Lonergan came to perhaps his greatest insight;
namely, that until then there had been perhaps a stunning oversight on the part of
academics precisely when it came to the nature of insight. What does it mean for one to
know? What happens when someone does come to know? Are there, truly, different ways
of knowing? It is precisely in his mapping out of an answer to these questions that
Lonergan may have given Catholic higher education the tools to once again integrate the
disciplines and thereby ground its ability be intellectually hospitable.
Lonergan and Cognition
The goal of a higher education, Catholic or otherwise, cannot ultimately be
separated from an improvement in students’ ability to know. Ideally, if a university is
offering something above and beyond job training for a career motivated mainly by
increased earnings potential, this is not merely a case of going to college to learn more.
Instead, it is reasonable to suppose that students should also be taught how to know more
effectively, regardless of their career path, for the rest of their lives. And this might be
said for students with whatever intended course of study. All the disciplines offer
students an approach to knowing, or to perceiving the world around them and their place
within that world. As Terry J. Tekippe states, intelligence and reasonableness cannot
simply be discarded through an act of will. So native are they, Tekippe notes, “to the
human being that one would want to cease possessing those qualities only after being
satisfied that it was the smart and reasonable thing to do.”70
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In 1957, when Bernard Lonergan published Insight: A Study of Human
Understanding, he sought “an explanatory understanding of the dynamics of human
understanding, that is, the basic ‘method’ followed by the human spirit at the basis of all
other methods.”71 Such attention on the subject of human knowing—rather than its
objects—was not a commonplace in contemporary Catholic thought as such a focus
might be seen to challenge the objectivity of truth. Nevertheless, Lonergan persisted,
writing later that he perceived Insight as “fundamentally an expression of traditional
thinking.”72 Studying empirically the actual carrying out of the methods employed by
mathematicians, philosophers, and scientists, Lonergan “traces the dynamic method of
the human spirit unfolding through the basic levels of experiencing, understanding, and
judging.”73 Armed with expertise in multiple disciplines, Lonergan was able to map out
the cognitive process which all humans followed, regardless of their own disciplines or
specializations. In opposition to the trends of fragmentation in academic life, then,
Lonergan’s work on insight may well represent the basis of a real and hospitable dialogue
between various ways of knowing. To know how the human mind comes to know, in
short, is to understand the foundation of any scholarly method.
For Lonergan, insight is the “supervening act of understanding.” Indeed, insight is
so central to cognition that “to grasp it in its conditions, its working, and its results is to
confer a basic yet startling unity on the whole field of human inquiry and human
opinion.”74 Insight is, using Tekippe’s terms, that “mental activity by which the mind
71. Liddy, “Bernard Lonergan on a Catholic Liberal Arts Education,” 523.
72. Lonergan, Topics in Education, 23.
73. Liddy, “Bernard Lonergan on a Catholic Liberal Arts Education,” 523.
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grasps the intelligible connections between things that previously had appeared
disparate.”75 As such, insight is that sudden (though perhaps not as sudden as one might
sometimes like) epiphany that seems to change the entire way that a given
problem/question/situation is perceived. In fact, once the insight is gained, there is little
chance the subject will be ever be able to consider the original issue in the same way
again. As Lonergan puts it, insight “passes into the habitual texture of one’s mind.”76
This is why Tekippe is on solid ground when he describes insight as a breakthrough, or
even as a “release from the tension of inquiry.”77
Always concerned with method, Lonergan believes that human cognition is
inherently methodical in nature. With knowing being the goal of cognition, it is certainly
legitimate to ask how learning can be ordered to the acquisition of knowledge if the
knowledge to be learned remains a mystery through much of the process. The answer,
according to Lonergan, “is the heuristic structure. Name the unknown. Work out its
properties. Use the properties to direct, order, guide the inquiry.”78
While insight may be central to the cognitive process as mapped out by Lonergan,
it certainly is not the beginning of that process. We are propelled through the process of
cognition, it seems, by a “primordial drive,” a "pure question.” Lonergan notes, “But no
one just wonders. We wonder about something.”79 Humans, like animals, begin with
sensory experience. Such experience for humans, however, has always encouraged the
formation of questions in the human mind that seeks to make sense of that which has
75. Tekippe, 11, 50.
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been experienced. The answers to these questions might be termed insights. Once insights
are obtained, they may lead to the development of a concept, by which “the universal
grasped by the insight under particular conditions is expressed in general form.”80
Even a concept is not the end of the process of knowing, however. No matter how
clever an insight or how all-encompassing a concept may seem to be, they often raise
questions of their inherent truthfulness. As Lonergan readily acknowledges, “among the
more conspicuous properties of understanding is its liability to incompleteness,
inadequacy, error.”81 Insights can be entirely coherent, but that is not enough. Are they,
in fact, true? There is, then, need for a third level in the cognitive process, one in which
insights are subjected to “an affirming or denying, an agreeing or disagreeing, an
assenting or dissenting.”82 This is the level of judgment, which entails a personal
commitment in way that the previous levels do not. As Lonergan posits, “It is on this
third level that there emerge the notions of truth and falsity, of certitude and the
probability that is not a frequency but a quality of judgment.”83
Initially, Lonergan had intended to end Insight after the thirteenth chapter. He
found, though, that if he “went no further (than chapter 13), my work would be regarded
as…incapable of grounding a metaphysics…”84 Not surprisingly, then, Lonergan
continued onward. For him, the link between cognition and metaphysics was as necessary
as it was clear. “Just as the notion of being underlies and penetrates and goes beyond all
other notions, so also metaphysics is the department of human knowledge that underlies,
80. Tekippe, 86.
81. Lonergan, Insight, 295.
82. Ibid, 297.
83. Ibid, 298-299.
84. Ibid, xxi.
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penetrates, transforms, and unifies all other departments.”85 It will come as little surprise
at this point in the chapter that Lonergan’s thinking takes an explicitly Thomistic turn. In
chapter 15 of Insight, Lonergan introduces the terms—already familiar to any student of
Thomism—potency, form, and act. The function of the mind corresponds to the nature of
reality, in a manner not unlike the relationship between a key and lock.86 The nature of
the process by which people come to know the world around them indicates something
about the nature things within that world. Potency, Lonergan writes, “denotes the
component of proportionate being to be known…by an intellectually patterned
experience of the empirical residue.” Form, according to Lonergan, “denotes the
component…to be known, not by understanding the names of things, nor by
understanding their relations to us, but by understanding them fully in their relations to
one another.” Act, Lonergan contends, “denotes the component…to be known by uttering
the virtually unconditioned yes of reasonable judgment.”87 Clearly, there is here “an
astounding similarity to the doctrines of the Aristotelian and Thomist tradition.”88
Has Lonergan made things overly-complicated? After all, is there not a constant
temptation to simply equate the entirety of the cognitive process to the level of
experience? As Tekippe helpfully points out, it would be utterly incoherent to render a
judgment to the effect that there is no such thing as judgment. As far as conception goes,
“A person may coherently conceive of a universe in which there is no conception. What
one cannot coherently do is to conceive this universe as having no conception, because
85. Ibid, 415.
86. Tekippe, 125.
87. Lonergan, Insight, 457.
88. Ibid, 545.
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the very act of conceiving this universe as having no conception would constitute at least
one exception.”89 Finally, again, it would be “incoherent to have an insight that there is
no such thing as insight.”90 Logically, therefore, Lonergan’s theory of the cognitional
structure is entirely self-justifying.
Insight and Fragmentation
The fragmentation of knowledge described briefly in the introduction of this
chapter is a significant challenge for the Catholic intellectual life, and therefore to
Catholic higher education as well. This is in no small part because of the way that it
hampers the Catholic university’s ability to be a community-practitioner of intellectual
hospitality. The various disciplines can easily tend to exist in their own silos, quite
isolated from the others. This inability for different academic departments within a
Catholic university closely parallels the way that fragmentation leaves hamstrung the
efforts of Catholic intellectuals to hospitably engage the other. Robert M. Doran, SJ,
suggests that the “fragmentation of knowledge…has…grown only more acute, and with it
the potential for ideological stalemates, mutual recriminations of all sorts, and the denial
through silence of the very existence of those with views other than our own.”91
How might a Catholic university respond to such a powerful trend that is so very
detrimental to the long tradition of Catholic education? One intriguing response has been
the proliferation of interdisciplinary courses, programs, and lecture series on Catholic
campuses that seek to break down the barriers between disciplines by bringing academics
89. Tekippe, 103.
90. Ibid, 103.
91. Thomas J. Farrell and Paul A. Soukup, Communication and Lonergan: Common Ground for
Forging the New Age (Kansas City: Sheed & Ward, 1993), ix.
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of various areas together while simultaneously helping students to recognize connections
between what they learn in one course with what they have learned from courses in an
entirely different discipline. While such interdisciplinary endeavors are entirely
worthwhile, they do not seem to have the campus clout necessary to integrate the entire
university curriculum in the way that the old Neo-scholastic synthesis had in an earlier
era. As Haughey asserts, “a modern university needs more than interdisciplinary research
to come to a sense of a common work or to the experience of being in a common
enterprise.”92
It is here, armed with this basic outline of human cognition, that the potential for
Lonergan’s thought to serve as a catalyst for integration in Catholic higher education
might be seen. Indeed, the integration of all knowledge seems to have been a goal of
Lonergan’s behind the writing of Insight in the first place. Early in the book Lonergan
would claim that “our concern is to reach the act of organizing intelligence that brings
within a single perspective the insights of mathematicians, scientists, and men of
common sense.”93 The integration of knowledge would require the various disciplines to
be hospitable toward each other, engaging in a vigorous and rigorous dialogue. Lonergan,
Haughey rightly notes, was convinced that such dialogue would be most successful if
“authentic personal subjectivity and collective intersubjectivity are operating in a more
explicit manner. Why? Because of the fact that the cognitional operations we all are
equipped with are invariant, hence universal.”94

92. Haughey, 9.
93. Lonergan, Insight, 4.
94. Haughey, 43.
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Lonergan’s theory of cognition guaranteed that his outlook was not at all shaped
by a kind of ivory tower mentality. Lonergan sees a distinction between the kind of
intelligence one might expect to find in, say, a laboratory and a garage, but that
distinction implied no qualitative advantage for one over the other. “There is intelligence
in industry and commerce, in finance and taxation, in journalism and public relations.
There is intelligence in the home and in friendship, in conversation and in sport, in the
arts and in entertainment.” And the intelligence that one found in each of these areas,
Lonergan believes, followed the same process of experiencing, understanding, and
judging: “In every case, the man or woman of intelligence is marked by a greater
readiness in catching on, in getting the point, in seeing the issue, in grasping implications,
in acquiring knowhow.”95 Distinguishing between science and common sense,
furthermore, did not mean that a person is simply forced to adopt one or the other as the
way of knowing that would be predominant in his/her life. Rational choice, Lonergan
contends, “is a choice of both, of science to master the universal, and of common sense to
deal with the particular.”96
In a university, similarly, there is significant potential for Lonergan’s theory of
cognition to serve as the intellectual basis for hospitality. This hospitality will be a means
not only for bringing Catholic and non-Catholic perspectives into engagement with one
another, but it will also serve as the basis of hospitality between the disciplines, helping
them to work toward greater integration of knowledge. For the scientist, the levels of
experiencing, understanding, and judging would unfold in the forms of “experimentation,
95. Lonergan, Insight, 196.
96. Ibid, 203.
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hypothesis formation, and verification.” For the historian, they would be manifest as
“research, interpretation, and historical judgment.” An accurate account of human
interiority as it manifests itself in the various methods employed by the human spirit is
the basis for a philosophical vision strong enough to integrate the various scientific and
scholarly methods.”97 As Liddy adds elsewhere, if “Catholic college administrators and
faculties…would reflect upon and discover, with Lonergan’s inspiration and guidance,
the basic human cognitive processes which underlie all disciplinary methodologies,” then
the Catholic university would be a place characterized by widespread “interdisciplinary
communication in pursuit of the common good of the university and of society.”98
Lonergan and Method
The potential impact of Lonergan’s cognitional theory on Catholic higher
education is undoubtedly this chapter’s primary contribution to the dissertation. The next
several sections represent, in some ways, appendices of additional implications of
Lonergan’s thought for the Catholic intellectual life and Catholic higher education. Some
of these additional implications have been highlighted by the foregoing consideration of
Lonergan’s Insight, as is the case with this brief section on Lonergan’s theological
method. The goal here is not a thorough review of Lonergan’s method so much as an
acknowledgement of how Lonergan himself seems to have been thinking of the
adaptability of his thought to the Catholic intellectual life.

97. Liddy, “Bernard Lonergan on a Catholic Liberal Arts Education,” 523.
98. Liddy, “Can Lonergan Replace Aquinas?”
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Lonergan may well provide a framework for increased hospitality and cooperation
between the disciplines, orienting such cooperation toward a synthesis of knowledge. But
who is responsible for beginning, pursuing, and persisting in this hard work? Presumably,
all stakeholders in a Catholic university community have a vested interested in promoting
and maintaining the Catholic identity of their institutions. That said, it is also clear that
certain disciplines will, by their very nature, have a perhaps more substantial role to play.
Pope John Paul II wrote that “Theology plays a particularly important role in the search
for a synthesis of knowledge as well as in the dialogue between faith and reason. It serves
all other disciplines in their search for meaning, not only by helping them to investigate
how their discoveries will affect individuals and society but also by bringing a
perspective and an orientation not contained within their own methodologies.”99
Theology, then, is instrumental in facilitating the dialogue between Catholicism and
everything else. Additionally, theology provides the space for the various disciplines to
consider the relationship between them. In circumstances where theology is perceived
with suspicion or even derision by academics, though, might this not set up for failure the
enterprise of promoting a synthesis of knowledge with all of the intellectual hospitality
that such a project would both require and promote? For Lonergan, theology’s status in
the Academy could be shored up significantly not by changing its vantage point (as in
preferring a supposedly more objective ‘religious studies’ to theology), but by being
clearer regarding theology’s method.

99. John Paul II, Ex Corde Ecclesiae, August 15th, 1990, 19, http://w2.vatican.va/content/johnpaul-ii/en/apost_constitutions/documents/hf_jp-ii_apc_15081990_ex-corde-ecclesiae.html.
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As noted in the biographical sections above, Lonergan had had a longstanding
fascination with method, which would eventually culminate in his 1971 work Method in
Theology. Advising his readers from the beginning that a book on theological method
must necessarily read differently than a book of theology, Lonergan employs his
understanding of human cognition in order to define how the discipline of theology
comes to know. Lonergan defines a method as “a normative pattern of recurrent and
related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results.”100 Just as in the natural
sciences—which had demonstrable success in defining their own method—theology
involves a number of distinct but related processes that will encourage inquiry, inquire,
evaluate inquiry, ensure that the fruits of inquiry are incorporated into what is already
known, and wield the fruits of inquiry to begin asking the next generation of questions.
But is such theological deliberation worthwhile? Is any deliberation worthwhile?
“To deliberate about deliberating,” Lonergan believes, “is to ask whether any deliberating
is worth while. Has ‘worth while’ any ultimate meaning? Is moral enterprise consonant
with this world?”101 Thinking about method, or perhaps better, thinking about knowing
leads a person eventually to the question of God. Theology, then, for Lonergan, is an area
of legitimate intellectual inquiry: “…’however much religious or irreligious answers
differ, however much there differ the questions they explicitly raise, still at their root
there is the same transcendental tendency of the human spirit that questions, that
questions without restriction, that questions the significance of its own questioning, and
so comes to the question of God.” Obviously, the believer, the agnostic, and the atheist
100. Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), 4.
101. Ibid, 102.
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may answer that question differently. In the case of the latter two, though, even “their
negations presuppose the spark in our clod, our native orientation to the divine.”102
For Lonergan, theology involves a twofold movement: one involves a retrieval of
insight from a religious tradition situated in a particular cultural past, while the other
looks ahead to the future, seeking to mediate the content of that tradition into what the
culture is and will be. Thus, it is clear that Lonergan does not embrace a notion of culture
as something to be accomplished once and for all and then simply preserved. Theology
undertaken with such a classicist notion of culture would see itself as “a permanent
achievement,” wherein theologians would continually “(discourse) on its nature.” Instead,
Lonergan perceives culture empirically, wherein “theology is known to be an ongoing
process…”103 Lonergan’s method includes eight functional specialties in theology, with
the first four involved in the retrieval of the past while the latter four work toward the
future dimension of the theological task. These eight functional specialties include
research, interpretation, history, dialectic, foundations, doctrines, systematics, and
communications.104 Since, in Lonergan’s theory of cognition, the human person engaged
in any investigation must operate on the levels of experience, understanding, judgment,
and decision, Lonergan saw that there must be four functional specialties involved in
each of theology’s movements.105 Though an individual theologian may be especially
accomplished in or focused on any one or a combination of the eight specialties, he must
also be cognizant of how his areas fit the rest of the eight if theology is to be done well.
102. Ibid, 103.
103. Ibid, xi.
104. Ibid, 127.
105. Ibid, 134.
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Otherwise, “the man with the blind-spot is fond of concluding that his specialty is to be
pursued because of its excellence and the other seven are to be derided because by
themselves they are insufficient. From such one-sidedness theology has suffered gravely
from the middle ages to the present day.”106
Lonergan’s Trinitarian Theology
In 2015, Timothy Hanchin submitted a dissertation on Lonergan’s ‘Trinitarian
vision of education’ and the implications of his Trinitarian theology for friendship in
Catholic higher education. This chapter would be remiss to avoid any engagement with
Hanchin’s research given its proximity to the content of this chapter as well as this
dissertation as a whole. This section will attempt to distill Hanchin’s work with two goals
in mind. First, Hanchin’s research further demonstrates the degree to which Lonergan’s
thought is indebted to its grounding in the Catholic tradition, especially—as indicated
above—Aquinas. Second, and perhaps more importantly, this section will begin to more
intentionally connect Lonergan’s work to the kind of intellectual hospitality and
friendship in Catholic intellectual life that this dissertation is both examining and
advocating. Up to this point, the chapter has tended to speak broadly of the capacity of
Lonergan’s cognitional theory to drive toward a greater integration of knowledge which,
we are contending, implies a significant receptivity and even hospitality to perspectives
and insights encountered through engagement with both Catholics and non-Catholics
alike. This and the following sections will more intentionally address the hospitable
orientation latent throughout Lonergan’s work.

106. Ibid, 137.
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Hanchin surveys the Lonergan corpus to propose a vision of Catholic higher
education saturated with friendship. Hanchin’s thesis is that “Bernard Lonergan’s integral
hermeneutics—the mutual mediation of the ways ‘below upwards’ and ‘above
downwards’—provides a promising heuristic for the Catholic university’s selfunderstanding as a participation in the coordinated missions of the Son and the Spirit and
therefore sharing in the life of the triune God—by exercising friendship.”107 For
Lonergan, following in the footsteps of both Augustine and Aquinas, understanding one’s
own understanding “provides an analogy that aids us in more adequately understanding
the mystery of the Trinity.”108 Lonergan’s theory of human cognition, Hanchin contends,
can lead one to understand God’s life as analogous to friendship: “The sending of the
missions of the Spirit and the Son is an act of friendship with creation extended by a God
constituted as friendship.”109 Christ both represents and offers a reconciliation between
God and humanity, signaling God’s acceptance of and love for people by overpowering
evil and fashioning out of it something good; namely, love. “The love of a divine person
looks upon the evil and suffering of his friends as his own—made manifest in the sorrow
and detestation for sin that Christ exhibits on the cross—and transforms his friends’ evil
into good so that his friends may be friends with God.”110
For Lonergan, the Trinity is understood as a community of friends, the friendship
between which is so perfect that it binds “three distinct persons…as one.”111 What,
exactly, though, is the friendship between the Son and the Father? Between the Father
107. Hanchin, 6.
108. Ibid, 111.
109. Ibid.
110. Ibid, 161.
111. Ibid, 106.
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and the Spirit? Can these instances of friendship be understood as identical to the
procession of either the Son or Spirit from the Father? Hanchin suggests that “The
distinction of persons is analogously conceived in terms of the dynamism of
consciousness, and the consubstantiality of the Trinity is attributed to the infinite act of
divine consciousness. There is an inherent relatedness of understanding, affirming, and
loving.”112 For Aquinas, when one loves something, there is within the lover “an imprint
of the loved reality.” The object of love and the reality which is known, then, are both
present within one who loves and knows.113 The Son and Spirit process from the Father
in these terms. The Father knows (Son), and the Father loves (Spirit).
Augustine had once posited that “None can love what he does not know.”114
Aquinas noted, however, that the love of a person for God does not function along a
simple knowing-to-loving trajectory. God is not perfectly known, but can be loved
perfectly. Aquinas, therefore, describes “a reciprocal dynamism between the faculties of
the intellect and will. The will wills what is recognized as good having been grasped by
the intellect in the act of understanding, but the will also wills the intellect to understand.
Love is therefore conversely the cause of knowledge.”115 As will be seen in the next
chapter, John S. Dunne will also grapple with this dynamic relationship between intellect
and will, knowing and loving.
Lonergan’s theory of human cognition accounts for the dynamic relationship
between knowing and loving, which parallels the processions of the Son and Spirit from
112. Ibid, 101.
113. Ibid, 88.
114. Ibid, 90.
115. Ibid.
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God the Father. Lonergan “identified the extroverted, visible mission of the Word with
development below upwards and the introverted, invisible mission of the Spirit with
development above downwards.”116 By ‘below upwards’ one means that the development
of the human person “flows from attentiveness through understanding to judgment
producing loving action.” This movement was clearly Lonergan’s focus throughout
Insight, which described knowing as proceeding from experience to understanding to
judgment. The way ‘above downwards,’ on the other hand, entails a “(cascading) from
loving action through judgment informing understanding and attentiveness,” as in the
case of the human person transformed by and in the love of God.117 Therefore,
Lonergan’s theory of human cognition was not unrelated to his earlier work on
Trinitarian theology, but actually reflected his understanding of the relationship between
and the missions of the divine Persons.
In the previous chapter, it was shown that Merton’s apostolate of friendship,
despite its uniqueness, was not something he pursued in spite of his vocation as a
monastic contemplative. Rather, he came to see that apostolate as part and parcel of his
vocation, part and parcel of what it meant for him to be a Catholic, Trappist monk.
Merton’s intellectual hospitality, therefore, was in no small part an expression of his
faith. Something similar can be said in Lonergan’s case, despite the vast gulf between
Lonergan and Merton in terms of style and interests. Lonergan’s major contribution to
philosophy is his work on cognition. His major contribution to theology is his ability to
take what he had learned regarding human knowing and use it to forge a coherent method
116. Ibid, 205.
117. Ibid, 166.
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for theology to follow. Lonergan’s thought, oriented as it is toward defining common
ground between widely divergent perspectives, is inherently hospitable. This hospitality,
like Merton’s, is not something that Lonergan achieved despite his personal commitment
to the Catholic faith. Instead, given the impact of Lonergan’s Trinitarian theology on his
theory of cognition, it is no stretch to say that Lonergan’s hospitality is also a function of
his own Catholic identity.
Hospitality, Friendship, and Lonergan
Dialogue of any kind requires the parties involved to navigate the tension between
common ground and the real differences that distinguish them. In the contemporary,
postmodern context, this can seem especially difficult given the sheer pluralism of
perspectives and the widely divergent philosophical and religious systems that underpin
them. For the university striving to bring all knowledge into conversation, however, the
responsibility is not one it can afford to shirk. For the Catholic university, there is a desire
to share the riches of the Catholic tradition, but there must also be a clear desire to find
truth wherever it is to be found—even as the institution remains committed to asserting
the one Source of all truth.
Where is the common ground necessary for engagement between Catholic
thought and that of ‘the world’ to be found? Given the broad spectrum of worldviews to
be found throughout the world, coupled with the astonishing diversity of cultural
outlooks, is common ground simply a pipe dream? Frederick Crowe, SJ, asks “Is there a
community that lies behind their differences and makes communication between the
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cultures possible, allows transition from one to another as well as integration of their
goods and achievements in the realm of spirit.?118 His answer, and this chapter’s answer,
is that the very process of human cognition as mapped out by Bernard Lonergan provides
the basic common ground from which dialogue between religions, cultures, and academic
disciplines might proceed. What virtues are perhaps required to not only acknowledge
this common ground despite glaring apparent differences but also to make the sustained
engagement between perspectives beneficial for all involved? The obvious answer might
be to posit that tolerance is the requisite virtue. Tolerance, this dissertation contends,
pales in comparison to hospitality as a Christian virtue. Haughey suggests that “simply to
make room for those who hold these plural worldviews” is at best “a merely tolerant
hospitality.”119 Hanchin, similarly, suggests that tolerance is a weak virtue, given that it
“is often non-engagement as peace keeping when navigating various truth claims in a sea
of pluralism.”120 For Lonergan, the stakes of orienting one’s intellectual posture toward
tolerance were high: “when people merely tolerate one another’s views, they cannot have
any common view, and they cannot act effectively to deal with social evils, (which) gives
rise to totalitarianism.”121
Haughey is equally critical, though, of a kind of hospitality that would seek to
engage the other with the ulterior motive of somehow prevailing in the end. “A host who
is out to win is actually more like a would-be conqueror than a host. A host who claims to

118. Frederick E. Crowe, SJ, “Neither Jew nor Greek but One Human Nature and Operation in
All,” in Communication and Lonergan, ed. Thomas J. Farrell and Paul A. Soukup (Kansas City: Sheed and
Ward, 1993), 91.
119. Haughey, 37.
120. Hanchin, 258.
121. Lonergan, Topics in Education, 65.
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know what the other should do or be has already failed a basic test of hospitality.”122
Instead, what Haughey would like to see in the Catholic intellectual life—and thus on the
campuses of Catholic universities—is a more robust brand of intellectual hospitality that
is capable of promoting meaningful dialogue between the Catholic tradition and, without
exaggeration, everything else. “…a university can house plural worldviews by hearing
them, taking them seriously, engaging them. This…form of hospitality can lead to a real
growth in understanding on the part of both hosts and guests.”123
Concretely speaking, of what might such hospitality consist on a Catholic
university campus? Haughey acknowledges that it would be multilayered and proceeds to
describe three distinct levels. The first involves the individual faculty member, who must
exhibit a hospitable openness toward the findings of her research, allowing the evidence
to take her where it leads rather than trying to “mangle the evidence in…her favor.” The
second layer of hospitality on a Catholic campus, according to Haughey, would be
interpersonal. Scholars of various disciplines and even worldviews must be willing to run
the risk of disagreement that comes with serious academic discussion between them. The
institutions themselves, it seems, must provide structures within which such encounters
might take place. Finally, in what might be the most all-encompassing layer in relation to
the academic life of the university, would be a vigorous engagement with the Catholic
intellectual tradition.124

122. Haughey, 37.
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Haughey recognizes that this third layer might do with some additional
explanation, devoting two chapters to an extended description of the Catholic intellectual
tradition, which he calls “the fourth leg under the chair of Peter,” along with Sacred
Tradition, scripture, and the magisterium of the Church.125 This intellectual tradition
developed historically out of the fact that the Good News of Christ needed further, and
even continual, development so as to flesh out its full ramifications and maintain its
relevance as the Church worked always to preserve the integrity of the Gospel at all
times. Believing in the God of all creation, Who is the source of all truth, the Catholic
intellectual tradition has apparently no limit to its capacity. It is entirely committed to the
understanding of all that is. As Haughey asserts in terms reminiscent of Lonergan,
“where one is seeking out truth and value, one is seeking ‘being,’ and if that pursuit is
unrestricted and disinterested, one is contributing to this tradition whether one is aware of
this or not.”126
This unboundedness of the Catholic intellectual tradition can be invigorating, but
also frightening to those committed to the preservation of the truth of the faith, as well as
its transmission to the next generation. It is the Church’s “first line of hospitality,”127 but
it will necessarily seem to cross the visible boundaries of thought which is apparently or
explicitly Catholic. For this reason, it seems legitimate to suggest that there is indeed a
necessary fourth layer to the kind of hospitality needed on Catholic university campuses,
one that is as unique as Haughey’s third, the engagement with the Catholic intellectual
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tradition. There must be a level of hospitality, perhaps even friendship (recall the circular
relationship between the two described in chapter 2) between the university and the
hierarchy of the Church. As Hanchin makes clear, tension between bishops and Catholic
universities, or between bishops and theologians in particular, is best seen as a conflict
between two cultures: the classicist cultures in which many clerics were formed, and the
academics who have “no reference point” for it.128
It is in the midst of this tension, at the heart of so many of the conflicts between
Catholic universities and churchmen described in chapter 1, that Hanchin’s work on a
hermeneutics of friendship based in Lonergan’s thought becomes intriguing. Lonergan,
Hanchin contends, “is in the line of Heidegger and Gadamer in radicalizing the notion of
hermeneutics as part of the finite and situated character of all human knowing.”129
Lonergan was far more interested in what it meant for one to know, and what one did
when knowing, than in whether a person knew anything. Hanchin proposes a
“hermeneutics and pedagogy of friendship as a way that a Catholic university may
participate in the ongoing missions of the Spirit and Son and therefore participate in
divine friendship.”130 Lonergan himself noted the correlation between his Trinitarian
theology—God as community of friends—and his hermeneutics. “He identified the
extroverted, visible mission of the Word with development below upwards and the
introverted, invisible mission of the Spirit with development above downwards. Like the
two divine missions, the two vectors of development are distinct and
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coordinated.”131Attentiveness to what it means to know can assist the Catholic university
not only in its quest for knowledge or to integrate all knowledge, but also in its task to
articulate its role within the Church. As the Church works to build the Kingdom of God
insofar as it is able, the Catholic university seeks to participate in the missions and
friendship of God precisely as a community of learners, coming to know in a dynamic
pattern that matches and mirrors the pattern of cognition outlined in Lonergan’s Insight.
Preliminary Conclusions
Lonergan was convinced of the value of a good general education. As he was
convinced that it is simply “too easy to produce crackpots by premature specialization,”
he respected a general education’s abilities to develop a person’s assimilative powers: “If
one learns to know man through the reading of literature and the study of history, one
will have a basis for stepping into the human sciences that is much more useful perhaps
than the study of those sciences.”132 Lonergan’s theory of the cognitive process could
help the university professor embrace a vision of the Catholic university precisely as a
university, rather than as a multiversity that plays host to a whole series of parochial
disciplines. Lonergan’s is “a strikingly catholic philosophy in the deepest sense of the
term. It is open, dynamic, comprehensive, historically minded, pluralistic, integrative,
and critical. Lonergan takes his stand on human beings as they are, concrete existential
subjects with a mature commitment to self-knowledge and self-appropriation.”133
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And it is precisely in this notion of ‘self-appropriation’ that the full implications
of Lonergan’s thought for students might be seen. Frederick Crowe, SJ suggests that
Lonergan does not teach a reader about a topic so much as he helps the reader come to
know the reader. In Lonergan “we find…an occasion, hear an invitation, receive a
stimulus to learn something about ourselves by attending to our own interior
activities.”134 The structure of human consciousness as Lonergan perceives impacts
everything a person does. Lonergan’s self-appropriation is a person coming “to the
explicit awareness that ‘This in fact is who I am: one who experiences, questions and is
capable of understanding, judging, deciding, loving.”135 This self-appropriation is akin to
an intellectual conversion which allows the scholar or student to convey what they have
learned in a certain specialization and convey it meaningfully to scholars and students
immersed in another. As Liddy optimistically posits, “Such conversion leads to ‘the
theory of philosophic differences,’ that is, the philosophy that enables us to discern and
critique the prevalent philosophies of the culture around us. It allows one to move beyond
one’s own restricted world…to accurately assessing the currents, theories, and
philosophies of the world around us.”136
In order to welcome students into the kind of work that a Catholic university does,
perhaps there is a need for all students to attend early on in their studies to what it means
for them to know. If hospitality is to be a goal of the Catholic university, or at least a
virtue that is to motivate the sorts of decisions a Catholic university undertakes, students
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need to be helped in order to see how such hospitality functions. Teachers at all levels of
education are routinely counseled to make sure that students know the educational goal of
what they are doing at any given time. With more attention given at the beginning of
undergraduate studies to what it means for students to know, students could be better able
to see cohesion between the various academic disciplines. How have students come to
know what they know already? What will it mean for them to know in a theology course?
In a chemistry course? In a history course? Lonergan’s theory of human cognition would
equip students and scholars alike to better engage with those who see things rather
differently they do, or at least have gone about understanding the world around them
using a different method of knowing. This may be the most substantial antidote to the
specialization and fragmentation of higher education today. Students aware not only of
the content that a given professor is trying to communicate to them but also of what it
means for them to know in the first place—regardless of discipline—will be well-placed
for a hospitable engagement with multiple subjects and multiple worldviews.
A Catholic university must always be a place where the Church is able to engage
with all cultures. In order for such an engagement to happen, the identity of the Catholic
institution must always be strong enough to warrant the confidence necessary to be
hospitable toward those cultures. As Haughey observes, “the virtue most peculiar to
committed academics is their hospitable disposition towards data, in whatever guise it
comes or however uncongenial it might seem to be. Hospitality welcomes others…as
worthy of the room one makes for them.”137 In order to encourage the scholars and

137. Haughey, 28.
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professors of Catholic higher education to be so hospitable, there must be a means of
articulating that notion so central to the Catholic tradition; namely, that a unity of all
knowledge is possible under a framework of faith.
In an earlier era, the thinking of Thomas Aquinas, filtered through the neoScholasticism of the early 20th century, offered a synthesis of knowledge that could serve
as a backbone for a distinctively Catholic curriculum. With the old synthesis long gone,
Bernard Lonergan’s thinking on cognition offers a possible replacement. With its
understanding of how all peoples of all cultures (and from all academic disciplines) come
to know, Lonergan’s theory of human consciousness opens a door to interdisciplinary
dialogue based on self-appropriation and the resulting awareness of how the ‘other’ also
comes to know. This, in turn, could overcome the longstanding trends toward everincreasing specialization and fragmentation of knowledge, helping professors help
students to see a genuine wholeness in their education. Once students have been helped to
see where they, themselves, ‘stand’ intellectually, they will be uniquely well-placed to
make the most of opportunities to engage with, for instance, those speakers whom some
might deem controversial.

Chapter 5: John Dunne and the Hospitality of Passing Over
Introduction
Just as it would be hard to overestimate Thomas Merton’s impact on the
spirituality of American Catholics in the 20th, so too would it be difficult to quantify
Bernard Lonergan’s influence on Catholic theology in the decades since Insight and
Method in Theology were published. One of the most unique theologians to emerge from
the ranks of Lonergan’s students was undoubtedly John S. Dunne, C.S.C. Reading
Dunne, like reading Lonergan, is an experience rather unlike that of reading most
Catholic theologians. Like Lonergan, Dunne can sometimes seem to the reader that he
has developed—if not his own language—then at least his own matrix of questions,
quotations, and insights that he consistently injects into his books. Like Lonergan, the
reader will not find in the majority of Dunne’s works an explicit reliance on Church
Fathers, councils, papal pronouncements, etc. Though Dunne was, like Merton, perhaps
most famous for his prolific career as an author of works of spirituality, he was also an
extremely capable theologian. Unlike Merton, Dunne does not comment on the
particulars of current events. Like both Merton and Lonergan, Dunne’s record suggests
that he was an accomplished teacher, reportedly having taught more students at the
University of Notre Dame than any other professor.
Also like Merton and Lonergan, and certainly of most importance for this
dissertation, John S. Dunne was one of the more notable practitioners of Catholic
intellectual hospitality of the past half century. Thomas Merton’s apostolate of friendship
led him to look far beyond the walls of his monastery in order to engage with people of
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very different backgrounds and worldviews, all the while learning and teaching. Bernard
Lonergan’s map of human cognition allowed him to see a breathtaking unity of
knowledge, woven together by the consistent processes of human knowing. As such,
Lonergan was able to see a common ground underneath all forms of knowing, that was
therefore supporting people who pursue perhaps widely divergent paths to knowledge.
Though Lonergan’s influence on Dunne certainly shines through Dunne’s work in a
number of places, Dunne’s intellectual hospitality possessed a distinctive style and
method.
As will be seen, Dunne’s earliest work, focused largely on the theology of
participation found in Aquinas, is unexceptional in its style. As Dunne got just a bit older,
however, his interests and even his method would undertake a drastic transformation. It
was when he turned 30, Dunne would later recall, that he developed a “vivid awareness”
of “life opening up all the way to death…”1 In terms of writing style, Dunne would only
occasionally resort to technical theological language for the remainder of his career. As
far as his interests were concerned, death—both as such as well as his own eventual—
would drive the development of his thought and inspire the process that he would call
‘passing over.’
It is this process of passing over that represents Dunne’s contribution to this
dissertation as an obvious exemplar of Catholic intellectual hospitality. In passing over,
Dunne would attempt to immerse himself in “the standpoint of other lives and times,”

1. John S. Dunne, A Journey with God in Time, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press,
2003), 8.
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before “coming back to that of our own lives and times.”2 Whereas Merton’s friendship
extended to a large number of his contemporaries, Dunne’s offer of hospitality—and
perhaps even friendship—was extended most often to people long dead, to cultures quite
foreign to his own, or to eras long since passed.
Dunne’s books are unique, but he did not feel that he had any claim to a
monopoly on passing over. Gandhi, in Dunne’s estimation, was himself skilled at
“(passing) over by sympathetic understanding from his own religion to other religions
and (coming) back again with new insight to his own.”3 Dunne would also point to
Machiavelli as a fellow practitioner, in that Machiavelli would commune for hours each
evening with “the great men of former times.” In addition to escaping boredom,
forgetting trouble, and overcoming fear of poverty and death through these nightly
experiences, Dunne contends, Machiavelli was also able to “gain from the past an
understanding of the present and future.”4
This chapter will explore the particulars of Dunne’s intellectual hospitality as
demonstrated in his method of passing over. Though Dunne’s practice of hospitality was
not identical to Merton’s or Lonergan’s there will emerge some obvious common ground.
In all three cases, these prodigious thinkers and prolific writers were inspired to
hospitality by something inherent to their own Catholic faith. Indeed, all three were able
to be hospitable to the other because of their commitment to Catholicism, not in spite of
it. Once Dunne’s work has been thoroughly surveyed in this chapter, the dissertation will
2. John S. Dunne, The Reasons of the Heart, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press,
1978), 149.
3. John S. Dunne, The Way of All the Earth, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1978),
ix.
4. Ibid, 157.
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finally be able to support several conclusions regarding what Catholic intellectual
hospitality seems to be in practice, and what the ramifications of that might for Catholic
higher education.
John S. Dunne’s Early Biography
The first-time reader of Dunne might easily feel, at first, as though he has
stumbled upon an author with his own language, or at least his own form of
communication. Dunne seems to almost constantly invoke the same names as he tackles
subjects. Dante, Gandhi, Aquinas, Buber, and many others are called upon to help
develop Dunne’s ideas, and it is sometimes the same quote from one of these figures that
pops up several times in the same book or even in multiple books. Typically, Dunne
would write a single paragraph each day. While there are certainly times, as a result, that
Dunne’s work reads like someone’s stream of consciousness, to leave one’s conclusions
about Dunne there would be to miss the development that happens within each book and
certainly from book to book as well. Very little of the work he published in the latter half
of his life deals with classic theological categories as an exclusive or even primary focus.
Instead, Dunne never seems to move entirely beyond his preoccupation with death. Not
surprisingly, then, Dunne’s reflections on life, time, meaning, and death always strike the
reader as though there is an autobiographical thread running throughout his work.
What might seem initially to be Dunne’s own personal style or language,
however, may actually turn out to be nothing more than the language of the human
condition communicated from Dunne’s personal experience of changing standpoints.
Interestingly, the reader will be best positioned to see Dunne’s work as applicable to all if
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he has a handle on Dunne’s biography. Very much in the style of his teacher, Lonergan,
Dunne’s theology was undertaken by someone who had diverted his attention toward the
knowing subject. Before beginning his first book, Dunne decided to write an
autobiographical sketch as a necessary step before embracing the kind of intellectual
hospitality that would characterize his work. Dunne, it seems, needed to know how and
why he knew what he knew, in order to begin considering and engaging with the
perspectives of others. Dunne’s intellectual hospitality, therefore, required him to occupy
a place, or perhaps even a tradition, of his own. While that early autobiographical
reflection was never published, he did eventually publish an autobiographical work, A
Journey with God in Time, in 2003. In that book, Dunne would interpret events in his life
through the lens of insights he had gained rather later on.
Dunne thinks of his life as a journey with God in time.5 Nevertheless, Dunne (not
at all unlike Merton) believes that there are moments in life when the presence of the
eternal can be seen or known. Dunne, born December 3, 1929, fondly recalls a childhood
in which his natural curiosity was encouraged by a family that valued reading. The
memory of his grandfather telling him stories suggests that his first five years were happy
ones. Indeed, his grandfather’s place in Dunne’s life is confirmed when he says that “God
has become my companion on the way, I realize now, replacing my grandfather…”6 The
decade after his grandfather’s death was not as happy. Dunne remembers beginning to
look at the people he encountered in those days, trying to find people who were happy in

5. Dunne, Journey, 1.
6. Ibid, 3.
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order to learn their secret. Dunne’s habit of passing over to the perspectives of others,
therefore, has very deep roots.
Dunne’s earliest recollection of doing theology also dates back to when he was
quite young, comparing God to sparrows. “My concept of God was of Someone as
harmless as a sparrow and yet existing everywhere, like sparrows, and caring about
everyone and everything.”7 Later on, Dunne recalls sleeping outside during the summers,
when the vastness of the night sky would fill him with a sense of wonder that the world—
and everything else—actually existed. One hears the echoes of Dunne’s lifelong
engagement with Aquinas and Lonergan in his contention that “The wonder was not so
much a proof as a sign of God’s reality. To come to God from the wonder is an insight. It
means no longer taking for granted what is most taken for granted, the existence of
things, and when that is no longer taken for granted, God’s presence appears.”8
Dunne’s parents sent him to boarding school one hundred miles from home in
Austin, after “perceiving my unhappiness…This then became my first sally in quest of
happiness.” Armed with his memories of lost happiness in the midst of his teenage
unhappiness, Dunne compares his boarding school years to the experience of Odysseus.
The time away from home was like a journey through a wonderland, encountering “dread
and fascination of the mystery of life.”9 The second venture in Dunne’s quest for
happiness was “a spiritual quest, and it followed closely on my journey away from
home.” Dunne’s lifelong habit of passing over seems to have begun here quite

7. Ibid.
8. Ibid, 4.
9. Ibid, 16.
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intentionally, and the intellectual hospitality it entails often seems oriented more toward
Dunne’s desire to receive insight rather than offer it. “Passing over to fellow students was
passing over to fellow seekers, not finders; passing over to teachers, on the other hand,
was passing over to finders, or so I hoped.”10 From these teachers, Holy Cross brothers
and priests, Dunne hoped to find the secret of happiness. The young Dunne thought he
had found that secret in the opening lines of The Imitation of Christ (from John’s
Gospel): “One who follows me will not walk in darkness.”11
This discovery seems to have set the stage for Dunne’s “third sally in quest for
happiness,” which was “to go to Notre Dame to join the priests of Holy Cross.”12 While
at Notre Dame, Dunne would take his first steps into philosophical thinking, engaging
with Newman’s distinction between knowledge and learning. Though Dunne had always
been encouraged to love learning by his family, the acquisition of knowledge struck him
as a higher goal. “To be learned was to be well read and well informed, but to have
knowledge was to have insight and understanding. It was to have vision. It was for me the
beginning of a quest of vision. My quest of happiness was changing into a quest of
wisdom.”13
In the last chapter, it was noted how Thomism had come to reassert itself in the
Catholic Church through the neo-Scholastic revival. It is not at all surprising, then, that
Dunne’s newfound quest for wisdom would take a turn toward Aquinas during his
college years at Notre Dame. During the summer after his sophomore year, Dunne
10. Ibid, 17.
11. Ibid, 18.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid, 19.
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committed to reading the Summa Theologiae. Apparently, Dunne employed the strategy
of reading the body of each article only, skipping objections and responses to objections.
This was nevertheless enough to shape Dunne’s view of the world. “Reading it article by
article, I was getting the vision of things, how everything comes from God, how human
beings return to God, and how Christ is the way.”14 Dunne found peace and serenity in
reading Aquinas, which he also found reading Augustine’s Confessions. Aquinas made a
more significant impression on Dunne, though, as can be seen from his decision to read
through the Summa over and over, year after year. With his appropriation of Aquinas’s
vision of all things originating with God, and of human beings proceeding from and then
turning back toward God, Dunne was inspired to seek the very summit of academic
accomplishment: “Now an ambition took hold of me, to do with modern thought what
Saint Thomas had done with ancient thought.” Dunne seems to have put no mean effort
into carrying out this goal. “I began to read Kant…But then I realized Kant was working
from Newton’s science…I realized I would have to work instead form Einstein’s science,
taking space and time to be the sensorium of the moving observer…I began to collect
principles like this to form the basis of a kind of Summa.”15
Upon graduation from Notre Dame, Dunne learned that the Congregation of Holy
Cross, his order, would be sending him to Rome for advanced studies in theology.
Interestingly, Dunne found that he could be receptive, and even hospitable, to places
inasmuch as those places could be the loci of others’ perspectives. Dunne would therefore
look back on his initial journey to Rome as an exercise in passing over, “first of all to the
14. Ibid, 22.
15. Ibid, 23.
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ancient city of Rome, entering into the journey Virgil describes in the Aeneid…The
illustrious men and women of ancient Rome…were the dead for me. I was seeing them as
immortal souls, not just as figures living in our memory of them…”16 In coming back
from this venture in passing over, of course, Dunne was coming into the Rome of the
present and his theological studies at the Angelicum. Dunne had decided to study there
given the importance of Aquinas in Dominican theology, but his continuing desire to do
with modern thought what St. Thomas had done with classical thought apparently left
Dunne dissatisfied with the Angelicum’s “closure of theology on the Summa, and so he
“decided to transfer after that first year to the Gregorian, the Jesuit school of theology in
Rome.”17 This decision would prove to be of momentous significance for the later
trajectory of Dunne’s thought.
After his first summer break in Europe, Dunne returned to Rome. This again
struck him, later on, as having been a “process of passing over, now to Renaissance
Rome as well as to ancient Rome.” Dunne found himself passing over, in particular, into
the method of Leonardo and Michelangelo, as he saw it, “seeing the human body in terms
of the universe and seeing the universe in terms of the human body.”18 After the
following summer and return to Rome, Dunne found himself “passing over now to
modern Rome and modern Catholicism in its crisis of renewal in the last days of Pope
Pius XII.”19 This apparently involved reading the works of those theologians, like de
Lubac, at the forefront of the Catholic ressourcement as well as leading Protestant
16. Ibid, 29.
17. Ibid, 30.
18. Ibid, 31.
19. Ibid, 32.
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thinkers such as Karl Barth. Dunne learned that Barth was working on his own
magisterial work of systematic theology, and entertained the idea of asking to study with
him. When that idea did not come to fruition (Dunne does not get into details here), he
asked to remain at the Gregorian, in order to write his dissertation under the direction of
Bernard Lonergan.
Lonergan’s Influence on Dunne
It was around the time of Dunne’s ordination in December 1954 that he first heard
Lonergan’s lectures in Rome. Dunne would recall that “I knew him in his earlier period
when he was writing his book Insight and before he did his later and more systematic
work Method in Theology.”20 It was Lonergan, ultimately, who suggested Dunne’s
dissertation topic: “on the idea of participation in the theology of Saint Thomas.”21
Dunne’s first attempt to finish his dissertation was not altogether successful, as he tried to
do it somewhat hurriedly, relying largely on what he already knew from his annual
readings of the Summa. “Lonergan rejected this version of my thesis and told me to do it
over again, this time examining all the texts where Saint Thomas speaks of participation.
So I began a laborious process of writing down all the passages on participation and
collecting them into piles according to subject…”22 Being, Dunne found, was simply that
something, or rather all things, exist. How things exist, however, is through participation
in Being. “According to Saint Thomas, moreover, God is Being by essence not just by

20. Ibid, 35.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
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participation. The whole wonder of existence thus is concentrated in God. Everything
other than God participates in Being and has its own mode of participation.”23
Lonergan’s influence on Dunne extended much further—or perhaps deeper—than
simply having a role in selecting a dissertation topic or even in the crafting of that
dissertation. Lonergan aspired to a knowing of knowing, a turn to the subject. Dunne,
even decades before the publication of his spiritual autobiography, undertook his
theologizing with a considerable degree of attentiveness to self. Dunne, for instance,
would say that his ‘search for God in time and memory’ would be akin to writing an
autobiography. This “would involve you in a process of bringing time to mind.” This,
eventually, would “carry you to the edges of your life, backward to birth and forward to
death; it would give you a sense of your lifetime being a part of a larger time…You
might compare your life with other lives that seem somewhat parallel; you might even
compare it with lives out of epochs long past. You might wonder how far your story is
simply the perennial human story…”24
Indeed, Dunne seems to have been captivated by Lonergan’s insight into insight,
his idea of understanding as “insight into image. Thus faith seeking understanding
became for me faith seeking insight into the great images of faith, especially life and light
and love, the three great metaphors of the Gospel of John.”25 Dunne would not, however,
appropriate Lonergan’s vocabulary or his thought without adding his own distinctive
flair. Indeed, this is typical of Dunne’s ability to make room in his own thinking for the
23. Ibid, 36.
24. John S. Dunne, A Search for God in Time and Memory, (Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1977), vii, viii.
25. John S. Dunne, The Circle Dance of Time, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press,
2010), 1-2.
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insights of others: “Later I came to my own notion of insight as what happens when the
reasons of the heart become known to the mind. It became essential for me then to
explore the realm of the heart and to understand the human heart and the heart’s desire.”26
It is especially—and certainly not surprisingly—in Dunne’s earlier works where
Lonergan’s influence is clearest. Citations to Lonergan’s work are relatively rare in
Dunne’s books. Nevertheless, it would be difficult to miss the imprint that Lonergan had
left on Dunne’s thinking. “A knowing of knowing would be like a view from a
mountaintop. By knowing all about knowing itself one would know in some manner
everything there is to know. It would be like seeing everything from a great height…The
knowing of knowing would mean being in possession of all the various methods of
knowing.”27 How could anyone familiar with Lonergan’s Insight not, upon reading these
words from Dunne, immediately think of Lonergan’s vision for where his theory of
human cognition might lead him? Dunne himself seems to express a similar excitement
for the possibilities: “It would mean knowing how an artist thinks, putting a thing
together; knowing how a scientist thinks, taking a thing apart; knowing how a practical
man thinks, sizing up a situation; knowing how a man of understanding thinks, grasping
the principle of a thing; knowing how a man of wisdom thinks, reflecting upon human
experience.”28Dunne, however much he may have been influenced by Lonergan, though,
falls mostly into that last category as a man of wisdom. Dunne knows that God is
typically imagined to be at the top of such a mountain. Dunne was firmly convinced,

26. Ibid, 2.
27. Dunne, The Way, 17.
28. Ibid.
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though, and indeed much of his career as a theologian reflects a commitment to the
conviction, that God was not only at the top of such a mountain. “There is a wisdom at
the bottom of the mountain, let us say, just as there is at the top. The God we imagined at
the top had a wisdom which amounted to a knowing of knowing, a knowledge which
gave him complete and inviolable autonomy. If we were to imagine a God at the bottom,
we would have to imagine him possessing a wisdom which could see through autonomy
itself.”29 Lonergan’s theory of cognition shaped Dunne’s thought to a considerable
degree, but Dunne’s style would remain very much his own. This is not to say, by any
means, that Dunne eschewed his mentor’s insistence on clarity of method in theology.
Though Lonergan had not yet written Method in Theology when Dunne studied under
him in Rome, Dunne does exhibit a tendency to be clear and up front about his method,
particularly in some of his first books after Lonergan’s Method was published in 1972.30
Dunne’s Early Work and His Debt to Aquinas
The previous section attempts to situate the work of John S. Dunne alongside that
of his dissertation director, Bernard Lonergan. The goal of this section is twofold. First, it
will aim to continue the chronicle of Dunne’s life begun earlier in this chapter by
examining briefly his earliest work as a professional theologian. Second, it will proceed
from considering the influence of Aquinas on Dunne’s early work to a broader survey of
Aquinas’s influence on Dunne’s entire corpus. Just as the previous chapters show the
degree to which Merton and Lonergan were immersed in the Catholic tradition, so too
will this section be crucial for at least beginning to demonstrate Dunne’s own rootedness
29. Ibid, 21.
30. See, for example, Dunne, Reasons, 147-152.
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in Catholicism in no small part because of his rootedness in Thomistic thought
throughout his career. Dunne’s intellectual hospitality, like that of Merton and Lonergan,
is made possible in no small part because of this rootedness.
In 1960, Dunne’s article on “Two Contemporary Approaches to Theology” was
published in Theological Studies. Within the essay, Dunne identifies and critiques the two
approaches, with the one being the analytical approach of John Wisdom and the other
being the existentialist approach of Rudolf Bultmann. “Though a Catholic will find much
to criticize in either approach,” Dunne found, “it is profitable for him to engage in
discussion of one and the other as a kind of dialogue with contemporary thought.”31
Though this article clearly does not involve the writing style that makes Dunne’s later
work so distinctive, the sentiment expressed in this statement certainly does suggest
something of Dunne’s general willingness to engage with just about anyone or anything.
As Jon Nilson has observed, Dunne’s later works of theology are notable for his tendency
to venture off of the beaten path as far as sources are concerned: “the ‘sources’ of
Dunne’s theology are not often the typical ones of Scripture, dogma, Fathers, councils,
and great figures of the theological traditions.”32
Aquinas, however, proves to be the clear exception. It has already been said that
Dunne’s habit of studying Aquinas annually was established early on, and that he
eventually settled on the Thomistic theology of participation for a dissertation topic. In
1957, Dunne published a summary of his dissertation in Theological Studies under the
31. John S. Dunne, CSC, “Two Contemporary Approaches to Theology,” Theological Studies, 21
(1960), 46.
32. Jon Nilson, “Doing Theology by Heart: John S. Dunne’s Theological Method,” Theological
Studies, 48 (1987), 83.
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title “St. Thomas’ Theology of Participation.”33 Finding that humanity could be by nature
only what it could be by participation in God’s own essence as pure act of being, Dunne
discovered that humanity had been created with, as it were, a capacity for God. Though
this essay is written entirely within the typical style and conventions and Thomists of the
era, there is nevertheless something to that notion of man’s capacity for God that would
prove essential for Dunne’s later work and especially his notion of passing over.
In A Search for God in Time and Memory, Dunne’s second book and the first
wherein he explicitly attends to his strategy of passing over, Dunne wonders if that
passing over may be a key for understanding another person. “I must die with him and
rise with him again; I must pass over with him from the standpoint of life to that of death,
and then I must pass back with him from the standpoint of death to that of life.” To
Dunne, this was hardly an original thought but rather was essentially Pauline. “I must do
in his regard something analogous to what Paul would have the Christian do in regard to
Christ: be buried with him in death in order to be raised with him unto life.”34 At this
point, Dunne’s reflections on passing over had brought him, obviously, quite close to the
heart of traditional Christian doctrine. If, as Dunne found in his doctoral work, a person
has a capacity for God (through participation in God’s being), in what way is that
capacity impacted or shaped by the Incarnation? What would it mean, in other words, to
have a capacity for Christ?

33. John S. Dunne, CSC, “St. Thomas’ Theology of Participation,” Theological Studies, (18)
(1957).
34. Dunne, Search, 19.
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It is unsurprising that Dunne is reminded, only a few pages further into A Search
for God in Time and Memory, of Paul’s hauntingly beautiful hymn to Christ’s kenosis in
the Letter to the Philippians. The “logic” of Christ’s kenosis and subsequent exaltation,
Dunne posits, is that of “the man who loses himself as God in order that man may be
born in undergoing the passion of God, for it is the passion of God to lose oneself as God
in order that man may be born. So the ‘name that is above every name’ belongs to such a
one, that is, the name of the Lord.”35 Dunne sees something similarly kenotic in the
passing over he attempts: “we have first to pass over from our standpoint to (Jesus’s), and
only then will we be able, passing back to our own standpoint, to participate in his
kenosis and exaltation.”36 Obviously, Dunne is speaking here of passing over to the
perspective of Jesus37 Himself. Dunne’s use of the word participate in this statement,
though, is a clear indication of the early work he had done to finish his doctorate. To pass
over, which again is Dunne’s method of intellectual hospitality, was not so much a
temporary abandonment of Dunne’s Catholic perspective so much as it was a (however
imperfect) reflection of and participation in the being of a God Who is revealed in Christ.
Dunne also remained, throughout his career, captivated by Aquinas’s vision of a
person’s spiritual journey: “a great circle going from God to God with the figure of Jesus
as the way.”38 As he passed over to the religion of the poor, Dunne believed that
“everything is converging upon Omega, or really upon Alpha: our journey together in
35. Ibid, 22.
36. Ibid, 25.
37. While Dunne does occasionally speak of passing over into the earthly experiences of Jesus of
Nazareth (see John S. Dunne, Reading the Gospel, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1978),
99-100), he most often discusses passing over to Jesus as a means of entering, insofar as one can, into the
relationship of the Son and Father.
38. Dunne, Reasons, 19.
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time is toward the sources of life.”39 In the estimation of Paul Kollman, CSC, Dunne’s
final book (for which Kollman wrote the preface) was shaped in large part by the same
image of a circular journey, an “embracing paradigm of emanation from God and return
to God…”40 For Dunne at the end of his career, this vision from Aquinas was at the very
heart of his understanding of how to carry out Christ’s Great Commandment. To love
God with all of one’s mind, Dunne reckoned, was to come “to a peaceful vision of
everything coming from God and everything returning to God and Christ as the way…”41
Similarly circular is the relationship between knowing and loving, which also
comes up several times in Dunne’s writing: “we take things in by knowing them, and
from there to the heart, as knowing leads into loving, and from there back to the things of
life, as we go out to things by loving them. Then the circle goes round again, as the
loving leads into new knowing and the knowing into new loving.” Does this have an
impact on Dunne’s central method of passing over and coming back? “When I enter into
a sharing of life with others, I am entering into this round dance of mind and heart, letting
others have a mind and heart-changing effect upon me.”42
Dunne would return to this cycle of knowing and loving again in his 1993 book
on the contemplative life (in which, incidentally, Dunne acknowledged “getting my
conception of the contemplative life more from Aquinas,” even as it had an Augustinian

39. John S. Dunne, The Church of the Poor Devil, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press,
1982), 102.
40. John S. Dunne, Dark Light of Love, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2014), vii.
41. Ibid, 58.
42. Dunne, Poor Devil, 135.
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flavor to it as well).43 The book was written in the wake of a dream Dunne had in which
he encountered Aquinas, and asked him “Do we love with a love we know or with a love
we do not know?”44 Knowing, according to Aquinas, “brings the things we know into us,
but loving takes us out to the things we love.”45 Dunne makes clear that this circle is not
unrelated to the first circle of moving away from and then toward God. Instead, “It is like
the great circle of love coming from God and returning to God. In fact, as loving becomes
knowing and knowing becomes loving, the circle of the soul becomes in us the great
circle of the love of God.”46
This section has demonstrated that Dunne’s entire method of passing over is
undertaken not as something apart from or even moving away from Dunne’s own
commitment to the Catholic faith. Instead, it seems, Dunne’s passing over is a reflection
of his prolonged study of Aquinas, and was part and parcel of his attempt to participate in
the being of God, Who is revealed in Christ. Before delving into the specific instances of
passing over that characterize Dunne’s various works, the next section of this chapter will
try to establish the full breadth of the possibilities of passing over. Once the full
‘landscape’ of passing over is mapped out, the succeeding sections will profile Dunne’s
more substantive experiences of passing over.
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Dunne’s Method: Passing Over and Coming Back
For Bernard Lonergan, a method was “a normative pattern of recurrent and
related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results.”47 Jon Nilson argues that
Dunne’s method, unique though it is, fits Lonergan’s definition of method, and therefore
“deserves more serious attention and a more prominent place in the contemporary
theological conversation than it has been given so far.48 This section, proceeding as it
does from a perspective of agreement with Nilson’s contention, will echo and seek to
augment Nilson’s own work to describe of what, exactly, Dunne’s method consists.
Though Dunne’s work can often seem inextricably linked to his own life story, Nilson
rightly sees value in Dunne’s position that “My method is my journey.”49 With the
journey on Dunne’s mind being, essentially, life, perhaps instead of seeing Dunne’s work
as a highly unique expression of an individual prone to thinking theologically about his
own life, it may be better understood as an expression of the experience of all of us?
“The sense of a complete relativity of standpoints,” Dunne observes, “a relativity
such that no standpoint, fixed or shifting, is the true standpoint, seems characteristic of
the twentieth century.”50 Over the course of a person’s life, one’s standpoints change a
great deal. As Nilson summarizes, Dunne believes “the quest for understanding is not like
exploring unknown terrain from one fixed perspective. Instead, it is a journey in time
from standpoint to standpoint, each of which illumines more of the unknown.”51 Passing
over, then, was the means by which Dunne would seek to complement the standpoints of
his own experience with those of others, further helping him to illumine the unknown.
47. Lonergan, Method in Theology, 4.
48. Nilson, 65.
49. Ibid.
50. Dunne, Search, 66.
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“Passing over means entering into the standpoint of another person, age, or culture and
thereby gaining new understanding. Passing over means temporarily adopting another
and different perspective on common concerns and thus discovering truths about oneself,
others, and God which would not have been found solely within the confines of one’s
own standpoint.”52 Upon coming back to his own standpoint, of course, Dunne would
find that that standpoint was not really the same as it had been, “because it has been
expanded and enriched by the truths discovered in passing over.”53 Only God’s
standpoint is absolute, though one can discover something true in every standpoint of his
life, and from every standpoint to which he passes over and then comes back. That
passing over is an exercise in intellectual hospitality ought to be clear. There is an
openness required to pass over, a willingness to be vulnerable in the face of what the
other sees, knows, and has experienced. Where did Dunne’s hospitality lead him?
Dunne’s first book, The City of the Gods, was not the book he had initially
planned to write. Dunne envisioned, at first, a book on the political theology of the
ancient Greek city-states. As Nilson puts it, Dunne “had evidently planned a massive
undertaking whose accomplishment would have consumed years.”54 Dunne would
discover, however, that such a task, wherein “the viewpoint from which the work was to
be written was fixed” and “the topics were clear and the method ready to hand,” could
not inspire him to see it through to completion.55 Having recently turned thirty, Dunne
found that the confrontation with the problem of death, and not political theology, was his
52. Ibid, 71.
53. Ibid, 71-72.
54. Ibid, 67.
55. Ibid.
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primary interest. Dunne’s curiosity regarding death was fanned by his reading of the story
of Gilgamesh, in which the ancient hero traveled the world seeking an avenue to
immortality. Though Dunne does not use the language of ‘passing over’ and ‘coming
back’ in The City of the Gods, he was able to see later that that was, nevertheless, exactly
what he had done in that book. He had “engaged in passing over to cultures. I compared
cultures there in terms of their answers to death.”56Or, as he put it again several years
later, “I had passed over to times in my first book…”57 For the reader familiar with some
of Dunne’s later work, there is no doubt that The City of the Gods can be seen clearly
(and quite early on) as an exercise in passing over. Dunne remarks in his preface that
“Homer said of Odysseus that ‘he saw the cities of many men and learned their mind.’
We shall be seeking in our fashion to do just this, to see the cities of many men and learn
their mind, only to us the cities of men will be cities of gods more than of men because
we shall be seeking like Gilgamesh to learn their mind on life and death…”58
One no longer needs to read between the lines to find passing over in Dunne’s
next book, A Search for God in Time and Memory. “Passing over to other lives and times
became a conscious project for me in writing this second book, and coming back with
new insight to my own life and times.”59 Whereas he had passed over to cultures in his
first book, in the second Dunne “became engaged in passing over to lives. It was there
that I began to use the term ‘passing over’ and began to study the different standpoints,
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biographical and autobiographical, from which a life can be understood.”60 Nilson notes
that passing over is one of three facets of Dunne’s overall method, along with the
aforementioned equation of method with journey, and, as Dunne puts it “a process of
eliciting images from feelings, attaining insight into those images, and converting
insights into a guide for life.”61 While Dunne occasionally uses one of these three aspects
independently of the others, he will also use “passing over and coming back to refer to (a)
conjunction of all three components.”62
In his third book, The Way of All the Earth, Dunne passes over to religions.. To
pass over into the great religions of the world, Dunne would write three decades later, is
to enter into the “shaking of the foundations that they bring about. Buddhism shakes the
foundations of the self…Christianity shakes the foundations of life and death…Islam
shakes the foundations of our will and purpose.”63 How, or perhaps why, is a passing
over to the religions possible when they often seem separated by a gulf that may at once
seem both spiritual and doctrinal? It is possible, Dunne writes, “in virtue of (the) common
experience of a center of stillness surrounded by silence…There is a unity of religious
experience, therefore, as well as the ‘varieties of religious experience,’ and the unity is
that of the heart as our center of stillness surrounded by silence, while the varieties are
those of the reasons of the heart known in the various religions.”64 As Dunne put it more
directly elsewhere, “the great religions each consist of unique insights into the common
experience of humanity. There is a depth in common experience, I want to say, that is
60. Dunne, The Way, xi-xii.
61. Nilson, 69.
62. Ibid, 70.
63. Dunne, Journey, 47-48.
64. Dunne, Circle, 11.
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revealed in the great religions.”65 Or, again, “The possibility of passing over seems to
imply that each man is somehow all men, that each life is somehow all lives.”66 Every
person to whom Dunne might pass over, then, “is a microcosm, that…reflects the whole
universe from a particular standpoint.”67
In 1978, Dunne took a voyage through South America that included a five day
journey up the Amazon. This trip would prompt Dunne’s next experiment in passing
over, which is memorably documented in The Church of the Poor Devil. At its most basic
level, the passing over Dunne undertook in South America was simply a “passing over
from one social class to another.” He was also passing over, though, from one culture to
another, and “ultimately, as it turned out, from personal religion, as I now see my own
starting point, to the religion of the poor.”68 Interestingly, though, Dunne never seems to
have lost sight of the fact that any human standpoint that seems absolute is necessarily
illusive. The absolute standpoint, and the standpoint to which Dunne was aspiring,
belonged to God. “So the mystery of encounter involved me in an encounter with popular
religion as well as with the great religions, and an encounter with women as well as with
men, but my thou was never really other than God, and my journey was always a journey
with God in time.”69 Dunne would come to see passing over as an expansive method of
theological reflection, encompassing even something so simple as reading, which
“becomes a passing over into the thoughts, the lives, the times of others.”70 Even with
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passing over covering so much ground as to involve Dunne’s reading, the God Who is
revealed in Jesus seems always to serve as the backdrop of Dunne’s method. It has
already been seen how passing over builds upon Dunne’s early work on the theology of
participation found in the writings of Thomas Aquinas. Dunne sought to participate in the
being of God, and that, Dunne found, depended on his willingness to pass over to Jesus
Himself: “It is a matter of entering into his relationship with God, letting his God be our
God, letting his thou become our thou and his I am become our own I am so he can say
‘I in them and thou in me.’”71
This section has tried to survey the full territory covered by John Dunne’s notion
of passing over and coming back. This method has been traced through the course of
Dunne’s major works, and it has been seen how his method was an essentially hospitable
one, enabling him to engage with other people, places, cultures, and eras. Sometimes this
passing over involves actual travel, sometimes it involves encountering the other face to
face, sometimes it is conducted through reading. Ultimately, though, it points Dunne back
toward the standpoint of God, a standpoint illuminated by the person of Jesus. At this
point, now that the broadest contours of passing over have been sketched, it is necessary
to delve deeper into some of the specific instances of passing over so as to see Dunne’s
method ‘in action.’
The City of the Gods
Dunne’s first book, The City of the Gods, was published in 1965. Intending to
write a work on ancient political theology, Dunne received a grant for a year of research
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and writing at Princeton. As he read the classics at Princeton, however, Dunne found
himself focusing his attention on something far closer to home than ancient political
theology: “my feelings were all about my youth passing and my life opening up before
me to death.”72 Passing over and coming back are not explicitly mentioned anywhere in
this book, but it seems that by the time he was nearly through with the writing, Dunne
had formulated a question that would spur much of the theological work he would pursue
for the remainder of his career: “If I must some day die, what can I do to satisfy my
desire to live?”73
Reading the classics, in particular The Epic of Gilgamesh, had prompted Dunne to
take his earlier focus of ancient political theology and re-direct it toward asking how
various societies throughout history had grappled with the certainty of death. It is no
great wonder, then, that Dunne would focus a considerable part of his book on
exploring—or, as the older Dunne would have put it, passing over to—the myths of these
societies. “What we call ‘myths’ at the present time…are usually expressions of the
experience of earlier times, and what we are willing to regard as myths current in our
own time are for the most part what we recognize to be survivals or revivals of these
earlier myths.” The myths, as Dunne saw clearly, cannot properly be understood as
artifacts that existed only on the fringes of the societies that created them. “It will not be
the accessory elements of our own culture which will be regarded as myth in the
future…but the most important element of it, the measure by which we judge earlier

72. Dunne, Journey, 41.
73. Dunne, City, v.

219

myths to be myths, the standpoint which makes the modern man modern.”74 Reading
Gilgamesh led Dunne to look at these various myths as solutions to the problem of death,
something with which all societies have obviously had to contend.75
Dunne no doubt saw something of his own experience in the story of Gilgamesh.
At first, Dunne found, Gilgamesh “suffers from the common illusion of being immortal,
regarding death as something which happens to people in general not to himself in
particular. After he had come face to face with death too many times to retain this
illusion, Gilgamesh “sets out to acquire a name and a fame that will live on after his
death.” Perhaps that way something of him might survive as a lasting testament to
accomplishments, or at least to his existence. The story, though, is dominated largely by
the third stage, “in which his whole existence becomes a desperate quest for life
everlasting.”76 For Dunne, Gilgamesh was much more, therefore, than simply the product
of his own time, or his own culture. Instead, Gilgamesh became an “image not only of
archaic man but of man himself because we can discern in his stark figure the reason why
no standpoint has remained the leading edge of human experience for long.”77 As epoch
gives way to epoch throughout history, as societies put forth different solutions to the
problem of death, humanity never, Dunne contends, ultimately breaks out of Gilgamesh’s
shadow.
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Passing over to ancient Egypt, Dunne finds the pyramids “standing witness to the
Egyptian concern over life after death.”78 The Egyptians were able to see a possibility for
life after death insofar as “identity was believed to consist in physical individuality and
was thought therefore to be conserved as long as the body was preserved in the tomb.”79
Obviously, the ancient Egyptians were not constructing pyramids for everyone and
anyone. Rather, the common people were seen to share “vicariously in the experience of
the king,” who “lived the life which had been lived by the dead king…”80 The aggregate
of these deceased individuals, it seems, became “an anonymous collectivity consisting of
all the dead who had become Osiris.”81 Graves were robbed, however, and some bodies
were not protected or preserved forever. Feeling cut off from their past, then, the
Egyptians no doubt found their solution to death to be wanting.
Passing over next to ancient Greece, Dunne finds in Homer a very different
answer to death, predicated in no small part on a very different relationship between the
people and their gods. Whereas earlier peoples might have waged war so as to capture a
goddess whose residence was claimed by two cities, Homer writes instead of Helen, a
goddess fallen down to the human level. This development points, Dunne contends, to
“The despair of all fellowship with the gods…”82 Dunne finds in Homer a contention that
war, since it cannot be fought to win proximity to the gods, is essentially absurd. When
Odysseus rejects, in the Odyssey, the goddess Calypso, he proposes a solution to the
problem of death rather different than that of the Egyptians. He chose “to be happy and
78. Ibid, 17.
79. Ibid, 219.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid, 21.
82. Ibid, 34.
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die rather than to be unhappy and live forever.”83 Though this seems to be, at first, a
renunciation of the quest for immortality undertaken by Gilgamesh, Dunne finds that it is
rather “not because he had no desire for immortality but because he did not want an
immortality which could be attained only through the experience of death. What he
wanted was an indefinite prolongation of his earthly existence.”84 For Odysseus, this
would have been a prolongation of his earthly existence at home.
Dunne surveys the confluence of historical factors that lead to the idea that the
soul is immortal, and notes how this new conviction altered the urgency of the problem of
death: “Once the soul is considered immortal, though, and thought to enjoy something
more than a ghostly existence after death in a nether world, the desire for the boundless
perpetuation of the present life tends to lose its force.”85 From there Dunne finds the
rationale behind the development of Socratic and Platonic philosophy, as well as various
forms of Eastern mysticism. Instead of satisfying the desire to live, these schools of
thought advocated a renunciation of the will to live and recommended one engage instead
“in what Plato and Socrates call the ‘practice of dying.’”86 In Christianity, too, Dunne
sees similarities to these other mystical perspectives. These similarities seem to be
outweighed by “Some fairly salient divergencies,” however. Namely, Christianity’s
“denial of reincarnation, of fate, of dualism, and of immortality apart from God” tends
“to destroy the significance of mysticism as an escape from the present life.”87
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But what of Christianity’s answer to the problem of death? With its doctrine of
only one God, and that this God is, in fact, the God of the living (to whom even the dead
are alive), Christianity did not so much offer a new answer to the problem of death as it
changed “the very terms of the problem.”88 A post-death existence that appears attractive
no longer seems so clearly to be a thing worth strenuously avoiding. Dunne passes over
to a number of other ancient and medieval perspectives before bringing The City of the
Gods to a close, but it is telling that the end brings him back again to Christianity. Is this
end the equivalent of Dunne’s later notion of coming back? After learning how various
peoples answered the problem of death, the end of the book finds Dunne haunted by
Christ, rather than Gilgamesh. “Not having the power to lay down his life and take it up
again, man cannot know about Christ’s Resurrection the way he knows about facts which
correspond to what he himself knows how to do or experience.” “What man should do if
he must some day die is be willing to lay down his life.”89 If one lays down his life as it
is, and relies on God to take it up again, “released from all evil,” he will discover that
which is, in Dunne’s estimation, “man’s last and best hope, the hope Christ has brought
to him, the Christ who said ‘I am the resurrection and the life; he who believes in me,
though he be dead, shall live; and whoever lives and believes in me shall never die.”90
This initial, academic foray into the method of passing over is a clear indication of how
expansive Dunne’s intellectual hospitality could be. To pass over into another
civilization, Dunne shows himself capable of immersing himself in the perspective of an

88. Ibid, 149.
89. Ibid, 228, 229.
90. Ibid, 230.

223

entirely different (and oftentimes extinct) culture, bringing the fruits of those experiences
back into his assessment of Christianity.
A Search for God in Time and Memory
Dunne’s second book, A Search for God in Time and Memory, was suggested to
him by the method he followed in the The City of the Gods. “I thought at first that
individuals would simply be instances of the answer to death in society, but then I saw
how personal memory of the past meant a similarly personal anticipation of the future.”91
Rather than seeing people merely as microcosms of their societal context, Dunne begins
in his second book to consciously pass over to the lives of other individuals. This may be
seen as a more daring practice of hospitality than that which involved passing over to a
culture: it is surely harder to be open to concrete individuals—with all their flaws—than
to more abstract groups of people. The hope, for Dunne, was to shed light on what he
could not see by learning what others could.
At the very beginning of A Search for God in Time and Memory, Dunne tells—or
perhaps warns—his reader that the journey is to be an intense one. “It is a search that will
carry us on quests and journeys through life stories, through hells, purgatories, and
heavens, through ages of life, through stories of God. It is the sort of thing you might
undertake if you were writing an autobiography or composing a personal creed.”92 As
such, time was clearly very much on Dunne’s mind. His path through this book would
require him to be attentive to his life, to his memory, to the way that his lifetime fit into
time as such. The kind of self-awareness that would come from this attentiveness to self,
91. Dunne, Journey, 43-44.
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Dunne argues, will enhance “greatly your ability to understand lives other than your own.
You find yourself able to pass over from the standpoint of your life to those of others,
entering into a sympathetic understanding of them, finding resonances between their lives
and your own, and coming back once again…”93 Whereas Jesus was something that
Dunne seemed to rediscover at the end of The City of the Gods, He is rather more
conspicuously present here, as if always looming on the horizon. For “It is by passing
over that a man makes contact with Jesus, becomes contemporary with Jesus, and it is by
coming back to himself from this that Jesus in turn becomes contemporary with him.”94
It is important to remember, though, that none of this is to say that death was no
longer on Dunne’s mind. To reflect on one’s life, after all, may certainly involve
reflecting on the end of one’s lifetime. Instead, A Search for God in Time and Memory is
still quite obviously the work of someone trying to satisfy his desire to live, despite the
inevitability of death. Passing over to St. Paul, Dunne finds a perspective on death which
obviously continued to be highly influential down through the time of the Protestant
Reformation and even down to the present. “The sting of death is sin,” Paul memorably
declares to the Corinthians.95 The antidote, then, to death’s sting is the righteousness
found in reliance upon Christ’s own faithfulness. All people, according to Paul, deserve
to die, because all people are unrighteous. “Evidently,” Dunne concludes,
“unrighteousness gives death its sting by making a man worthy of death and making him
know that he is worthy of death. The sting is the consciousness that one is worthy of
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death. What righteousness does, consequently, is not to eliminate death itself but to
eliminate this worthiness of death.”96 The quest for justification, something which Paul
clearly believed could not be conferred on the self by the self, was a “quest for divine
acceptance.”97
Jesus challenged the earlier, Pharisaical conceptions of God and God’s justice in
that He, despite being condemned to die via crucifixion, was unconditionally accepted by
God. For Paul, therefore, “The news about Jesus…was the revelation of a God who was
righteous in a way quite different from that which would have been expected by a
Pharisee.”98 For Dunne, then, to pass over from his modern standpoint to that of the New
Testament was to go from being “responsible for making our lives unacceptable or only
conditionally acceptable to a standpoint where we appear to be unable to make our lives
unconditionally acceptable.”99 Coming back, though, Dunne finds that Christ, “by his
willingness to be our fellow, appears to have brought unconditional acceptance to us.”100
It is unsurprising that Dunne passes over next to St. Augustine, and it is also
unsurprising, given the nature of A Search for God in Time and Memory, that Augustine
would have tremendous influence over Dunne’s thinking. In thinking about his life back
to its beginning, Augustine had been led to think back even further, to the very beginning
of everything. This is why Augustine’s Confessions end with chapters on memory and
time. It was St. Augustine’s Confessions, therefore, that suggested to Dunne the title of
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his second book.101 Unlike Paul’s story, Augustine’s strikes Dunne as possessing a
“genuinely archetypal character,” because it “is told (as) a story of experience, of the
running of a gamut of experience, rather than as a tale of unique deeds and
achievements.”102 It is this focus on experience rather than deeds, Dunne posits, that led
Augustine to carry his search for God “to the outermost limit of his past experience, to
the nothingness that preceded his conception and birth. It is here that he finds God.”103
This nothingness brought Augustine face to face with his own contingency, his own
dependence on God for his very being. In this contingency, Dunne argues, Augustine saw
common ground shared by himself and the entire world, finding himself “in some real
sense contemporaneous with the beginning of time.”104
In passing over to the standpoint of the modern person, Dunne observes how
remarkable it is that “Christ has been able to remain the archetypal man of Western
civilization in its transition from medieval to modern form.”105 Whereas medieval people
could experience mediation between themselves and God in both spiritual and temporal
affairs, the Reformation and ‘Revolution’ broke these structures of mediation down and
led to a drastic restructuring of life in the West. As the preeminent Mediator between God
and humanity, though, Christ could be the gold standard for the medieval mediators but
also for the alienated person of modern times. As Dunne observes, “The words ‘My God,
my God, why have you forsaken me?’ which Christ uttered upon the cross, have become
meaningful to modern man in his unmediated existence in a way that they could not be to
101. Dunne, Journey, 45.
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the medieval man living in the hierarchical world of mediation.”106 The loss of mediation
between the human and the divine in early modern times leaves the individual exposed to
the brilliant glare of divine scrutiny, Dunne finds. Passing over to the standpoint of
figures as diverse as Luther, Erasmus, Calvin, John Wesley, and John Bunyan, Dunne
explores the different means of coming to terms with the loss of spiritual mediation.
From there, Dunne passes over the standpoints of the autonomous man, the
human person in an age after the temporal mediators of medieval lord and king no longer
stood between her and the God of the living. In particular, Dunne surveys the
perspectives of Rousseau, Wordsworth, and Goethe, with plenty of insights from
Nietzsche, Jung, and Sartre included along the way. Indeed, Dunne discovers that the
modern man is left with the responsibility of inventing himself, “eliciting images from
feelings, attaining insight into the images and converting insight into a guide of life…”107
The Way of All the Earth
In 1968, Dunne set out on his first journey throughout South America, during
which he found his thoughts settling on a new inspiration: “‘Not to be afraid of Freud and
Marx,’ I told myself, Freud saying religion is wishful belief and Marx saying it is the
opiate of the people, but to look for insight in the great religions of humanity.”108 This
refusal to be afraid of Freud and Marx, despite their notorious antagonism toward
Christianity, is interestingly reflective of Dunne’s hospitality. Instead of throwing up
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walls and hiding behind the defenses of his own intellectual and religious tradition,
Dunne desired to seek truth wherever it could be found. Dunne determined around this
time, apparently, that his intellectual quest was aiming for understanding rather than
certainty. “The circle of truths becomes smaller and smaller on the quest of certainty, I
thought, but it becomes larger and more encompassing on the quest of understanding.”109
Dunne spent the academic year of 1969-1970 at Berkeley, where he worked on his book,
The Way of All the Earth. In this, his third book, Dunne attempts to pass over to the great
religions of the world, and into the lives of Buddha, Jesus, and Muhammad.
In the midst of this search for wisdom in the great religions of the world, Dunne
clearly refines—and amplifies—his understanding of passing over and coming back. “Is a
religion coming to birth in our time?” Dunne asks at the beginning of his preface.
Acknowledging this as a possibility, and taking Gandhi as his model, Dunne describes
passing over and labels it “the spiritual adventure of our time.”110 At no point in the book
does Dunne slip into a lazy assessment of the great religions that sees nothing but
common ground. To the contrary, Dunne is consistently clear and fair in his delineation
of the differences among the religions and the men who founded them. Nevertheless,
implied in the very method of passing over is the awareness of some commonality, some
shared experience that makes passing over meaningful in the first place, and coming back
an enrichment of some kind. Originally, Dunne recalls, “I expected that experiments with
truth would mean gaining new experiences by walking new paths…As I went on, though,
I began to realize that the experiences on which the religions were based were common
109. Ibid.
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experiences, and that the uncommon thing was insight into the experiences, the
‘enlightenment’ and the ‘revelation.’” The title of the book, taken from the King James
Version’s translation of a phrase found both in Joshua and 1 Kings, Dunne chose “to
mean the common experience of mankind and wish to say by it that the religions consist
of insight into the common experiences of mankind.”111
Taking Gandhi’s experiments with truth as his model, Dunne delves immediately
into the human problems of love and war, and examines how one’s religious instinct to
avoid both is challenged by the incarnate deity found in both Christianity and Hinduism.
Dunne imagines one climbing a mountain “to escape from love and war, for he feared
that love might so encumber and complicate his pursuit of happiness that he could never
be happy, and that war might bring on the loss of everything he already possessed and of
his hopes for the future besides.” Though one might seek self-sufficiency through
knowledge at the mountaintop, it also becomes clear that “he had lost everything else by
escaping from love and war,” so he turns around “and (starts) to make his way down into
the valley again.”112 Though Gandhi’s vow of celibacy and commitment to non-violence
might seem a part of his own escape up the mountain, Dunne contends rather that they
are part of Gandhi’s return down the mountainside. Gandhi’s celibacy was, according to
Dunne, “not a retreat from the two-person to the one-person situation so much as an
advance from the two-person to the many-person situation; (it) was an experiment in
universal love.”113 Similarly, Gandhi’s nonviolence was “not a refusal to fight so much as
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a willingness to fight with a handicap, namely without using violence, and to run thereby
a greater personal risk in the struggles of mankind; (his strategy of nonviolence) was an
experiment in courage.”114
In writing on the simple life of the religious man, Dunne’s attention turns to the
life and teaching of Buddha, for whom both the flesh and spirit could burn with desire.
“The desire that was satisfied yesterday,” Dunne learns, whether it is a bodily or spiritual
desire, “arises again today and is stronger and more insistent for having been satisfied
yesterday.”115 To live life in search of contentment, then, may well prove to be illusory.
Instead, Dunne wonders, perhaps it is well-being that ought to be the goal of the simple
life? Or possibly bliss? Dunne suggests that both Jesus and Buddha found a way to live
well, and be well, without searching for or finding contentment. Indeed, the lives of
Buddha and Jesus are quite similar in Dunne’s mind, despite the life of Jesus being
“greatly telescoped.” Buddha renounced luxury and lived the ascetic life for seven years
before finding a middle way between the two, which he spent the remainder of his life
trying to share with others. In much the same way, Jesus spent forty days in the desert
and had perhaps only a few years to spread the good news, in comparison with the four
decades of Buddha’s public life.116
The brevity of Jesus’s life poses a problem for any Christian, in that He did not
have an opportunity to demonstrate how to live the second half of one’s life. In the
example of Buddha, however, Dunne sees that “Evidently…the ultimate length of life

114. Ibid.
115. Ibid, 27.
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does not matter; the important thing is to find one’s way to bliss and then spend the
remainder of one’s life, long or short, sharing one’s insight with others.”117 But what of
the person who has already reached middle age and has yet to find bliss or the path
toward it? “Communicating whatever limited insight he has found might in fact be the
best method of searching for the way…As one communicates the limited insight one has,
one receives further insight.”118
Passing over is, again, part and parcel of what is for Dunne a quest for
understanding rather than certainty. After all, “the more intensely one seeks certainty the
more uncertain one becomes. Perhaps this is because what is sought…is a state of repose,
a repose of heart or of mind which is incompatible by its very nature with the restless
state of seeking. One can find repose only by ceasing to seek for it.” If, however, one
seeks for, say, “inspiration or movement of the heart—one is likely to find what one is
looking for.”119 If one is able to change her orientation in this way, she will no longer be
“anxiously trying to make sure of other persons,” and “no longer depressed by (her)
failure to be reassured by them.”120 Things like reaching agreement between perspectives,
or restoring confidence in one’s own perspective, will give way to goals such as attaining
insight and understanding. This will make passing over possible.
In chapter two, it was shown that Christian hospitality of any kind involves risk
on the part of the practitioner. For a practitioner of Christian intellectual hospitality like
John Dunne, the intellectual nature of his hospitality did not abolish or even minimize the
117. Ibid, 38.
118. Ibid, 39.
119. Ibid, 114, 115.
120. Ibid, 43.
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risks that he took. Perhaps he would find something he could consider superior to
Christianity, and would therefore abandon the Gospel. Perhaps he would have come to
abandon faith altogether, able to do little more than lament the lack of absolute agreement
between religious traditions. The method of passing over that Dunne both followed and
advocated, given its orientation toward understanding rather certainty, seems to have
made any risks worth taking. Of course, the practitioner of Dunne’s brand of Christian
intellectual hospitality will not be the same after having passed over. “His purity of heart,
his singleness of mind, his peace of soul, such as they are, will in the last analysis be
those of the Gospel. And yet his understanding of the Gospel will be transformed by his
understanding of the Dharma and the Koran.”121
In short, Dunne’s passing over, like all of the examples of Christian hospitality
explored in chapter two, rests in no small part on a willingness to receive even as much as
giving. Dunne argues that Jesus was, Himself, deeply influenced by John the Baptist, and
therefore suggests that the life of Jesus “can be seen as a rich and full life of giving and
receiving.” There is real danger, then, for a Christian to be unwilling to pass over. As
Dunne writes:
If I try to live a life of giving without receiving, communicating my insights to
others but unwilling to allow others to have an influence on me or to give me
anything, I find myself becoming a troubled man before others, anxious to be well
received by them, a troubled man by himself, keenly aware of the lack of intimacy
in his life, a man with a troubled body, troubled by urges of sexuality and
violence to take what he does not receive. The willingness to receive tends to
change all this. It breaks down the unwillingness which keeps others at a
distance…122

121. Ibid, 130.
122. Ibid, 182.
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The Church of the Poor Devil
During a 1978 trip through South America, his second, Dunne spent five days on
a riverboat on the Amazon. Having come across mention of a small chapel called the
Church of the Poor Devil in a guidebook, Dunne was intrigued and asked a group of
students traveling on the riverboat to help him find it. What he found was a small
wedding chapel that was officially called the Chapel of Santo Antonio. It was the
unofficial name, though, that held Dunne’s attention. “Who was the Poor Devil? I could
find no answers then, but later I became so enamored of the name and intrigued by it that
I decided to name a book for it, The Church of the Poor Devil, a book about the religion
of the poor.”123 Clearly, a great deal more than the name of a chapel had struck Dunne on
his journey. Having passed over to cultures, individuals, and religions in his first three
books, Dunne does a little bit of all three in this one. Dunne’s intellectual hospitality is
extended here to the poor he encountered, poor from very different cultures than Dunne’s
own, and with a commitment to Christianity that seemed both familiar and foreign at the
same time. As Dunne would later recall, his passing over in this book was, even here,
inseparable from the overarching quest of his life: “…the mystery of encounter involved
me in an encounter with popular religion as well as with the great religions, and an
encounter with women as well as with men, but my thou was never really other than God,
and my journey was always a journey with God in time.”124

123. Dunne, Journey, 67.
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Within the book, the Church of the Poor Devil is used by Dunne as an image for
the religion of the poor. It meant, for Dunne, “an adventure in passing over from personal
religion to the religion of the poor and coming to a vision of human misery and the
heart’s longing.”125 Dunne finds in the religion of the poor two elements, each of which
were unfamiliar—or at least different, than they were in his experience of personal
religion: human misery and the heart’s longing. Dunne sees danger in failing to
appreciate the reality of either. To take the heart’s longing as an illusion, Dunne fears it
would be “impossible for me to enter into sympathy with the sigh, the heart, and the soul
of the poor. I am left with the conditions under which the poor live, but I have no way of
getting inside the poor themselves.”126 To fail to see the reality of human misery as real
would be to fail “to understand what the heart’s longing means to the poor, living under
conditions of poverty and deprivation.”127 Throughout The Church of the Poor Devil,
Dunne attempts to take both to be real, so he might “come to a vision of the human road
as a way leading from the human condition to the heart’s desire, a way of living in our
naked humanity.’128
Dunne vividly remembers a scene from the voyage in which the two classes of
people—rich and poor—were neatly separated into two styles of living quarters on the
boat; the poor had hammocks on the lowest and middle decks, while the rich (including
Dunne) had cabins on the middle and upper decks. Passing alongside a village made up
of many little huts on the riverside, people from the village began to row out to the
125. Dunne, Poor Devil, vii.
126. Ibid, viii.
127. Ibid, ix.
128. Ibid.
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riverboat on their small canoes. While the people from the cabins just watched, the
people from the hammocks laughed, cheered, and threw clothes down for the people in
the canoes to retrieve. The people in the hammocks, Dunne concluded, already “shared a
life with the people in the canoes, while the people from the cabins stood outside of that
life.”129
The scene moved Dunne to ask if it were possible to pass over to discover the
human essence that joins such seemingly disparate groups together. “Is it possible for a
person from one social class to understand one from another…Is it possible for a person
from one society to understand one from another…?”130 Even if the only thing that
human beings have in common is that they live alone, Dunne contends, that very
aloneness is itself not nothing, and may serve as a starting point in passing over. Dunne
felt lonely at the sight of other people interacting freely with one another on the riverboat,
but seeing the cramped conditions of the poor on the boat made him realize also that he
wanted to be alone. Despite the poor’s lack of privacy, however, Dunne noticed that they
still apparently had their own thoughts and feelings: “Yet there is common ground: we
both live in the solitude of our heart. Really we live in the same solitude. It is as if we
lived in the same wilderness, the same desert or the same forest. We can meet there.”131
What is the result of such a meeting? What can Dunne, or anyone else for that
matter, gain from passing over from personal religion to the religion of the poor? Dunne
certainly experienced a broadening of horizons in passing over and coming back in this
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way: “There is an awakening of soul…I go from concern about personal destiny to
concern about the common fate, from feelings surrounding my relation to the things of
life to feelings surrounding the things themselves, the common joys and sorrows.”132
Whereas Dunne had once thought of his personal religion as an expression of his own
situation, his own aloneness, passing over to the religion of the poor led him to see how
“my longing is connected with their longing.”133 Dunne’s aloneness, or indeed the sum
total of his suffering, he found, is “my link to the suffering of humanity.”134
Christ
Throughout Dunne’s employment of passing over and coming back, he
consistently practiced an almost breathtaking degree of intellectual hospitality. Whether
he was passing over to cultures, individuals, religions, or economic classes, Dunne was
always able to consider the very best of what the other had to offer, and see how his new
insights might help illuminate elements of the human experience which may have been
obscure to him, before. Hospitality requires a willingness to make room for the other,
space within which the other might be able to become a friend. Hospitality certainly
entails an openness to sharing what one has, but it is equally dependent on an openness to
receive what the other might have to offer in return. Passing over is a clear example of
intellectual hospitality. Dunne’s investigations took him all throughout history and all
over the world. His journey, though wide-ranging, rarely gives the impression of
restlessness, however. What anchored him, and prevented passing over from becoming a
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thinly-disguised intellectual waywardness? What gave him the confidence to venture into
the hospitable embrace of others, and the strength to make room for the insights of the
other within his own intellectual home? It has been shown, already, that Dunne’s method
proceeds from an awareness of the human person’s shifting standpoint over time. With
only God’s standpoint being absolute, every perspective to which Dunne passed over had
the potential to augment his own with some new insight into the way of God’s world.
This dissertation has shown how, for both Thomas Merton and Bernard Lonergan,
intellectual hospitality is not something that is accomplished or practiced in spite of one’s
anchoring in the Catholic tradition, but is rather an expression of that tradition. Dunne’s
hospitality is no different. This chapter has demonstrated how Dunne’s early work on a
theology of participation in the thought of Thomas Aquinas contributes to his method,
developed later, of passing over. If someone exists through her participation in the being
of God, she therefore has, by virtue of her own existence, a capacity for God. The
doctrine of the Incarnation suggests this capacity has a kenotic potential. In passing over,
especially in passing over to Christ Himself, she is enabled to mirror and even participate
in Christ’s own kenosis.135
If passing over was, from the time of the first book wherein it was a conscious
method, a means of making contact with Christ, it would seem, then, that Dunne was at
no point thinking that passing over involved risking his identity as a Catholic Christian.
Intriguingly, however, Dunne remembered elsewhere that his method of coming back
apparently did, at least for a short time, leave his ongoing commitment to the Christian

135. Dunne, Search, 19, 22, 25.
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faith an open question. During a 1974 trip to the Holy Land, Dunne had an opportunity to
spend time in friendship with Jews, Christians, and Muslims and in study of Judaism,
Christianity, and Islam. “But the really transforming experience for me came when…I
went a little apart and sat reading the Beatitudes...It was as if I were meeting Christ and
he were saying ‘Follow me!’ I realized I am a Christian and not simply a universal man
who can understand all the religions.”136 What can be made of this realization? To what
extent had Dunne, truly, begun to think of himself as an entirely objective student of
religion rather than a Christian? Dunne gives us little upon which to base a clear
conclusion on this point. At the very least, though, it is fair to say that Dunne clearly had
made himself vulnerable in his passing over and coming back. If authentic hospitality
necessarily involves risk, Dunne had, undoubtedly, undertaken Christian hospitality as he
sought to engage the other.
For Dunne, to be a Christian is to enter into the relationship of Jesus and the
Father. Rather than suggesting that He takes our place in His sacrifice on the cross,
Dunne suggests that Jesus enables us to take His place. This involves an experience of
both God’s intimacy with and distance from us. “What happens in Christianity, I believe,
is that we enter into the ‘unconditional relation,’ as Martin Buber calls it, of Jesus with
his God, whom he calls Abba.”137 While the feeling of God’s remoteness can be
frightening and real, Jesus’s vantage point—and our crossing over into it—tames it with
an awareness of God’s immanence. Dunne quotes Buber again, in his observation that “If
separation ever touches (Jesus), his solidarity of relation is the greater; he speaks to
136. Dunne, Journey, 62.
137. Ibid, 65.
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others only out of this solidarity.”138 It is this vantage point of Jesus that makes
Christianity remain distinctive and appealing to Dunne. His most extensive reflections on
Jesus are found in his 2000 work, Reading the Gospel. Reflecting on his (at that point)
nearly half a century-long career as a theologian, teacher, and writer, Dunne writes that
“My own odyssey of reading and traveling has been an experience of the mystical unity
of the great religions. It is in coming back, though, and going deep in my own religion, in
planting my oar deep in the heart of my homeland that I’ve come to perceive the
uniqueness of Christianity.”139
Preliminary Conclusions
As a young man, Dunne intended to do with modern thought what Aquinas had
done in his Summa. This synthesis of knowing may never have been completed, but
Dunne nevertheless serves as a clear exemplar of the goal of a university—Catholic or
otherwise. Dunne always understands his standpoint to be a dynamic one, ready at any
time to be augmented by whatever broadening of horizons might come from passing over
into the perspectives of other people, other cultures, or other religions. For the passing
over to be fruitful, however, there must be an initial perspective and there must be an
intention of coming back to it with the fruit of what has been learned.
Dunne was, by all accounts, an accomplished professor, but his method
demonstrates less teaching than, for instance, Merton’s apostolate of friendship. This can
no doubt be attributed largely to the fact that many of the perspectives to which Dunne
passed over were perspectives of people long since passed on. Dunne does not provide as
138. Dunne, Circle, 16.
139. Dunne, Reading, 5.
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systematic a method for intellectual investigation as Lonergan, but he does propose in
passing over a method that really anyone with a standpoint might follow (even if it is
someone who has not given cognition much attention). Dunne’s intellectual hospitality is
therefore different than the other two brands surveyed by this dissertation. There would
seem to be a ready applicability of Dunne’s method for both students and scholars of
Catholic universities who seek to be hospitable in both the classroom or the public lecture
hall. Just as one might run great risk in opening up his home to a needy passerby, John
Dunne ran the risk of damaging his commitment to Catholicism as he passed over to the
various perspectives he did over the course of his career. Nevertheless, that commitment
gave him a frame of reference by which to measure the insights that he learned, and also
an intellectual home into which to invite the other in the first place. Dunne’s hospitality is
further indication of the need for a solid grounding within a tradition. One might easily be
captivated by the breadth of Dunne’s quest to pass over, but one must also appreciate the
importance of Dunne’s mooring in Catholic, and especially Thomistic, thought.
If a Catholic university is successful in welcoming students into conversation with
the Catholic tradition, students may, following Dunne’s lead, have little reason to fear the
perspectives of even the most controversial of professors, authors, or guest speakers. In
order to pass over, in effect, students need something to which to come back: they need a
place to call their intellectual home. For the Catholic intellectuals on campus, Dunne’s
brand of intellectual hospitality is certainly a call to be mindful of their role in forming
their students, but it is simultaneously a call for courageous engagement with the other.
Even for non-Catholic students there are significant ramifications of Dunne’s brand of
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intellectual hospitality. Though a Catholic university’s role is not to proselytize, all
students should be invited to run the risk of passing over into Catholic perspectives and
benefitting from anything good and true that they find within those perspectives. Indeed,
even most of the Catholic students themselves could find passing over into Catholic
perspectives to be an exercise in becoming vulnerable in the search for truth.
Though Dunne’s books do not read like those of most theologians, there is a
clearly Catholic vision running throughout his written work. He never seems to have
‘outgrown,’ for instance, the Thomistic sense of all things proceeding from and
ultimately returning to God. Also, Dunne never left Jesus out of the picture, seeking
always to make contact with Him as he sought to participate in Jesus’s kenosis by
emptying himself out through passing over to the other. Not all members of a Catholic
university community, of course, would opt to see their learning as a participation or
reflection of Jesus, but this hardly seems crucial. These same faculty and students are
already contributing to the mission and identity of the Catholic university to seek the
truth wherever it is to be found, even if they are in profound disagreement over the
Source of that truth. In the same way, the intellectual hospitality of John Dunne, though
thoroughly Catholic, can be applicable to all.

Chapter 6: Hospitality in Catholic Higher Education

Overview
Hospitality is the Christian virtue which makes room for the other to become a
friend. While this virtue is no doubt most often considered in physical terms of providing
for a guest’s bodily needs, there is in the life of the church a need for intellectual
hospitality as well. Intellectual hospitality involves the welcoming of someone with a
different worldview into conversation with mutual enrichment and even friendship being
among the goals. These goals can be achieved regardless of whether any disagreements
persist, so long as the other has been hospitably welcomed into a dialogue that involves
the practitioner of hospitality accurately reflecting his own point of view, while critically
engaging the perspective of the other to both offer and receive truth wherever it is to be
found.1 After a brief recap of the previous five chapters, intellectual hospitality and its
potential in the Catholic intellectual life of today will be considered. This consideration
will necessarily require an acknowledgement of potential limitations in the practice of
hospitality and the difficulty of cultivating intellectual hospitality as a virtue. The unique
approaches of Merton, Lonergan, and Dunne to overcoming these difficulties will be
explored before I conclude with some recommendations on how intellectual hospitality
might be promoted in Catholic higher education.
Chapter one demonstrated the need for a retrieval of hospitality and its application
in Catholic higher education. In particular, the ecclesiological shift both signaled and
1. The “cause of truth” has been described as “the honour and responsibility of a Catholic
university…” John Paul II, Ex Corde Ecclesiae, August, 15, 1990, 4, http://w2.vatican.va/content/johnpaul-ii/en/apost_constitutions/documents/hf_jp-ii_apc_15081990_ex-corde-ecclesiae.html.
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further propelled by the Second Vatican Council reoriented the relationship between the
Church and the world. With a new willingness to engage world, the Church had a greater
need for universities capable of hosting the encounter between the very best of Catholic
thought and the many other perspectives that characterize the modern world. With such
openness, however, came challenges to institutions’ Catholic identity. Faculty hiring and
invitations to speakers who might be openly antagonistic toward Catholic teaching have
raised questions about how Catholic identity is to be protected or maintained in an era
when the prevalence of vowed religious on campus can no longer serve as a sufficient
assurance of Catholic identity. At the same time, a refusal to engage with the modern
world would also confront Catholic higher education with challenges.2 Without a robust
intellectual life rising to meet contemporary circumstances, the Church’s interpretation
and presentation of the Gospel could easily grow stagnant. Catholic universities could
quickly be relegated to the second tier—or worse.
In the current context, how can a Catholic university navigate the tension between
a desire for the open inquiry proper to a university and the need for fidelity to the
Catholic tradition? The ancient Christian virtue of hospitality represents the most
significant answer to that challenge. Often enough, hospitality has been given as the
rationale for welcoming controversial speakers onto Catholic campuses. Surely
hospitality as a virtue, however, reaches far beyond the welcoming of controversial
speakers to campus and has an entire range of applications at a Catholic university. But,

2. And would run directly counter to the Second Vatican Council. See The Second Vatican
Council, “Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World,” in The Documents of Vatican II, ed.
Walter M. Abbott, S.J. (New York: Guild Press, 1966).
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what are they? And, what exactly is hospitality? Must a university’s hospitality
necessarily involve letting anything and everything happen, or can it have limits?
Chapter two described hospitality as a virtue that encourages both a strong sense
of identity and a posture of welcome to and charity toward others. Since Henri Nouwen’s
retrieval of hospitality as a virtue, it has become clear that hospitality requires a
willingness to embrace one’s own particularity in order to receive the other. One cannot
welcome someone else into his home if he is homeless, either literally or intellectually. In
order to make space where the other can become a friend, there needs to be a place where
space can be made. In the contemporary context, characterized as it is by widespread
fragmentation and specialization of knowledge, intellectual hospitality likewise requires
grounding in order to avoid being left adrift. Chapter two also noted a close, circular
relationship between hospitality and friendship. The openness that comes with hospitality
allows friends to be made, while friendship functions as a school of charity, drawing us
out of ourselves and teaching us to grow in the concern for others that makes hospitality
possible.
Chapter three presented Thomas Merton as an exemplar of how this circular
relationship between hospitality and friendship functions. The Merton who became
famous for The Seven Storey Mountain would be transformed in the 1950s by his
experience of teaching and befriending his fellow monks at Gethsemani Abbey. This
transformation instilled in Merton a new desire to share his contemplative perspective
with the world in an apostolate of friendship. Throughout the latter half of his monastic
life, Merton was able to engage with a stunning range of people with widely divergent
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perspectives. Throughout this truly hospitable dialogue, Merton displayed a constant
willingness to impart wisdom from his own Catholic tradition even as his dialogue
partners taught him a great deal in return. It was Merton’s rootedness in Catholicism that
freed him for engagement with the other.
Chapter four described the particular challenge posed to Catholic institutional
identity in Catholic higher education by the fragmentation of knowledge. Indeed, this
must also be seen as an obstacle to a Catholic university’s ability to be hospitable in that
it encourages the separation of the disciplines and limits one’s ability to see common
ground upon which dialogue might take place. This chapter described the former
prominence of the neo-Scholastic synthesis as well as its ability to synthesize knowledge
and be hospitable. With the collapse of neo-Scholasticism, Catholic higher education
lacked a unifying vision for how all knowledge might be united. Bernard Lonergan’s map
of human cognition may well represent the best potential basis for such a vision in that it
suggests a common ground beneath the methods of any and all academic disciplines. As
was the case with Merton, Lonergan’s openness to the other was not unrelated to his
commitment to Catholicism but was rather made possible because of it.
In chapter five, John S. Dunne was presented as a third and final example of a
Catholic thinker who had clearly possessed and practiced the virtue of intellectual
hospitality. Much of Dunne’s career centered on his unique method of passing over into
the perspectives of others and then coming back to enrich his initial position with the
insights he had gleaned by passing over. Throughout Dunne’s works, he passes over to
people, places, social classes, religions, and civilizations. This ability to be open to the
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other is again not something that requires an abandonment of his Catholic worldview, but
is rather an expression of his commitment to the Catholic tradition. In particular, Dunne’s
deep familiarity with Thomistic thinking led him to see passing over as reflective of his
participation in the life of the God Who is revealed in Christ.
Disagreements over Catholic identity often seem to take place between two poles:
the one is the open inquiry appropriate to the task of any university, and the other is
fidelity to the Catholic tradition and Catholic teaching. I join what is likely a healthy
majority in trying to maintain a tension between the two while offering a friendly critique
to any who would emphasize the one while neglecting the other. To those prioritizing
open inquiry, I would suggest that it is shortsighted to suppose that students can walk
before they can run. Undergraduates deserve an opportunity to situate themselves in an
intellectual tradition before they are left to consider the magnitude of knowledge to which
the university will expose them. Without such a grounding, these undergraduates will
find it very difficult to cobble together anything close to resembling a cohesive
worldview. To those primarily concerned with fidelity to Catholic teaching, I would point
out the sheer dynamism which has characterized Catholic thought down through the ages,
and more recently the thought of such Catholic intellectuals as Merton, Lonergan, and
Dunne. Indeed, Lonergan’s thinking on the importance of moving beyond a classicist
perspective on culture is helpfully illustrative on this point. The work of the Catholic
university may partially be bound up in the transmission of the wisdom of the ages, but
there is also a need for the university to conceive its work as an ongoing process of
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bringing that wisdom into a critical encounter with human learning as it continually
unfolds.3
Intellectual Hospitality
The Christian practice of hospitality has long entailed something more substantial
than simply providing for the physical needs of a stranger or guest. Of course, it would
hardly be hospitable to disregard the hunger, thirst, or discomfort of the guest in one’s
home. One of the defining characteristics of a distinctively Christian hospitality, though,
is the importance of recognition. The person knocking on the door of one’s home,
whatever their condition and however inconvenient their presence on the doorstep might
be, remains someone created in the image of God and someone for whom Christ died.
Christian hospitality recognizes, therefore, the inherent dignity and value of the stranger
or guest.
What would recognition require in the practice of intellectual hospitality? If one is
in conversation with someone of a very different intellectual or faith perspective, what
would it mean to recognize his/her dignity and value? The answer, I contend, is to
critically engage with that person’s worldview. To seek, as far as one is capable, to
understand the outlook of the other and to seek whether there is anything worth
appropriating therein. Such a critical engagement, as has been shown in the cases of
Merton, Lonergan, and Dunne, does not mean a lazy acceptance, or even tolerance, of all
that one’s dialogue partners have to say. Nor is it undertaken with the stubborn posture of
the apologist who is unwilling to see the true or the beautiful anywhere but in the mirror.
3. See Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), xixii, 123-124.
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How does one know if one is engaging critically while remaining hospitable? While this
is a difficult question, the answer may well be found in the ancient Christian insistence on
dwelling together in common life as an integral part of hospitality. If one’s critical
engagement with the other takes his/her thoughts seriously, accepting and rejecting
anything that deserves to be accepted or rejected, all the while retaining the ability to
dwell together, an authentically Christian intellectual hospitality has been achieved.
What separates intellectual hospitality from mere civility, or good manners? The
answer here seems to be that true hospitality involves feeling a loss of self.4 It challenges
us to expand our understanding of who our neighbors are, and it reminds us that those
who are different—and even those we may have once perceived as adversaries—are
people. It also has the ability to shake us out of our complacency. To enter into the
perspectives of others may well lead me to question the status quo with a clearer vision.
Intellectual hospitality may help me to ask whether cultural norms in our nation, in our
city, in our church, or on our campus actually are obstacles on my path of discipleship.
Limitations
Any discussion of limitations on Catholic intellectual hospitality will necessarily
be an uncomfortable one. To suggest that there may be limits to how hospitable a
Catholic thinker, or even a Catholic university, ought to be will no doubt strike many as
backward, and perhaps even painfully reminiscent of an earlier era in Catholic higher
education. And yet, practitioners of Christian hospitality always run into limitations, and
4. One is reminded here first and foremost of Christ’s mission, characterized by the hospitable
embrace of humanity. This mission, according to St. Paul, was a kenotic one (See Philippians 2:6-11).
Within the context of this dissertation, the clearest example of one losing the self in order to emulate Jesus
in fully engaging the other is likely Dunne. See John S. Dunne, A Search for God in Time and Memory,
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), 21-25.
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always have to come to terms with them, however painful it might be. To suggest that
intellectual hospitality might be different, that it might be possible to be intellectually
hospitable with no limitations whatsoever, may be more reflective of hubris than
hospitality.
What, then, are the limitations? Are there perspectives out there with which
Catholics simply should not engage? Are there people whose ideas simply should not be
allowed on a Catholic university campus? Are there, for instance, certain non—
negotiables in the Catechism that might serve as a shibboleth for entrance to the campus?
It would be hard, after surveying the work of Merton, Lonergan, and Dunne, to answer
any of these questions in the affirmative. And yet, all three of those thinkers were formed
in an intellectual tradition before their hospitality was sharpened. Rather than asking if
there are ‘untouchable’ perspectives out there, it seems a great deal wiser to prescribe a
more introspective path. Catholic universities might ask themselves, for instance, whether
their core curricula are, in fact, forming students, or at least encouraging them to enter
into an intellectual tradition. They might even ask whether their faculty is strong enough
in relevant areas to warrant inviting, say, a famous abortion rights activist to speak on
campus. Will the theology department be able and willing to engage students on the
issue? Are there scholars on campus with backgrounds on bioethics who might, similarly,
engage students? If a socialist politician, or a wealthy capitalist with questionable
business dealings of some kind are to be invited to speak on campus, are there members
of the faculty who will be able to lead discussions on Catholic social teaching in order to
ensure that students will be able to engage those speakers critically while also engaging
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with the best of Catholic thought? Given the diversity of Catholic institutions of higher
education, it is difficult to prescribe any ‘one size fits all’ kind of approach to intellectual
hospitality. To ignore limitations out of hand, however, seems clearly short-sighted.
Merton, Lonergan, and Dunne each suggest something about how to cultivate the virtue
of intellectual hospitality.
Merton
As a young man, Thomas Merton had been as fully immersed in the world as one
could likely be. Eventually, he would flee to the monastery so as to escape from the
world which he had written off as full of obstacles to the spiritual life. Had Merton’s
outlook never developed beyond where it was in the writing of The Seven Storey
Mountain, he would be a poor source of lessons for the Catholic intellectual life or
Catholic higher education of today. As has been shown, however, Merton’s career saw
his thinking develop tremendously, to the point where he was willing to fully engage the
world he had once left behind. A series of important eras in his life served to draw
Merton out of himself to recognize the significance of the other, and even the need for the
other in one’s intellectual (and even spiritual!) growth.
After his dismal year at Cambridge, Merton’s life took a clear turn for the better
when he enrolled at Columbia University and found a group of men with whom he had
what were likely the first substantial friendships of his life. This circle of friends
contributed much to Merton’s embrace of the Catholic faith and the Catholic intellectual
tradition, though they do not seem to have led Merton to a plan of engagement with
perspectives beyond that tradition. Instead, when Merton became Catholic and eventually
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a monk, he apparently thought that his journey had reached its climax. The experience of
teaching in the monastery, however, shook Merton out of his self-centered spiritual
sensibilities to the point where he was able to see something good in other people.
Merton’s commitment to the rhythm of monastic life and his grounding in the life of his
Trappist community helped him to see his solitude as a connectedness to God’s world.
This insight eventually led to a proliferation of interactions, both through letters
and in person, with people from all over the world and with various views of the world.
All the while his apostolate of friendship was being carried out, however, Merton seems
to have always appreciated the importance of retaining his identification with a distinctly
Catholic outlook. Indeed, his transition toward a more eremitic style of monastic life even
as he remained a monk at Gethsemani Abbey demonstrates something of a deepening of
his connection to his Catholic monastic grounding rather than a distancing. That Merton
was able to sink his roots ever deeper into solitude and his own tradition even as his
apostolate of friendship kept his attention all over the world seems to have rested on two
points. First, he realized that he would not be able to enter into meaningful dialogue with
the other if he himself did not occupy particular intellectual ground. Second, the
centrality of Christ in the Catholic worldview was crucial to Merton’s unique brand of
intellectual hospitality. He was able to develop his idea of the point vierge because of his
conviction that God could be found at the center of all people, and because he also
perceived the world as being permeated by Christ as the Word of God.
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Lonergan
A watershed moment in Bernard Lonergan’s intellectual development was his
early reading of John Henry Newman. Newman’s lesson that one should take all
difficulties head on was of immense significance to the man who would tackle such a
heady topic as human cognition (to say nothing of his other projects). Though neoScholasticism’s shortcomings are fully appreciated here, it is interesting to remember that
Lonergan learned his Aquinas while neo-Scholasticism was at its peak. While Lonergan
himself was aware of the limitations of that school of thought as it functioned at the time,
he clearly saw the value of having a philosophical framework that might synthesize all
knowledge. Rather than starting with the first principles of the Thomists, however,
Lonergan would work from the process of human knowing first, and only reason from
there to any metaphysical conclusions that might be articulated. While Lonergan’s work
required that he consider a wide range of academic disciplines and even non-academic
paths to knowledge, the goal of a synthesis of knowledge apparently made any risks
worth taking in Lonergan’s mind. Indeed, the very writing of Insight was a majestic
demonstration of intellectual hospitality in that Lonergan could not do justice to the topic
while working within the confines of how a theologian might think, or a philosopher, or
any member of any single discipline.
Dunne
John S. Dunne was well on his way to being a stylistically typical Thomistic
theologian when his thirtieth birthday led him to consider death with an intensity that
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drove the remainder of his theological reflections. Even before that, though, the roots of
his intellectual hospitality can be seen in his recollections of intending, as a young man,
to do with modern knowledge what Aquinas had done in his own time. To put it simply,
Dunne saw early on that he would have to make room in his thinking for the insights of
someone like Albert Einstein if his thinking were to be as expansive as he wanted it to be.
Though Dunne never wrote his modern Summa, he did have an illustrious career as a
teacher and author, in no small part because of his unique theological method of passing
over and coming back. In order to undertake this method, Dunne needed to be someone
to come back to. That Dunne was, like Merton, rooted in his Catholic worldview is clear.
Whatever difficulties there may have been in specific instances of passing over, Dunne
found strength in the way that passing over reflected the mission of Jesus insofar as
passing over required him to empty himself in order to enter into the perspective of the
other.
Recommendations
Intellectual hospitality certainly requires the practitioner to make room where the
other can become friend and the insights of the other can be critically appropriated into
one’s own perspective. The legacy of all three Catholic practitioners of Catholic
intellectual hospitality seems also to suggest that this hospitality must also include an
appreciation of the potential sacramentality of one’s conversation partners. Rather than
looking at the other simply as, say, a non-Catholic or even a potential Catholic, Merton,
Lonergan and Dunne each appear to have recognized the manner in which the other
might help them advance in their awareness of God’s presence in all that is true,
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beautiful, and good. Such hospitality has a number of applications on a Catholic
university campus. Scholars ought to be hospitable to those working in other disciplines,
as well as to the new ideas in their own fields that drive the academic realm forward.
Students ought to be hospitable to what will likely be a wide range of new ideas, whether
those ideas come from professors, classmates, or guest speakers. These people may very
well see the world similarly to how a particular student does, but they may not. Indeed,
some of them may even be antagonistic toward a student’s Catholic worldview, but this is
not necessarily a reason to deny them a hospitable welcome. It also does not mean that
Catholics on campus may not learn something valuable from engagement with their
ideas. The Catholic university must be hospitable to these same people, as well as to
those other members of the Church who have real questions about what a Catholic
university should be like. That devout Catholics of various sensibilities have different
notions of how a Catholic university should function is a real blessing in that it shows a
degree of vitality in contemporary Catholicism. Relatedly, the Catholic university must
also be hospitable to the local bishop, who will be uniquely well placed both to help the
university maintain its connection to the broader Church as well as communicate to that
broader Catholic community the ways in which the Church benefits from a particular
university’s work.
None of that should sound objectionable. The real difficulty comes, of course, in
cultivating this kind of intellectual hospitality on a Catholic university campus. As has
been seen, the Church has long been aware—and especially so since Vatican II—that it
needs to straddle the twin dynamics of identity and mission. The Church needs to protect
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the integrity of the Gospel, but it also needs to boldly carry that Good News into new and
potentially ever-changing contexts. Hospitality, as it has been described here, is precisely
the virtue needed to help the Church fulfill these two obligations. Catholic universities,
often on the front lines of the Church’s engagement with the world, seem to have begun
realizing this. Hospitality is often given as a justification for the presence of controversial
speakers on campus, which certainly makes sense. It is hard to imagine a strong rationale
for inviting controversial speakers without any mention of hospitality. As I have tried to
make clear, however, hospitality is, like all virtues, a difficult undertaking. To simply
throw open the doors and let whatever happens happen is not hospitality. To use
hospitality simply as an excuse for maintaining the status quo is not necessarily
legitimate, either. I have explored the work of three notable practitioners of Catholic
intellectual hospitality. In all three cases, there was clear boldness in their willingness to
engage the other, but in all three cases there was a corresponding grounding in the
Catholic tradition that made that engagement both possible and meaningful. If a Catholic
university is going to truly strive to be hospitable in a manner consistent with what
hospitality has entailed throughout Christian history, any use of the term hospitality must
imply not only an openness, but also a rootedness. Conversations cannot take place
between someone and no one.
The most basic recommendation that could be made at this point would no doubt
be for a Catholic university to ensure that students read the works of thinkers like Merton,
Lonergan, and Dunne, so that they might be given clear examples of what kind of
hospitable posture ought to characterize their own intellectual journeys during their time
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on campus. And certainly, while basic, this recommendation could certainly do
something to stimulate discussions on intellectual hospitality amongst the faculty as well.
This dissertation cannot be content to rest on this very modest suggestion, however.
Catholic universities, presumably like other institutions of higher learning, exist
for a number of reasons. At least one of those reasons is the conviction that the world
needs Catholic insights. This is comparable to Thomas Merton’s belief that the world
needed to hear the insights of a Christian contemplative. One would be hard-pressed to
produce a lengthy list of Catholic intellectuals more deeply engaged in dialogue with
non-Catholics than Merton. It is interesting and important to emphasize, then, that
Merton’s apostolate of friendship did not have its origin primarily in a desire to learn, but
rather in a desire to teach. As any Catholic educator—at any level—will no doubt echo,
however, no matter how focused one is on teaching, one will always find herself learning
from her students. For a Catholic scholar on a Catholic university campus to invite
students into a vigorous engagement with the Catholic intellectual tradition need not
imply a covert form of proselytizing. Students, even at the undergraduate level, need the
kind of intellectual formation that will enable them to find an intellectual home. The core
curriculum of a Catholic university is where this formation should happen. Certainly, the
theology department plays a key role in this engagement with the Catholic tradition, but
other departments are also responsible for leading students in an engagement with the
best of Catholic thought. An interesting place to begin this process might be in instituting,

257

for all theology majors, a required course in catechetics.5 To develop such a course on the
methods and practice of catechesis would require faculty in the theology department to
give serious thought to what well-formed Catholics ought to know, or at least to have
thought about. This could easily lead to any necessary development in the theology
department’s general education course offerings. The Catholic university, in order to be
hospitable, needs a means of ensuring that all students know the basic vocabulary of
Catholic discourse, as well as some way for students to see how that vocabulary gives
structure to the matrix of ideas that makes the Catholic tradition something distinctive.
The goal, of course, does not have to be to make all students Catholic. What must
happen, rather, is that all students see the manner in which an intellectual tradition
functions. It is not outrageous to think that, say, a Muslim student could leave a Catholic
university as a better Muslim because he has been both hospitably invited into
conversation with Catholicism as well as exposed to a detailed glimpse into how an
intellectual tradition benefits those who work and think within it. If all students on
campus are entering into a substantial engagement with the Catholic tradition, there is far
less reason to fear the presence of controversial speakers on campus, just as Merton’s
formation left him confident enough to engage meaningfully with his various dialogue
partners. The professor’s task may well demand a willingness to see students of all
backgrounds as potential friends. Given Wadell’s understanding of a circular relationship
between friendship and hospitality, this posture of openness to friendship with students

5. A similar suggestion is made in Berard L. Marthaler, O.F.M.Conv, “Catechesis Isn’t Just for
Children Anymore,” in Theological Education in the Catholic Tradition, ed. Patrick W. Carey and Earl C.
Muller (New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 1997), 62-66.
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will sharpen the professor’s ability to be hospitable to both ideas and the people who
propose them. Students will notice this hospitality on the part of their professors and will
seek to appropriate it to the extent they can. In this time that many sense to be
characterized by alienation and loneliness, to be recognized by an educator as someone
possessing dignity and capable of making valuable contributions to classroom discourse
could be a potent antidote to feelings of desperation and disenfranchisement, or even of
pessimism regarding the very possibility of truth.
Educators at all levels are routinely trained to always make students aware of the
goals of a given task or lesson. Catholic universities would do well to extend the wisdom
of this training to the general institutional mission to be a place of learning. Students
come to learn, but might benefit greatly if they are encouraged to think about what it
means for them to learn, what it means for them to know, in the first place. Lonergan’s
work on human cognition suggests that all humans, regardless of specialty or expertise,
follow a predictable pattern in coming to know what they know. It is not uncommon for
Catholic universities to require students to take an introductory philosophy course as a
part of the general education requirements. Could such a course be adapted to include a
section on knowing? If so, that might do a great deal to help students see an underlying
unity in what they learn across the disciplines. Perhaps each year the faculty in the
various academic departments could collaborate with upperclassmen majors to contribute
a unit on their particular path to knowing for the freshmen to consider with all the others
amidst an introductory course of some kind. Such interdisciplinary collaboration could
involve all on campus in a vigorous discussion on how the various disciplines fit together
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into the university’s search for knowledge. Haughey has written about the importance of
catholicity as a name for the university’s task of helping students to see how the things
they learn fit together into a whole. Haughey has suggested that, if a university,
characterized as it is by its various departments and disciplines, is to “have the plural
efforts converge into a more coherent whole,” it will be possible only if faculty
themselves “can better understand their own understandings and see that the operations of
consciousness are universal.”6
Furthermore, this is a venture that could be repeated consistently, if not each year,
especially given the constant expansion of knowledge in the modern world.7 For the
Catholic university, in particular, dedicated as it must be to highlighting the belief in the
one Source of all that is true, the fruits of such a venture could be central to how it, as
well as the professors and students who labor within it, go about loving God with all of
their minds. To have achieved the self-appropriation that Lonergan describes, to be
aware of their own knowing, will enable students to better practice intellectual
hospitality. Students will be able to more clearly articulate what they know and how they
know it, and they will also be better able to appreciate what others know, even as they
might still disagree. For modern students, accustomed as they are to talk of tolerance and
inclusion, to be invited into a university where their education will allow them such an
awareness of their own perspectives without an expectation that they must sacrifice their

6. John C. Haughey, SJ, Where is Knowing Going? (Washington: Georgetown University Press,
2009), 54.
7. As such, Catholic universities have been called to a “continuous renewal.” John Paul II, 7.
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own particularity in the interest of conversation with the other could be extremely
appealing.
I also strongly endorse the presence of interdisciplinary programs and courses on
Catholic university campuses. While such projects may not be able to fully take the place
of a synthesis of knowledge8, they can help to encourage intellectual hospitality on the
part of students, who will be asked to understand and even appreciate the insights that
come with different methods and disciplines. Additionally, interdisciplinary collaboration
of various kinds can help to foster the kind of personal relationships across disciplinary
lines that can make a university faculty a real community of thinkers and educators. As
was seen perhaps most clearly in the case of Thomas Merton, community life in general
and specifically teaching in the midst of that community life can have a tremendous
impact on an individual’s ability to look beyond the self to engage the other in substantial
ways. This willingness to engage is a beginning of hospitality and a path to potential
friendship.
It also seems that the Catholic university needs to give reflection on questions of
morality a key place in the core curriculum. While many might agree that this would be
important so as to lead students to reckon with Catholic notions of morality, it is also
likely in questions of morality that students will most clearly be led to see and appreciate
the manner in which all knowledge is tradition-bound. While this lesson could be learned
in discussion of perhaps any topic, topics pertaining to morality will likely make this

8. Which remains a goal of a Catholic University. See John Paul II, 16.
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clearer because of the sheer diversity of moral perspectives past and present.9 Regardless
of which discipline plays host to such lessons, students engaging in reflection on morality
and its implications will see the way that knowledge is mediated by traditions. This
should serve as a cornerstone of the Catholic university’s invitation to all students to
consider their own intellectual homes, Catholic or otherwise.
If the Catholic tradition is presented to students or faculty as a static reality that
has been accomplished once and for all, it will no doubt stifle inquiry and crush any real
hospitality. This was ultimately the problem with the neo-Scholastic revival of the last
century. It failed to express the full richness of the Catholic tradition in a manner capable
of engaging modern thought and incorporating critically the insights found therein. The
passing over of John Dunne is a potent reminder that to be rooted does not need to imply
an apathy toward the other or a lack of intellectual dynamism. Every standpoint is only
temporary, and we can advance from one standpoint to the next by entering into the
perspectives of others and then coming back, enriched, to our own perspective. Dunne’s
passing over represents a powerful example of how students of all backgrounds might go
through their university studies. Just as a Catholic student might find her understanding
and appreciation of the Gospel enhanced by an exploration of Hinduism or her
understanding of Catholic social teaching enhanced by a reading of Marx, so too might
the agnostic student find her worldview enhanced by discovering the manner in which the
Scriptural authors pursued some of the same questions about life that she may also be
asking. Relatedly, to be an authentically Catholic university does not mean that students
9. For commentary on the impact of history and context on moral decision-making, see Daniel C.
Maguire, The Moral Choice, (New York: Doubleday, 1978), 309-342.
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are never tasked with reading the Talmud, the Qur’an, Marx, Nietzsche, or Freud.
Instead, the hospitality of the Catholic university welcomes all into a dialogue with
Catholic thought while also modeling the importance of occupying an intellectual home.
Unlike Merton, Dunne’s hospitality proceeded primarily from a desire to learn from those
to whom he passed over. As his lengthy tenure at Notre Dame attests, however, Dunne
clearly found that this desire to learn lent itself to teaching, as well. This corresponds, of
course, to the very nature of hospitality as a Christian virtue as it has been understood and
practiced down through the ages. If hidden within my hospitality is a desire only to give
and re-form, I am not so much a host as an aspiring invader. If my hospitality is an
extension only of a desire to receive, true hospitality will be impossible because I am not
functioning as a person occupying any real space. Dialogue with me will be impossible.
For any of this to happen, it does seem necessary that a Catholic university have a
critical mass of faculty who are willing to champion the identity and mission of their
particular institution.10 It seems likely that, within that critical mass, there will need to be
a cadre of Catholic scholars who themselves are able and willing to practice Catholic
intellectual hospitality so as to model it to students and colleagues. For a Catholic
university to fulfill its obligations to the Church, the world, and its faculty and students, it
must be a community characterized by hospitality. Thomas Merton believed that if he
could unite within himself the perspectives of East and West, then a lasting unity of
peoples would ultimately be possible.11 In the same way, I suggest that a Catholic
10. Charles E. Curran, “The Catholic Identity of Catholic Institutions,” Theological Studies, 58
(1997), 108.
11. Michael Mott, The Seven Mountains of Thomas Merton, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1984),
306.
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university can only be a place of hospitality toward ideas and people if it is home to
scholars who are themselves able to practice Christian hospitality. The practice of
intellectual hospitality will give Catholic universities the language they need to function
as high-quality institutions while also witnessing to the Gospel the Christian’s vocation to
perfect love. Though some, or even many, on a Catholic university campus may not
subscribe to this vocation for themselves or their university, they may nevertheless
contribute to the university’s work simply by carrying out their regular work of teaching,
learning, or research. Just as Merton was convinced that Christ permeated the cosmos as
the Word or Wisdom of God, the Catholics on campus will know that all truth discovered
can ultimately be traced back to God.
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